Development for Improvement Methodology of Radiation Shielding Evaluation Efficiency about PWR SNF Interim Storage Facility

2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 92-100
Author(s):  
Taeman Kim ◽  
Myungwhan Seo ◽  
Chunhyung Cho ◽  
Gilyong Cha ◽  
Soonyoung Kim
Keyword(s):  
Radiation Shielding ◽  
Storage Facility ◽  
Interim Storage

The Radiation Protection Design of PWR Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facility

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liming Huang ◽  
Shouhai Yang ◽  
Jie Liu
Keyword(s):  
Radiation Protection ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Radiation Safety ◽  
Three Dimensional ◽  
Radiation Shielding ◽  
Storage Facility ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Dry Storage ◽  
Spent Fuel Storage ◽  
Fuel Storage

Radiation safety is an important part of safety assessment of spent fuel dry storage technology. This paper describes the radiation protection design of PWR spent fuel dry storage facility for radiation safety completed by China General Nuclear Power Corporation. Considering the special site conditions, Monte Carlo method is used to complete the precise calculation of the three-dimensional radiation dose field in the spent fuel storage building. Through the spent fuel storage module and the storage building with shielding function, radiation shielding design is completed to meet China’s regulatory requirements, which ensures radiation safety for workers and the public during the transport and storage of spent fuel. It will provide a reference for construction of spent fuel dry storage facility of CPR1000 and HPR1000.

Last Developments About Spent Fuel Management in Belgium

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Wittebolle
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Fuel Cycle ◽  
Research Centre ◽  
Total Output ◽  
Storage Facility ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Fuel Management ◽  
Dry Storage ◽  
Wet Storage ◽  
Interim Storage

Abstract In Belgium 57% of the electricity is presently generated by 7 nuclear units of the PWR type located in Doel and Tihange. Their total output amounts to 5632 MWe. Part of the spent fuel unloaded from the first three units has been sent till 2000 for reprocessing in the Cogema facility at La Hague. As the reprocessing of the spent fuel produced by the last four units is not covered by the contracts concluded with Cogema, Synatom, the Belgian utilities’ subsidiary in charge of the front- and back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle for all PWR reactors in Belgium, decided to study the possible solutions for a temporary storage of this spent fuel. End of 1993, the Belgian government decided that reprocessing (closed cycle) and direct disposal (open cycle) of spent fuel had to be considered as equal options in the back-end policy for nuclear fuel in Belgium. The resolution further allowed continued execution of a running reprocessing contract (from 1978) and use of the corresponding Pu for MOX in Belgian NPP’s, but requested a reprocessing contract concluded in 1990 (for reprocessing services after 2000) not to be executed during a five-year period. During this period priority was to be given to studies on the once-through cycle as an option for spent fuel management. Figure 1 is a chart showing the two alternatives for the spent fuel cycle in Belgium. In this context, Synatom entrusted Belgatom1 to develop a dedicated flask (called “bottle”) for direct disposal of spent fuel, to perform a design study of an appropriate encapsulation process and to prepare a preliminary feasibility study of a complete spent fuel conditioning plant. Meanwhile preparation works were made for the construction of an interim storage facility on both NPP sites of Doel and Tihange in order to meet increasing storage capacity needs. For selecting the type of interim storage facility, Belgatom performed a technical-economical analysis. Considerations of design and safety criteria as well as flexibility, reversibility, technical constraints, global economical aspects and construction time led to adopt dry storage with dual purpose casks (in operation since end 1995) for the Doel site and wet storage in a modular pool for the Tihange site (in operation since 1997). In parallel, ONRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian Agency for the management of radioactive waste and enriched fissile materials and the Belgian nuclear research centre, SCK•CEN, conduct underground investigations in view of geological disposal. The paper describes the methodology that Belgatom has developed to provide the utilities with appropriate solutions (reracking, dry storage in casks, wet storage in ponds, etc.) and how Belgatom demonstrated also the feasibility of spent fuel conditioning with a view to direct disposal in clay layers. The spent fuel storage facilities in operation in Belgium and designed and built by Belgatom are then briefly presented.

