On the Boundary between Oneself and the Other: Aliens and Language in the Films AVP, Dark City, The Brother from Another Planet, and Possible Worlds

2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 234-254
Author(s):  
Mark Bould
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The Other

scholarly journals Possible worlds and the beauty of God

2010 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 479-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARK IAN THOMAS ROBSON
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The Other ◽  
The One ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractIn this paper I explore the relationship between the idea of possible worlds and the notion of the beauty of God. I argue that there is a clear contradiction between the idea that God is utterly and completely beautiful on the one hand and the notion that He contains within himself all possible worlds on the other. Since some of the possible worlds residing in the mind of the deity are ugly, their presence seems to compromise God's complete and utter beauty.

Modern Mathematics in Germany

1936 ◽  
Vol 29 (8) ◽  
pp. 390-393
Author(s):  
W. Threlfall
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Golden Age ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The Other ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
The World ◽  
Modern Mathematics ◽  
Mathematics And Physics

Since I am speaking to you about modern German mathematics, I wish to call your attention to a most important subject, namely to the world which surrounds us, and to our scientific knowledge of its extent in space and time. There can be no doubt about the fact that this world we are living in is not the best of all possible worlds. Financial, industrial, and political dieases, you know them just as well on the other side of the great pond as we do on this side. Nevertheless in one respect we are living just now in a golden age. The world of science is in an excellent state and few eras have seen as important successes of mathematics and physics as ours.

De Sousa On Kripke And Theoretical Identities

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. M. Yoshida
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The Other ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Rigid Designator ◽  
Rigid Designators ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Identity Statement ◽  
Naming And Necessity

In the by now well known talks he gave at Princeton, Saul Kripke claimed that “[t]heoretical identities … are generally identities involving two rigid designators and therefore are examples of the necessary a posteriori.” (Published as “Naming and Necessity,” in G. Harmon and D. Davidson, eds., Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht, 1972) 253-355; (hereafter referred to as “NN”; this quote p. 331.) A rigid designator is an expression that designates the same object in all possible worlds when it is used. So Kripke is claiming that ‘Water is H20’ and ‘Heat is the motion of molecules’ are generally identities involving expressions like ‘water’ and ‘the motion of molecules’ which designate the same objects in all possible worlds. If the identity statement is true, both sides designate the same object rigidly, i.e., in all possible worlds, and therefore the statement is necessarily true. On the other hand, whether it is true is determined ultimately by appeal to experience. It follows that if true, the identity is necessary a posteriori.

Plantinga's Necessary A Posteriori Truths

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-327
Author(s):  
Gregory W. Fitch
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
A Priori ◽  
The Other ◽  
Traditional View ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Necessary Truths

Alvin Plantinga has recently argued that there are certain propositions which are necessary but known only a posteriori. If Plantinga is correct then he has shown that the traditional view that all necessary truths are knowable a priori is false. Plantinga's examples deserve special attention because they differ in important respects from other proposed examples of necessary a posteriori truths. His examples depend on a certain conception of possible worlds and in particular on his conception of the actual world. It will be argued that these examples of necessary a posteriori propositions can be understood in two different ways. According to one way of understanding Plantinga, the propositions turn out to be contingent a posteriori truths, and according to the other way they turn out to be necessary a priori truths. The plausibility of Plantinga's position is due to a confusion between the two possible interpretations.

Anchoring world and time in biblical Hebrew

2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 491-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
GALIA HATAV
Keyword(s):  
Noun Phrase ◽  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Biblical Hebrew ◽  
The Other ◽  
Definite Article ◽  
Verbal System ◽  
Reference Time ◽  
Three Components

One of the most puzzling issues in biblical Hebrew has been its verbal system. In this article, I deal with one of the forms, namely wayyiqtol, suggesting that its meaning is compositional, calculated from three components: a verbal base and two morphemes. The verbal base is shown to be modal, involving quantification over possible worlds. The two morphemes prefixed to the verbal base restrict its modal nature. One morpheme functions like the definite article in a noun phrase; it picks out one of the possible worlds, the familiar actual world (Wo), and anchors the event into it. The other morpheme builds a reference-time, locating the event in time.

scholarly journals Truthmaking and the world-time parallel

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Gareth Leniston-Lee
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ontological Status ◽  
Parallel Argument ◽  
The World ◽  
The Face ◽  
To Come ◽  
Structural Parallel ◽  
Made In ◽  
The Way

