Can Public Choice Theory Explain the U.S. Budget Surpluses of the 1990s?

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 169-181
Author(s):  
Russell S. Sobel
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Government Expenditure ◽  
Budget Deficits ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Expenditure Growth ◽  
Deficit Financing ◽  
Federal Expenditure ◽  
The U.S

Abstract Rapid U.S. federal expenditure growth and budget deficits became commonplace during the second half of the twentieth century. Public choice models explained this by continual special interest group pressure for spending, rationally ignorant voters, and shortsighted politicians finding deficit financing attractive. However, the late 1990s saw budget surpluses and a slowdown in government expenditure growth. This paper uses public choice theory to explain this turn of events. I find that a slowdown in U.S. interest group activity growth is responsible for this shift.

Can Public Choice Theory Explain the U.S. Budget Surpluses of the 1990s?

2004 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 169-181
Author(s):  
Russell S. Sobel
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Government Expenditure ◽  
Budget Deficits ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Expenditure Growth ◽  
Deficit Financing ◽  
Federal Expenditure ◽  
The U.S

Abstract Rapid U.S. federal expenditure growth and budget deficits became commonplace during the second half of the twentieth century. Public choice models explained this by continual special interest group pressure for spending, rationally ignorant voters, and shortsighted politicians finding deficit financing attractive. However, the late 1990s saw budget surpluses and a slowdown in government expenditure growth. This paper uses public choice theory to explain this turn of events. I find that a slowdown in U.S. interest group activity growth is responsible for this shift.

The Political Economy of the Implementation of the Bankruptcy Law of China

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wang Zuofa
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
The Political ◽  
Bankruptcy Law ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Group Approach ◽  
Political Economy Analysis

AbstractThe implementation of the bankruptcy law of China deviates much from the expectation of the legislature. This article draws on political economy analysis, especially the interest group approach, to provide an explanation of the causes of the deviation and predict what the future of the modification and reform of the law might be. This article also describes the China context in using public choice theory to explain legal issues.

Nicht-kostendeckende Gerichtsgebühren

1996 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Wein
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Current Situation ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
Positive Externality

AbstractIn Germany, the level of court fees is not cost-covering. Analyzing several welfare arguments to justify not cost-covering fees, only one aspect is conclusive. The benefit of judgments are not only private but also public (positive externality of litigation). It is due to the supreme courts to fill legal loopholes. Therefore, not cost-covering fees are justified in the case of supreme courts. By analyzing not cost-covering fees with the instruments of public choice theory, one can find more plausible reasons: the interest group of lawyers profits from not cost covering fees because the demand for lawyer services increases. Politicians collect their votes without loosing other votes; bureaucrats in the courts have an advantage by increasing their staff. Therefore, in order to reform the current situation, it is necessary to alter the restrictions of these self interested actors.

Collective Decision-making: FIFA from the Perspective of Public Choice

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Follert ◽  
Lukas Richau ◽  
Eike Emrich ◽  
Christian Pierdzioch
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Public Confidence ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
World Cup ◽  
The World ◽  
Selection Of

AbstractVarious scandals have shaken public confidence in football's global governing body, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). It is evident that decision-making within such a collective provides incentives for corruption. We apply the Buchanan-Tullock model that is known from Public Choice theory to study collective decision-making within FIFA. On the basis of this theoretical model, we develop specific proposals that can contribute to combating corruption. Three core aspects are discussed: the selection of the World Cup host, transparency in the allocation of budgets, and clear guidelines for FIFA officials and bodies with regard to their rights and accountability. Our insights can contribute to a better understanding of collective decision making in heterogenous groups.

Financial Indicators as Determinants of Mayoral Elections

2020 ◽  
pp. 27-53
Author(s):  
Serena Santis ◽  
Francesca Citro ◽  
Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros ◽  
Marco Bisogno
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Capital Expenditure ◽  
Financial Indicators ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
The Public ◽  
Mayoral Elections ◽  
Local Politicians ◽  
Italian Context

The chapter seeks to contribute to the literature on determinants of local government election by adopting a different perspective focused on the effects of financial indicators on the elections of mayors. Using the agency and the public choice theory, this study implements a model where specific financial indicators—whose selection takes into account the increased autonomy and responsibility of local politicians—have been included to document their effect on mayoral re-election. Focusing on the Italian context, the chapter examines a sample of 129 municipalities during the period 2008-2014, where several elections were held. By using different estimators, findings indicate that the re-election of mayors is affected by the level of indebtedness and the current equilibrium. In addition, current spending is better valued by citizens/voters than capital expenditure, which increases the probability of being re-elected.

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