Conditioning of Plutonium Waste for Long-Term Interim Storage

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
F.-W. Ledebrink ◽  
P. Faber
Keyword(s):  
Radioactive Waste ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Storage Facility ◽  
Acceptance Criteria ◽  
Mox Fuel ◽  
Fuel Fabrication ◽  
Interim Storage ◽  
Waste Drums ◽  
Storage Facilities

Abstract In the period since Germany’s experimental final repository ASSE was closed in 1978, around 5000 drums of conditioned plutonium-bearing radioactive waste from mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication have accumulated in the interim storage facilities of Siemens AG’s MOX fuel fabrication plant in Hanau, Germany — formerly ALKEM GmbH, now Siemens Decommissioning Projects (Siemens DP). Another 5000 drums will arise in the course of decommissioning and dismantling the MOX plant which has now been underway for some months. Hopes that a final waste repository would soon be able to go into operation in Germany have remained unfulfilled over the last 20 years. Also, the agreements reached between Germany’s electric utilities and the Federal Government regarding the future of nuclear energy have not led to any further progress in connection with the issue of radwaste disposal. A concrete date for a final repository to start operation has still not been set. The German Federal Government estimates that a geologic repository will not be needed for at least another 30 years. Since the opening of a final storage facility is not foreseeable in the near term, Siemens is taking the necessary steps to enable radwaste to be safely stored in aboveground interim storage facilities for a prolonged period of time. Conditioning of radwaste from MOX fuel fabrication by cementing it in drums was started in 1984 in the belief — which was justified at that time — that final storage at the Konrad mine would be possible as of 1995. The quality requirements specified for the waste drums were therefore based on the Konrad acceptance criteria. The operating license for the storage facilities at Hanau at which these drums are presently in interim storage is limited to 20 years and will be expiring in 2004. The drums have not suffered any corrosion to date and, according to past experience, are not expected to do so in the future. However, permission to keep the drums in interim storage for a longer period of time in their current form would be extremely difficult to obtain as their corrosion resistance would have to be demonstrated for a further 30 years. The present goal is therefore to create a waste form suitable for interim storage which needs no maintenance over a long-term period, incorporates state-of-the-art technology and will probably not require any further treatment of the waste packages prior to emplacement in a final storage facility. At the same time, the highest possible degree of safety must be assured for the time during which the waste remains in interim storage. This goal can be attained by conditioning the drums such that they satisfy the requirements currently specified for final storage at the Konrad repository (1). In practice, this means immobilizing the cemented waste drums in concrete inside steel “Konrad Containers” (KCs). The KCs themselves and the concrete backfill represent two further barriers which not only serve as radiation shielding but also protect the drums against corrosion as well as any possible release of radioactive materials in the event of accidents occurring during interim storage. As the KCs are cuboid in shape, they can be stacked in space-saving configurations and are thus particularly suitable for interim storage. Also, due to their extremely heavy weight, theft of the waste packages can be practically ruled out. Despite the fact that the agreements with the German Federal Government have failed to bring opening of the Konrad repository within reach, it is nevertheless a good idea today to condition radwaste in a manner that renders it suitable for ultimate storage there. The agreements between the Government and the utilities are expected at least to result in a land use permit being issued for the Konrad mine before the end of 2001. At present there are no facts known that could cause the safety of this facility to be questioned. Only recently, Germany’s International Nuclear Technology Commission (ILK) confirmed Konrad’s suitability and demanded that it be placed in operation without further delay (2). Even if its operation should, in fact, be blocked by political lobbies, potential legal action or economic considerations, the alternative repository at Gorleben could possibly become operable in approximately 30 years’ time. Gorleben was planned right from the start to be able to accommodate waste packages based on the Konrad acceptance criteria. This means that any waste packages designed for storage at Konrad could likewise be handled and stored at Gorleben. The processes used by Siemens for conditioning of radwaste conform to the recommendations of the “Guidelines for the Control of radioactive Waste with negligible Heat Generation” issued by the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) in 1989 (3).

