scholarly journals The Limits of Legitimation. Preconditions for Conflict Resolution by Majority Rule in the European Union

2006 ◽  
Vol 42 (6) ◽  
pp. 1137-1150
Author(s):  
Georg Vobruba
Author(s):  
Robert E. Goodin ◽  
Kai Spiekermann

This chapter reflects on the election of Donald Trump and the vote of the British electorate in favour of ‘Brexit’ from the European Union. While we refrain from judging the outcomes of these votes, we do discuss concerns pertaining to the lack of truthfulness in both campaigns. After rehearsing the lies on which the Trump and Brexit campaigns were based, we consider different explanations as to why these campaigns were nevertheless successful, and where this leaves the argument for epistemic democracy. Particularly worrisome are tendencies towards ‘epistemic insouciance’, ‘epistemic malevolence’, and ‘epistemic agnosticism’. We also consider the problematic influence of social media in terms of echo chambers and filter bubbles. The core argument in favour of epistemic democracy is that the pooling of votes by majority rule has epistemically beneficial properties, assuming certain conditions. If these assumptions are not met, or are systematically corrupted, then epistemic democracy is under threat.


2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS KÖNIG ◽  
BJORN LINDBERG ◽  
SANDRA LECHNER ◽  
WINFRIED POHLMEIER

This article is a study of bicameral conflict resolution between the Council and the European Parliament in the European Union, which has established a bicameral conciliation process under the co-decision procedure. Scholars commonly agree that the European Parliament has gained power under the co-decision procedure, but the impact of the conciliation process on the power distribution between the Council and the European Parliament remains unclear. The scholarly debate suggests that the power of the institutional actors depends on their proximity to the status quo, the (im-)patience and the specific preference distribution of the institutional actors, although most analyses assume that the Commission plays an insignificant role. Using an ordered probit model, this study examines the power distribution between the two institutional actors, the factors for their bargaining success and the role of the Commission in the period between 1999 and 2002. The findings show that the European Parliament wins most conflicts, but that the Council is more successful in multi-dimensional disputes. The results confirm some theoretical claims made in the literature, such as the importance of the status quo location and of preference cohesiveness. However, they also reject a major assumption in the literature on the irrelevance of the Commission in the conciliation process, which we show to have an influential informational position for parliamentary success.


Author(s):  
Běla Plechanovová ◽  
Madeleine O. Hosli ◽  
Anatolij Plechanov

This chapter studies voting and representation in the European Union, specifically the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, over time. The authors assess the linkages between decision-making and democratic legitimacy, and then focus on potential alternatives to decision-making in the Council. They discuss development of the double-majority rule in view of aspects such as democratic representation, efficiency, and equitability and then offer analyses for different scenarios for the EU’s future, assuming different membership constellations and changes in member-states’ population sizes. They offer new calculations on voting power, the institution’s capacity to act, and equitability. Equitability, also with new rules incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty and effective as of November 2014, still deviates from the ideal value and with this, might induce the need for a rule change again in the future.


2009 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 417-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAIME TIJMES-LHL

AbstractThis article's subject is the implications that consensus/unanimity and majority voting might have for the World Trade Organization's (WTO) decision-making system. First it looks at some consequences that replacing the consensus rule with majority voting might have for the WTO, including justice concerns, legitimacy, homogeneity of WTO membership, and international enforcement. Second, it summarizes some solutions found in the European Union (EU) for coping with unanimity and majority rule, including constructive abstention, reallocation of contractual responsibilities, and the Luxembourg compromise. Finally, it considers some reform options for the WTO and offers some conclusions, namely expanding majority voting on certain areas only, redefining competences, multi-speed proposals (rethinking the single undertaking, constructive abstention, and the scheduling approach), redefining consensus, combining consensus and majority voting, and issuing interpretations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 628-632

Taken from the Iveagh House lecture, delivered at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Dublin, Ireland September 6, 2017.


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