Emergent Order and Liberal Political Theory

2002 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 29-33
Author(s):  
Gus. DiZerega
Author(s):  
Andrew Valls

The persistence of racial inequality in the United States raises deep and complex questions of racial justice. Some observers argue that public policy must be “color-blind,” while others argue that policies that take race into account should be defended on grounds of diversity or integration. This chapter begins to sketch an alternative to both of these, one that supports strong efforts to address racial inequality but that focuses on the conditions necessary for the liberty and equality of all. It argues that while race is a social construction, it remains deeply embedded in American society. A conception of racial justice is needed, one that is grounded on the premises provided by liberal political theory.


2019 ◽  
pp. 89-121
Author(s):  
Joan Wallach Scott

This chapter considers the contradictions of women's emancipation in light of the American (1776) and the French (1789) revolutions. It shows how the resistance to women's citizenship had less to do with the necessarily slow but inevitable progress of liberal democratic ideas than it did with a contradiction at the very heart of the political thinking that articulated them—a political thinking integral to the discourse of secularism. Liberal political theory postulated the sameness of all individuals as the key to their formal equality—abstracted from their circumstances there was no discernable difference among them, they stood as equals before the law. At the same time there were differences that were thought to refuse abstraction. These were people in a state of dependency, such as propertyless peasants, wage laborers, women, children, slaves. Therefore, they could not be counted as autonomous individuals—autonomy, after all, was at the heart of the very definition of individuality.


Author(s):  
Johann P. Sommerville

Filmer was one of the most important political thinkers in seventeenth-century England, and the author of Patriarcha. Locke replied to this and other works by Filmer in the Two Treatises of Government – perhaps the most famous of all works of liberal political theory. Filmer argued that notions of mixed or limited government were false and pernicious, and that the powers of all legitimate rulers were derived not from the people but directly from God, to whom alone rulers were accountable. Filmer’s contemporaries commonly held that the authority of a father and husband over his family stemmed not from the consent of his wife and children but from the natural and divinely appointed order of things. Filmer harnessed such ideas to the cause of royal absolutism by arguing that the state and the family were essentially the same institution.


2005 ◽  
Vol 114 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Wilkinson

Because journalism ethics draw deeply, and perhaps unreflexively, on liberal political traditions, there is a lot of confusion about what public accountability entails. When interpreted from the standpoint of liberal theory, the perception of the need for public accountability is generally framed by a simplistic opposition between the public's right to know and the individual's right to privacy. Central to the liberal framing of the accountability is a weak notion of ‘publicity’ anchored in notions of representation and revelation. Furthermore, there is also a strong tradition within liberal theory to treat ethics as a matter of private concern, rather than something that can be publicly resolved. For these reasons, the balance of democratic consideration always seems to sit more comfortably with privacy rights than it does with considerations of accountability to the public. This paper explores some of these dilemmas surrounding journalism ethics and public accountability by examining their theoretical underpinnings in liberal political theory and comparing them with a model of public accountability grounded in publicity construed as public participation.


2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 333-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Sypnowich

G. A. Cohen casts doubt on the extent to which Marxism can contribute to a theory of equality. This essay affirms Cohen's critique. The historical materialist approach to social change, the privileged role ascribed to the proletariat, and Marx's assumption that scarcity can be abolished: these three themes account for the impatience of classical Marxists with moral commitments and normative argument, an impatience which now seems utopian. Marx was wrong about how social change comes about, and that error made it very difficult for the goal of equality to be formulated, let alone realised. ‘The egalitarian turn’ in liberalism suggests that it is liberal political theory, not Marxism, which can inform debates about equality. The insistence on neutrality about the good in much left-liberal argument, however, has forestalled consideration of the kinds of lives to which human beings should aspire, something that must be considered if we are enable individuals to live well, as Marx understood with his critique of alienation. This paper argues that questions of human flourishing are essential to questions of equality, and that Marx's perfectionist vision of the equal society ought to be retrieved.


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