Establishing a Store Baseline During Interim Storage of Waste Packages and a Review of Potential Technologies for Baselining

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer McTeer ◽  
Jenny Morris ◽  
Stephen Wickham ◽  
Gary Bolton ◽  
James McKinney ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Waste Management ◽  
Storage System ◽  
Storage Facility ◽  
Original Condition ◽  
Final Disposal ◽  
Waste Storage ◽  
Secure Environment ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Inspection Data ◽  
Interim Storage

Interim storage is an essential component of the waste management lifecycle, providing a safe, secure environment for waste packages awaiting final disposal. In order to be able to monitor and detect change or degradation of the waste packages, storage building or equipment, it is necessary to know the original condition of these components (the “waste-storage system”). This paper presents an approach to establishing the baseline for a waste-storage system, and provides guidance on the selection and implementation of potential baselining technologies. The approach is made up of two sections; assessment of baselining needs and definition of baselining approach. During the assessment of baselining needs a review of available monitoring data and store/package records should be undertaken (if the store is operational). Evolutionary processes (affecting safety functions), and their corresponding indicators, that can be measured to provide a baseline for the waste-storage system should then be identified in order for the most suitable indicators to be selected for baselining. In defining the approach, identification of opportunities to collect data and constraints is undertaken before selecting the techniques for baselining and developing a baselining plan. Baselining data may be used to establish that the state of the packages is consistent with the waste acceptance criteria for the storage facility and to support the interpretation of monitoring and inspection data collected during store operations. Opportunities and constraints are identified for different store and package types. Technologies that could potentially be used to measure baseline indicators are also reviewed.

Developing a Concept for a National Used Fuel Interim Storage Facility in the United States

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald Wayne Lewis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Nuclear Waste ◽  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
The United States ◽  
Yucca Mountain ◽  
Storage Facility ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Geological Repository ◽  
Interim Storage

In the United States (U.S.) the nuclear waste issue has plagued the nuclear industry for decades. Originally, spent fuel was to be reprocessed but with the threat of nuclear proliferation, spent fuel reprocessing has been eliminated, at least for now. In 1983, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 [1] was established, authorizing development of one or more spent fuel and high-level nuclear waste geological repositories and a consolidated national storage facility, called a “Monitored Retrievable Storage” facility, that could store the spent nuclear fuel until it could be placed into the geological repository. Plans were under way to build a geological repository, Yucca Mountain, but with the decision by President Obama to terminate the development of Yucca Mountain, a consolidated national storage facility that can store spent fuel for an interim period until a new repository is established has become very important. Since reactor sites have not been able to wait for the government to come up with a storage or disposal location, spent fuel remains in wet or dry storage at each nuclear plant. The purpose of this paper is to present a concept developed to address the DOE’s goals stated above. This concept was developed over the past few months by collaboration between the DOE and industry experts that have experience in designing spent nuclear fuel facilities. The paper examines the current spent fuel storage conditions at shutdown reactor sites, operating reactor sites, and the type of storage systems (transportable versus non-transportable, welded or bolted). The concept lays out the basis for a pilot storage facility to house spent fuel from shutdown reactor sites and then how the pilot facility can be enlarged to a larger full scale consolidated interim storage facility.

scholarly journals Transport of Radioactive Soil and Waste to the Fukushima Interim Storage Facility—From Organizational Arrangement Perspectives

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
Masahiro Nishimura
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power Station ◽  
Absorptive Capacity ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Storage Facility ◽  
Power Station ◽  
Implementation Processes ◽  
Organizational Arrangement ◽  
Transport Plan ◽  
Regulatory Functions ◽  
Interim Storage

The Ministry of the Environment of Japan started transport of radioactive soil and waste to the Fukushima Interim Storage Facility in March 2015 following the decontamination works from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station disaster in March 2011. Although it was an unprecedented challenge and seemed unfit for the ministry with mainly regulatory functions, the ministry prepared the transport plan and smoothly started the initial works. This article reviews the planning and initial implementation processes mainly from the organizational arrangement perspectives. In addition to the organization’s original expertise and experiences, the organization’s absorptive capacity that stemmed from organizational culture contributed to the smooth implementation. It is recommended that organization’s absorptive capacity be considered when setting up implementation arrangements for responses to an unprecedented challenge that requires quick decisions and flexible actions.

