South Africa's 1999 Election: Consolidating a Dominant Party System

Africa Today ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimberly Lanegran
Keyword(s):  
2013 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 290-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danielle Langfield

What is responsible for the decline of democratically dominant parties and the corresponding growth of competitive party systems? This article argues that, despite a ruling party's dominance, opposition forces can gain by winning important subnational offices and then creating a governance record that they can use to win new supporters. It focuses on South Africa as a paradigmatic dominant party system, tracing the increased competitiveness of elections in Cape Town and the surrounding Western Cape province between 1999 and 2010. These events show how party strategies may evolve, reflecting how party elites can learn from forming coalitions.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 28
Author(s):  
M. Moniruzzaman

<p>Political stability is desired by every state. But is it contingent upon regime types or party systems? Existing studies on political stability suggest that regimes such as authoritarianism, democracy, and dictatorship and their variants have variously influenced political stability. Some have proved to be friendly with political stability in certain countries, while counterproductive for some other. However, the existing literature has exclusively focused on regime types alone neglecting the factor of party systems. This article argues that not only regime types but party systems also influence political stability. Based on data from Asia, Africa and Latin America this article examines the following four assumptions. Firstly, absolute monarchy and absolute authoritarianism together with no or one party system generally maintain political stability. Secondly, constitutional monarchies together with multiparty system generally maintain political stability. Thirdly, presidentialism together with dominant party system generally maintains political stability. And finally, parliamentarianism together with multi-party system is generally negatively related with political stability.</p>


Author(s):  
Redactie KITLV

- P.E. de Josselin de Jong, Vincent Monteil, Indonésie. Collection “Hommes et civilisations.” Horizons de France, 1970. 287 p., 280 plates (36 in colour). - H. Aveling, Burton Raffel, The forked tongue: A study of the translation process. (De proprietatibus Litterarum, series maior, 14). Mouton, The Hague and Paris 1971. 181 pp. - A. Teeuw, David H. de Queljoe, A preliminary study of some phonetic features of Petani, with glossaries. Special Report Series Number 5. Center for Southeast Asian Studies. Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois. Macrh 1971. XIII and 114 pp. - E. Postel-Coster, Kirk Michael Endicott, An analysis of Malay magic. Oxford Monographs on Social Anthropology, Oxford 1970. 188 pp. - Thé Siauw Giap, Mahathir bin Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma. Donald Moore for the Asia Pacific Press Pte Ltd, Singapore 1970. vi, 188 p. - P.D. de Josselin de Jong, Thomas J. Bellows, The People’s action party of Singapore. The energence of a dominant party system. Monograph Series No. 14, Yale University Southeast Asia Series. New Haven, Conn. 1970. 195 blz. - J.H. Maronier, J. de Loos-Haaxman, Dagwerk in Indië. Hommage aan het verstild verleden. F. Wever. Franeker. 103 bldz., 114 ill. in de tekst, 12 gekl. ill. in insteekmap. - P.H. Pott, Albert le Bonheur, La sculpture indonésienne au Musée Guimet. Catalogue et étude iconographique. Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1971, oblong, 4to, 360 p., vele platen. - J.J.M. Taeymans, J. Innes Miller, The spice trade of the Roman Empire, 29 B.C. - A.D. 641. Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press, Oxford 1969. 294 p., 4 plates, 9 maps. - ,


1969 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela Sutherland Burger
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 320-336
Author(s):  
Gülçın Balamır Coşkun

This article argues that the effects of high-level corruption scandals on the future of a dominant party depend on the existence of a rule of law system based on the separation of powers. The article will study two examples from a comparative perspective to concretise its theoretical claims: the Christian Democracy Party in Italy, which was the dominant party from 1948 to 1992, and the Justice and Development Party in Turkey. The comparison will be based on an institutionalist perspective. The first part tries to provide a theoretical clarification of the concepts of predominant party systems and corruption. The second part discusses whether the Turkish and Italian party systems can be classified as predominant and the characteristics of these systems. The final section seeks to draw out similarities and differences between these two systems and the effects corruption has on them.


2020 ◽  
Vol 93 (3) ◽  
pp. 567-592
Author(s):  
Sivhuoch Ou

The United Nations (UN) introduced multiparty elections to Cambodia in 1993 in the hope of bringing about democracy in that country. Ironically, the two-and-a-half decades of uninterrupted elections have led to an ever-more authoritarian government under Prime Minister Hun Sen and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP). Authoritarianism under the single-dominant party system began in 1997, but has intensified since 2017 with the ban on the leading opposition party. While concurring that repetitive elections have consolidated authoritarianism, this paper argues that elections are not merely tools that authoritarian leaders deploy to hold on to power. Elections are arguably mechanisms that have compelled the CPP to offer several extraordinary economic concessions since 2013; this is the first argument of the paper. The developments have created a win-win scenario for the rulers and the ruled—the authoritarian leaders prolong their rule, and the masses have more disposable income, among various benefits. The second argument is that such policy concessions are made only when the ruling party senses critical challenges from the opposition and voters. This paper contributes to the literature arguing that multiparty elections in electoral authoritarian regimes extract economic policy concessions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva Wegner

This article investigates accountability in South Africa’s dominant party system by studying how the African National Congress (ANC) reacts to electoral incentives at the local level. It compares the ANC’s degree of responsiveness to voters across municipalities with different levels of political competition. The analysis focuses on whether and under which conditions the ANC is more likely to renominate better quality municipal councillors. It examines the relationship between renomination as ANC municipal councillor and local government performance – as measured by voter signals, service delivery and audit outcomes. The results show that the ANC does indeed adapt its behaviour to electoral incentives. In municipalities where the ANC has larger margins of victory, performance matters little for renomination. In contrast, in municipalities with higher electoral competition, local government performance is strongly correlated with renomination. These results suggest the need to expand dominant party research to topics of voter responsiveness and sub-national behaviour.


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