Game Theory and the Spiral Model

1997 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 371-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Kydd

When one state engages in a military buildup, other states sometimes take this as a sign that it is more aggressive or expansionist than they previously thought. Some argue that such increases in mutual suspicion can drive arms races and even lead to war. Psychological bias is often invoked to explain this pattern of growing suspicions leading to hostility. This article presents an incomplete information model of an arms race and investigates when escalations should rationally generate increased fears and when, in order to reduce such fears, security seekers can refrain from building. It shows that escalations rationally provoke fear even in the absence of bias and that weak states and states facing high costs of arms racing and war will be especially likely to refrain from building as a way of signaling benign intentions.

Author(s):  
Nadiya Kostyuk

Abstract Can cyber deterrence work? Existing scholarly works argue that deterrence by punishment using cyberattacks is ineffective because the difficulty of attributing the origin of cyberattacks makes the threat of future attacks less credible. However, these works have told us relatively little about the deterrence ability of public cyberinstitutions (PCIs), defined as publicly observable proactive efforts aimed at signaling a country’s level of cyber offensive and defensive capability. This research shows that middle powers (that have scarce cyber arsenals) can use PCIs to deter cyber attacks that cause significant damage to their economy and prosperity; however, this deterrent capability is rather limited. Using an incomplete-information model, we demonstrate that PCIs only deter adversaries that are susceptible to the costs created by these institutions. Despite this limited deterrence ability, middle powers tend to over-invest resources in these cyberinstitutions: Weak cyber states tend to over-invest to convince strong cyber adversaries that they are strong, whereas strong cyber states over-invest so that adversaries do not believe that they are weak states pretending to be strong. By doing so, states reduce their overall cybercapacity. We establish the empirical plausibility of these results using election interference campaigns as examples of strategic attacks. Our focus on the strategic use of PCIs as a deterrent represents a departure from existing literature—which has focused only on cyberoperations—and has important policy implications.


Author(s):  
Toby J. Rider

An “arms race” is a competition over the quality or quantity of military capabilities between states in the international system. The arms race phenomenon has received considerable attention from scholars over many decades because of the ubiquity, throughout history, of states building arms as a means of deterring enemies, but disagreement persists over whether that policy is effective at avoiding war. The Latin phrase si vis pacem, para bellum, meaning “if you want peace, prepare for war,” dates back to the Roman Empire but the sentiment is likely much older. That states should rapidly build up their militaries in the face of potential threats is a common thread that runs through much of the modern international relations scholarship influenced by realism and deterrence theory. Meeting force with force, the logic went, was the only way to ensure the security or survival of the sovereign state. These states faced a paradox, however, best articulated by the “security dilemma.” Anything a state does in the name of defense, like a rapid military buildup, decreases the security of other states and will be viewed with hostile intent. This set up a debate over competing expectations regarding the relationship between arms races and war (peace). On one hand, deterrence theory posits that rapid arming is necessary to raise the cost of an adversary attacking and, consequently, preserves peace. On the other hand, the spiral model argues that the reality of the security dilemma means that arming produces mistrust, hostility and, thus, increases the likelihood of war. Scholars set out to test these competing hypotheses using large data sets and statistical techniques, but there was widespread disagreement on how to measure arms races, appropriate research design, and the statistical findings were somewhat mixed. Critics of this approach to studying arms races note a number of important weaknesses. First, scholars primarily focus on the consequences of arms races—whether they lead to war or peace—at the expense of understanding the causes. Those who advance this position believe that a theory of arms race onset might well inform our understanding of their consequences. Second, security dilemma, taken as the primary motivation for arms races, suffers from significant logical flaws. Third, assessment of the arms race-war relationship consists of comparative theory tests of deterrence theory and spiral model, yet these ideas are underdeveloped and expectations oversimplified. More recently, scholarship has shifted the focus from the consequences of arms races to developing theories and empirical tests of their causes. These efforts have been informed by insights from bargaining models of war, and their application to this context holds promise for better future understanding of both the causes and consequences of arms races.


1998 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 311-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Nolfi ◽  
Dario Floreano

Coevolution (i.e., the evolution of two or more competing populations with coupled fitness) has several features that may potentially enhance the power of adaptation of artificial evolution. In particular, as discussed by Dawkins and Krebs [3], competing populations may reciprocally drive one another to increasing levels of complexity by producing an evolutionary “arms race.” In this article we will investigate the role of coevolution in the context of evolutionary robotics. In particular, we will try to understand in what conditions coevolution can lead to “arms races.” Moreover, we will show that in some cases artificial coevolution has a higher adaptive power than simple evolution. Finally, by analyzing the dynamics of coevolved populations, we will show that in some circumstances well-adapted individuals would be better advised to adopt simple but easily modifiable strategies suited for the current competitor strategies rather than incorporate complex and general strategies that may be effective against a wide range of opposing counter-strategies.


Author(s):  
Beth A. Fischer

Did President Reagan launch a military buildup so as toforce the USSR to collapse, as triumphalists claim?In this view Reagan sought to entice Moscow into an arms race that it could not afford, thus forcing it into bankruptcy. This argument rests on two assumptions. The first is that Reagan officials believed the Soviet Union to be so fragile that it could be nudged to collapse. The second is that the administration intended to force the USSR to implode. This chapter finds both assumptions wanting. Although the president believed the USSR was unsustainable in the long run, virtually all of his advisers disagreed. They viewed Moscow as a formidable adversary that would continue to challenge the West for the foreseeable future. Moreover, high-ranking officials in the Reagan administration have rejected the claim that they sought to force the USSR to collapse.The objective was to pressure the Soviets to agree to arms reduction. President Reagan sought to eliminate nuclear weapons, and officials mistakenly believed that Moscow would not agree to reduce its arsenal until confronted with a strong and menacing adversary. Paradoxically, the buildup was intended to lead to arms reductions.This policy was called “peace through strength.”


2020 ◽  
pp. 002234331989871
Author(s):  
Jaehak Kim ◽  
Woosang Kim

Literatures on the influences of missile defense (MD) on the existing nuclear deterrence are divided into negative and positive perspectives. However, both sides seem to make contradictory arguments. Skeptics argue that it is not feasible that MD influences deterrence stability but that it causes security dilemma and arms race, while proponents suggest that MD does not have to be perfect to reinforce deterrence stability but that it does not cause security dilemma and arms race. To fix this logical inconsistency, we identify an additional variable which is crucial in understanding the security dilemma mechanism in addition to Jervis’s (1978) two variables. By adding another variable, a minimum MD effectiveness level required for deterrence success suggested by Quackenbush (2006), to Jervis’s framework, we develop three hypotheses, two of which are novel on MD and its potential influences on deterrence stability and arms race. We then introduce a probabilistic model of the MD effectiveness by modifying Wilkening’s (2000) and conduct simulation analysis to see if MD is more likely to incur security dilemma and arms race. Our simulation results show that MD influence is likely to be different depending on a potential challenger’s national capability. Against a great power challenger, MD is least likely to meet the minimum MD effectiveness level required for deterrence success, so that the challenger is more likely to respond flexibly to the defender’s buildup of MD. Against a newly nuclear-armed state, however, a defender’s MD is more likely to satisfy the minimum MD effectiveness level, so that the defender is highly likely to respond flexibly to the potential challenger’s reinforcement effort of its nuclear force. In either case, our simulation results indicate that arms races concerning MD among them are not likely to occur.


2001 ◽  
Vol 28 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 631-652 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Cheng ◽  
Bradley D. Childs ◽  
William W. Sheng

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