scholarly journals God’s Place in Logical Space

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 100-125
Author(s):  
Andrew Dennis Bassford
Keyword(s):  
Modal Realism ◽  
Medieval Philosophy ◽  
Logical Space ◽  
Classical Theism ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Realistic Picture

It has been argued recently that classical theism and Lewisian modal realism are incompatible theses. The most substantial argument to this effect takes the form of a trilemma. It argues that no sense can be made of God’s being a necessary being in the modal realistic picture, on pain of, among other things, modal collapse. The question of this essay is: Is that so? My goal here is to detail the reasons that have been offered in support of this contention and then defend the coherence of theistic modal realism from the trilemma. I call my reply to the argument an “Anselmian-Thomistic” defense, since it appeals to resources from classical medieval philosophy, especially from Anselm and Aquinas.

scholarly journals Incarnation, Divine Timelessness, and Modality

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-112
Author(s):  
Emily Paul
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Logical Space ◽  
Christian Doctrine ◽  
Son Of God ◽  
Classical Theism ◽  
Modal Claim ◽  
Modal Variation ◽  
Genuine Modal Realism

A central part of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation is that the Son of God ‘becomes’ incarnate. Furthermore, according to classical theism, God is timeless: He exists ‘outside’ of time, and His life has no temporal stages. A consequence of this ‘atemporalist’ view is that a timeless being cannot undergo intrinsic change—for this requires the being to be one way at one time, and a different way at a later time. How, then, can we understand the central Christian claim that the Son of God ‘becomes’ human? This paper examines one such explanation, drawn from a brief remark by Brian Leftow: the Word takes on flesh by exhibiting modal variation with regards to the incarnation. On this account, a timeless God ‘becomes’ incarnate simply due to variation across logical space: at some possible worlds He is incarnate and at others He is not. Modal variation need not, therefore, require temporality: it only requires variation across (static) possible worlds. I draw out the problems with Leftow’s modal claim under the heads of Ersatzism and Genuine Modal Realism about possible worlds, respectively. I argue that in both instances, Leftow’s desired cross–worldly variation of the Son’s incarnation cannot be achieved.  

Necessary Existence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss ◽  
Joshua L. Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Abstract Objects ◽  
Classical Theism ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Necessary Existence ◽  
Concrete Entity ◽  
The Universe

A necessary being is a concrete entity that cannot fail to exist. An example of such a being might be the God of classical theism or the universe of necessitarians. Necessary Existence offers and carefully defends a number of novel arguments for the thesis that there exists at least one necessary being, while inviting the reader to a future investigation of what the neccessary being(s) is (are) like. The arguments include a defense of a classic contingency argument, a series of new modal arguments from possible causes, an argument from abstract objects, and a Gödelian argument from perfections. Furthermore, arguments against the possibility of a necessary being are critically examined. Among these arguments are old and new arguments from conceivability, a subtraction argument, problems with causation, and an argument from parsimony. Necessary Existence also includes a defense of the axioms of S5 modal logic, which is a framework for understanding several arguments for necessary existents.

Norman Malcolm e Alvin Plantinga - Duas Versões Analíticas do Argumento do Proslogionde Santo Anselmo

2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (34) ◽  
pp. 333-355
Author(s):  
Maria Helena Reis Pereira ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Concept Of God ◽  
De Re ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
The Sixties ◽  
De Dicto

The purpose of this work is to show some aspects which characterized the way analytical philosophers in the sixties and seventies (last Century) have read Saint Anselm’s argument in the Proslogion, thereby bringing its problematic into a new light. And had the virtue to begin the question of the existence of God in the heart of the analytical philosophy which up to the date was concerned by atheism. In the Introduction, we will point out the most frequent analytical objections to the argument - (i) existence is not a predicate (ii) the concept of God is incoherent (iii) existence is not perfection. Anscombe - an exception in this analytical context - has defended and supported the thesis that the argument is not an ontological one. Malcolm discovered two arguments in the Proslogion: one in chapter II which he considers invalid, another one in Chapter III considered valid and interpreted as modal by him. Plantinga was one of the first critics of the modal proof because there was - according to him - a confusion between necessity de dicto and necessity de re. Plantinga thought that the two arguments implied and/or complemented each other and developed a theory of modal realism in which he explains the nature and divine necessity in terms of possible worlds. Based on this concept he has rewritten a new modal proof considered “victorious” by him but that was later refuted by Mackie, Tooley and Davis (amongst others) and accused of circularity. Plantinga didn’t accept his proof to be considered fallacious and Oppy didn’t also recognize the same claim made by Fergie. However, Plantinga has rephrased his proof and summarized it in just one premise: “maximal greatness is possibly instantiated”. More than a proof of God’s existence, this is a defense of the acceptance of theism, a justification of the rationality of belief. And the possibility of existence of a metaphysically necessary being drives us to a deepest reflection from where every cognitive potentiality from the labor of the philosopher can be taken.