<p>There is a close structural parallel between the way we talk about time and the way we talk about modality (i.e. matters of possibility, necessity, actuality etc.). A consequence of this is that whenever we construct a metaphysical argument within one of these domains, there is a parallel argument to be made in the other. On the face of it, this parallel between possible worlds and moments in time seems to commit us to holding corresponding attitudes to the ontological status of non-present and non-actual entities.  In this thesis I assess a claim made by Sider (2001: 41-42) that truthmaking – the idea that truth is grounded in existence – provides a way to avoid the commitment to ontological symmetry that this world-time parallel seems to foist upon us. Truthmaking challenges presentists, who deny the existence of past entities and actualists, who deny the existence of merely possible entities, to come up with a way of grounding truths that are ostensively about the events and entities that they deny exist. Sider’s claim can be broken down into three propositions:  1. Truthmaking provides reason to reject presentism. 2. Truthmaking does not provide reason to reject actualism. 3. Truthmaking breaks the ontological symmetry between time and modality.  In this thesis I argue that while 1 is false, 3 remains true. While I am not a presentist myself I do not think that truthmaking provides a sound basis for rejecting the position. Much of this thesis is dedicated to defending presentism against the challenge truthmaking poses. I also don’t believe that truthmaking undermines actualism, but do not commit myself to any particular actualist response to the truthmaking challenge in this thesis. My central aim is to show that the presentist has a viable response to the truthmaking challenge and that this response does not have a viable parallel in the modal case. So while I think that both presentists and actualists can provide adequate responses to the challenge truthmaking poses, truthmaking still breaks the symmetry because the arguments made in defence of each position are very different. So one might rationally accept one argument but not the other.</p>

Modal semantics without possible worlds

1981 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
John T. Kearns
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The Other ◽  
Modal Operator ◽  
Logical Operators ◽  
Semantic Account ◽  
Necessary Truth ◽  
Modal Semantics ◽  
Propositional Language ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Plain Truth

In this paper I will develop a semantic account for modal logic by considering only the values of sentences (and formulas). This account makes no use of possible worlds. To develop such an account, we must recognize four values. These are obtained by subdividing (plain) truth into necessary truth (T) and contingent truth (t); and by subdividing falsity into contingent falsity (f) and necessary falsity (impossibility: F). The semantic account results from reflecting on these concepts and on the meanings of the logical operators.To begin with, we shall consider the propositional language L0. The language L0 has (1) infinitely many atomic sentences, (2) the two truth-functional connectives ∼, ∨, and the modal operator □. (Square brackets are used for punctuation.) The other logical expressions are defined as follows:D1 [A & B] = (def)∼[∼A ∨ ∼ B],D2 [A ⊃ B] = (def)[∼A ∨ B],D3 ◊ A =(def)∼□∼A.I shall use matrices to give partial characterizations of the significance of logical expressions in L0. For negation, this matrix is wholly adequate:Upon reflection, it should be clear that this matrix is the obviously correct matrix for negation.

scholarly journals AN OVERVIEW OF ROUGH SET SEMANTICS FOR MODAL AND QUANTIFIER LOGICS

2000 ◽  
Vol 08 (01) ◽  
pp. 93-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHURN-JUNG LIAU
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Rough Set ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Rough Set Theory ◽  
Modal Logics ◽  
The Other ◽  
Approximation Space ◽  
The Universe

In this paper, we would like to present some logics with semantics based on rough set theory and related notions. These logics are mainly divided into two classes. One is the class of modal logics and the other is that of quantifier logics. For the former, the approximation space is based on a set of possible worlds, whereas in the latter, we consider the set of variable assignments as the universe of approximation. In addition to surveying some well-known results about the links between logics and rough set notions, we also develop some new applied logics inspired by rough set theory.

Infinitive Perfect and Backward Causation

1980 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kjell Johan Sæbø
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The Other ◽  
Counterfactual Analysis ◽  
Present Perfect ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Semantic Framework ◽  
Causative Constructions ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
General Semantic ◽  
Backward Causation

The present paper represents an attempt to explain the semantically deviant nature of causative constructions with present perfect effect sentences. As far as I known, such constructions have not been commented upon in the literature on causativity. I show that any counterfactual analysis of the traditional sort will bring them out as synthetic sentences, provided they are syntactically well-formed. On the other hand, if the notion os counterfactural dependence is re-interpreted along the lines of branching possible worlds, they can be shown to be systematically contradictory. I discuss the various revisions of the truth conditions for tensed formulae and of the general semantic framework which are necessary to accomplish this.

THE MODAL LOGIC AND FUZZY COGNITIVE MAPS IN TELEPRESENCE

1996 ◽  
Vol 05 (03) ◽  
pp. 305-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAULO CAMARGO SILVA
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Virtual Worlds ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Cognitive Maps ◽  
Fuzzy Cognitive Maps ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Operator ◽  
Logic Of Knowledge ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
States Of Nature

Telepresence is constituted of a robotic system controlled by a human operator at a remote control station. In these systems the human operator is immerse in a virtual reality and the robot is controlled at distance by human operator. Often the human operator has that repeat tasks through robot. In this article we propose that the telepresence can use semi-autonomous (semi-reactive) robots, that execute the tasks that the operator repeats often, However, to create a relationship between the human operator and the semi-autonomous (semi-reactive) robot, it is necessary to develop a logic that combines the knowledge of the reactive robot and the knowledge of the human operator. On the other hand, in the last years we have seen the possibility to structure virtual worlds with Fuzzy Cognitive Maps. These maps can model virtual worlds with numerous actors. Moreover these FCMs can combine different virtual worlds. In this article we introduce a multi-agent modal logic of knowledge and belief that can be used in design of telep resence with semi-reactive robots. In this logic we describe possible worlds (“states of nature”) by fuzzy cognitive maps.

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