scholarly journals Strategic Flexibility in Information Technology Alliances: The Influence of Transaction Cost Economics and Social Exchange Theory

1999 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 439-459 ◽  
Author(s):  
Candace Young-Ybarra ◽  
Margarethe Wiersema
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Social Exchange ◽  
Social Exchange Theory ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Exchange Theory ◽  
Strategic Flexibility ◽  
Technology Alliances

Professional Employer Organizations and Their Role in Small and Medium Enterprises: The Impact of HR Outsourcing

2003 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian S. Klaas
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Social Exchange ◽  
Social Exchange Theory ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Small And Medium Enterprises ◽  
Exchange Theory ◽  
Internal Resources ◽  
Market Governance ◽  
Medium Enterprises ◽  
The Impact

While effective HR services and programs can help firms gain competitive advantage, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) often lack the internal resources required to develop and deliver these services and programs. As a result, SMEs increasingly are outsourcing HR activities to professional employer organizations (PEOs). Questions remain, however, about the conditions under which SMEs will benefit from outsourcing HR to a PEO, as well as about the type of benefits that are potentially available. The very nature of many HR activities raises questions about the risks associated with market governance and a PEO's ability to ensure service quality for SMEs. In order for these questions to be addressed, it is necessary to understand the process by which PEO utilization affects SME outcomes. In this article, we use transaction cost economics, social exchange theory, and the strategic HR literature to develop a framework for understanding the factors and conditions likely to affect whether and how an SME will benefit from using a PEO.

Governance of supplier-customer relations: An empirical review

2007 ◽  
Vol 158 (12) ◽  
pp. 406-416
Author(s):  
Jon Bingen Sande
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Customer Relations ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Exchange Theory ◽  
Forest Industry ◽  
Relational Contracts ◽  
Relational Exchange ◽  
Exchange Relationships ◽  
Relational Exchange Theory

The forest industry is riddled with exchange relationships. The parties to exchanges may have diverging goals and interests, but still depend upon each other due to non-redeployable specific assets. Formal and relational contracts may be used to deal with the resulting cooperation problems. This paper proposes a framework based on transaction cost economics and relational exchange theory, and examines to what extent empirical research has found formal and relational contracts to deal with three different governance problems. To that end, I review the results from 32 studies in a range of settings. These studies generally support the view that exchanges characterized by high degrees of specific assets should be supported by formal and relational contracts.

Social movements and exchanges: Sketch of a theory

2021 ◽  
pp. 104346312110351
Author(s):  
Nicolás M Somma
Keyword(s):  
Social Movements ◽  
Social Movement ◽  
Social Exchange ◽  
Social Exchange Theory ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Exchange Theory ◽  
Voluntary Organizations ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Political Leverage

Using social exchange theory, this article presents a new theory for understanding the strategic choices made by social movement leaders—the “movement exchanges” theory. It looks at how leaders engage in exchanges of valued rewards with constituencies, institutional political players, bystander publics, and voluntary organizations. Leaders receive from these players important rewards (like committed activists, political leverage, and resources) for achieving movement goals. In turn, leaders make strategic choices (expressed in frames, tactics, targets, and claims) that other players find rewarding, favoring persistent exchanges across time. By considering movements’ simultaneous exchanges with several players, the theory makes sense of choices that remain puzzling for major movement theories. It also blends strategic behavior with culture (in the form of utopias, ideology, and emotions) but does not require the maximizing assumption of the homo economicus. I use the case of the contemporary Chilean student movement to illustrate the theory.

Conversation at Work

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guowei Jian ◽  
Francis Dalisay
Keyword(s):  
Social Exchange ◽  
Social Exchange Theory ◽  
Online Survey ◽  
Organizational Outcomes ◽  
Potential Interaction ◽  
Exchange Theory ◽  
Leader Member Exchange ◽  
Member Exchange ◽  
Communication Frequency ◽  
Using Data

Although research has made significant gains in understanding the constitutive nature of conversation in the process of organizing, its predictive effects on organizational outcomes are still uncertain. To contribute in this direction, based on social exchange theory and leader-member exchange (LMX) research, this study examined the predictive effects of leader-member conversational quality (LMCQ) on employee organizational commitment (OC), and the potential interaction effects of LMCQ with LMX quality. Using data from an online survey, this study found that above and beyond communication frequency and other control variables, LMCQ is significantly associated with employee OC. More interestingly, the effects of LMCQ vary based on the level of LMX quality. These findings have significant implications at both theoretical and practical levels.

Effects of suppliers’ trust and commitment on customer involvement

2015 ◽  
Vol 115 (6) ◽  
pp. 1041-1066 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi Li ◽  
Gang Li ◽  
Taiwen Feng
Keyword(s):  
Social Exchange ◽  
Structural Equation ◽  
Social Exchange Theory ◽  
Exchange Theory ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Relational Governance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Customer Involvement ◽  
Specific Investment ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationships among suppliers’ trust and commitment, transaction-specific investment, switching cost, and customer involvement within the context of relational governance mechanism and the social exchange theory. Design/methodology/approach – The authors use survey data from 214 Chinese manufacturing firms and employ the structural equation model to verify the conceptual model. Findings – Relational governance benefits customer involvement. Transaction-specific investment mediates the relationship between trust and commitment of suppliers. Switching costs negatively moderate the relationship between suppliers’ trust and customer involvement, but positively moderate the relationship between suppliers’ commitment and customer involvement. Research limitations/implications – The authors focus on two key elements of relationship, namely, trust and commitment of suppliers, but neglect other relational factors, such as relational norms and interdependence. Originality/value – These findings broaden the understanding and present new directions for the implementation of customer involvement from the perspective of relational governance and social exchange theory.

Too much is not always good: the inverted U-shaped link between green customer integration and opportunistic behavior

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Haiqing Shi ◽  
Taiwen Feng ◽  
Zhiyi Li
Keyword(s):  
Social Exchange ◽  
Social Exchange Theory ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Hierarchical Regression ◽  
Opportunistic Behavior ◽  
Moderating Effects ◽  
Customer Integration ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Relational Norms ◽  
Managerial Implications

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to explore the inverted U-shaped relationship between green customer integration (GCI) and opportunistic behavior, as well as the moderating effects of contractual control and relational norms.Design/methodology/approachThe authors conducted hierarchical regression analysis using two-waved data from 206 Chinese manufacturing firms to test hypotheses.FindingsThe authors found that GCI has an inverted U-shaped effect on opportunistic behavior. Furthermore, both contractual control and relational norms negatively moderate the inverted U-shaped relationship between GCI and opportunistic behavior.Originality/valueThis study uncovers an inverted U-shaped link between GCI and opportunistic behavior by combining transaction cost economics and social exchange theory. Furthermore, this study reveals contractual control and relational norms can be deemed as two boundary conditions affecting the inverted U-shaped GCI–opportunistic behavior relationship. This study also offers managerial implications for firms curbing opportunistic behavior that may result from GCI.

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