Classical theism and modal realism are incompatible

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 561-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHAD VANCE
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Intrinsic Properties ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Special Case

AbstractThe classical conception of God is that of a necessary being. On a possible worlds semantics, this entails that God exists at every possible world. According to the modal realist account of David Lewis, possible worlds are understood to be real, concrete worlds – no different in kind from the actual world. But, modal realism is equipped to accommodate the existence of a necessary being in only one of three ways: (1) By way of counterpart theory, or (2) by way of a special case of trans-world identity for causally inert necessary beings (e.g. pure sets), or else (3) causally potent ones which lack accidental intrinsic properties. I argue that each of these three options entails unacceptable consequences – (1) and (2) are incompatible with theism, and (3) is incompatible with modal realism. I conclude that (at least) one of these views is false.

scholarly journals The Metaphysics of Theism: A Classical and Neo-Classical Synthesis

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 967
Author(s):  
Joshua Reginald Sijuwade
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Ontological Pluralism ◽  
Classical Theism

This article aims to provide a metaphysical elucidation of the notion of Theism and a coherent theological synthesis of two extensions of this notion: Classical Theism and Neo-Classical Theism. A model of this notion and its extensions is formulated within the ontological pluralism framework of Kris McDaniel and Jason Turner, and the (modified) modal realism framework of David Lewis, which enables it to be explicated clearly and consistently, and two often raised objections against the elements of this notion can be successfully answered.

Theism and modal realism

2006 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAUL SHEEHY
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Classical Theism ◽  
Divine Omnipotence ◽  
Divine Knowledge ◽  
Classical Conception ◽  
Creative Role ◽  
The Relationship

This paper examines the relationship between the classical theistic conception of God and modal realism. I suggest that realism about possible worlds has unwelcome consequences for that conception. First, that modal realism entails the necessity of divine existence eludes explanation in a way congenial to a commitment to both modal realism and classical theism. Second, divine knowledge is dependent on worlds independent of the creative role and action of God, thereby suggesting a limitation on the nature of divine knowledge and on the nature of God's creative role. Third, modal realism indicates the existence of real, albeit non-actual, worlds of appalling evil threatening the classical conception of divine omnipotence and benevolence.

The Middle Term: Kierkegaard and the Contemporary Debate about Explanatory Theism

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingolf U. Dalferth
Keyword(s):  
Contemporary Debate ◽  
Middle Term ◽  
Classical Theism ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
First Cause

AbstractContrary to what many hold, Kierkegaard does not champion the God of classical theism. On the contrary, he criticizes the ideologies, anthropomorphisms and misleading objectifications of classical theism. He understands God not as a perfect being but as the fundamental dynamic reality of love without which nothing else could and would exist. In his view God is not a first cause or a necessary being but the infinite or eternal actuality of creative and transforming love: a love that is self-communicating and the source of all life and love in heaven and on earth

scholarly journals Necessary Suffering and Lewisian Theism

Sophia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew James Collier
Keyword(s):  
Related Problem ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Classical Theism ◽  
The Problem Of Evil

AbstractOne can readily conceive of worlds of horrendous, gratuitous suffering. Moreover, such worlds seem possible. For classical theists, however, God, amongst other things, is perfectly good. So, the question arises: for classical theists are such evil worlds possible? Many classical theists have said no. This is the modal problem of evil. Herein, I discuss a related problem: the problem of evil worlds for Lewisian theism. Lewisian theism is the conjunction of Lewis’s modal realism and classical theism, and a leading Lewisian theist, Almeida, thinks that Lewisian theists should admit the existence of on-balance evil worlds. I do not. Herein, I present a dilemma for Almeida: either give up God’s sovereignty and the reductionist account of modality or make God blameworthy for evil.

Visualization of Internal Skin Structures with the Scanning Electron Microscope

1969 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 46-47
Author(s):  
Emil Bernstein
Keyword(s):  
Electron Microscope ◽  
Scanning Electron Microscope ◽  
Great Depth ◽  
Hair Follicles ◽  
Depth Of Field ◽  
Pig Skin ◽  
Realistic Picture ◽  
Main Components ◽  
Scanning Electron

An interesting method for examining structures in g. pig skin has been developed. By modifying an existing technique for splitting skin into its two main components—epidermis and dermis—we can in effect create new surfaces which can be examined with the scanning electron microscope (SEM). Although this method is not offered as a complete substitute for sectioning, it provides the investigator with a means for examining certain structures such as hair follicles and glands intact. The great depth of field of the SEM complements the technique so that a very “realistic” picture of the organ is obtained.

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