International Cooperative Program Addressing the Management of Military Spent Nuclear Fuel in Russia

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert S. Dyer ◽  
Ella Barnes ◽  
Randall L. Snipes ◽  
Steinar Ho̸ibra˚ten ◽  
Valery Sveshnikov ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Arctic Region ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
Storage Facility ◽  
Dual Purpose ◽  
Long Term Storage ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
Interim Storage ◽  
Term Storage

Northwest Russia contains large quantities of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that potentially threaten the environmental security of the surrounding Arctic Region. The majority of the SNF from Russian decommissioned nuclear submarines is currently stored either onboard submarines or in floating storage vesssels in Northwest Russia. Some of the SNF is damaged, stored in an unstable condition, or of a type that cannot currently be reprocessed. Most of the existing storage facilities being used in Northwest Russia do not meet health and safety and physical security requirements. Existing Russian transport infrastructure and reprocessing facilities cannot meet the requirements for moving and reprocessing this fuel. Therefore, additional interim storage capacity is required. The removal, handling, interim storage, and shipment of the fuel pose technical, ecological, and security challenges. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Defense and the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Oak Ridge National Laboratory, along with the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, is working closely with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (RF) to develop an improved and integrated management system for interim storage of military SNF in NW Russia. The cooperative effort consists of three subprojects involving the development of: (1) a prototype dual-purpose, metal-concrete container for both transport and long-term storage of RF military SNF, (2) the first transshipment/interim storage facility for these containers, and (3) improved fuel preparation and cask loading procedures and systems to control the moisture levels within the containers. The first subproject, development of a prototype dual-purpose container, was completed in December 2000. This was the first metal-concrete container developed, licensed, and produced in Russia for both the transportation and storage of military SNF. These containers are now in serial production. Russia plans to use these containers for the transport and interim storage of military SNF from decommissioned nuclear submarines at naval installations in the Arctic and Far East. The second subproject, the design, construction, and licensing of the first transshipment/interim storage facility in Russia, was completed in September 2003. This facility can provide interim storage for up to nineteen 40-tonne SNF containers filled with SNF for a period not to exceed two years. The primary objective of building this transshipment/interim storage facility in Murmansk, Russia was to remove a bottleneck in the RF transportation infrastructure for moving containers, loaded with SNF, from the arctic region to PO “Mayak” for reprocessing or longer-term storage. The third subproject addresses the need to improve fuel conditioning and cask operating procedures to ensure safe storage of SNF for at least 50 years. This will involve the review and improvement of existing RF procedures and systems for preparing and loading the fuel in the specially designed casks for transport and long-term storage. This subproject is scheduled for completion in December 2003. Upon completion, these subprojects are designed to provide a physically secure, accountable, and environmentally sound integrated solution that will increase the capacity for removal and transfer of SNF from decommissioned RF submarines in the Russian Federation to PO “Mayak” in central Russia.

Measurement of Atmospheric Sea Salt Concentration in the Dry Storage Facility of the Spent Nuclear Fuel

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masumi Wataru ◽  
Hisashi Kato ◽  
Satoshi Kudo ◽  
Naoko Oshima ◽  
Koji Wada ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Sea Salt ◽  
Storage Facility ◽  
Japan Society ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Dry Storage ◽  
Storage Methods ◽  
Interim Storage

Spent nuclear fuel coming from a Japanese nuclear power plant is stored in the interim storage facility before reprocessing. There are two types of the storage methods which are wet and dry type. In Japan, it is anticipated that the dry storage facility will increase compared with the wet type facility. The dry interim storage facility using the metal cask has been operated in Japan. In another dry storage technology, there is a concrete overpack. Especially in USA, a lot of concrete overpacks are used for the dry interim storage. In Japan, for the concrete cask, the codes of the Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers and the governmental technical guidelines are prepared for the realization of the interim storage as well as the code for the metal cask. But the interim storage using the concrete overpack has not been in progress because the evaluation on the stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of the canister is not sufficient. Japanese interim storage facilities would be constructed near the seashore. The metal casks and concrete overpacks are stored in the storage building in Japan. On the other hand, in USA they are stored outside. It is necessary to remove the decay heat of the spent nuclear fuel in the cask from the storage building. Generally, the heat is removed by natural cooling in the dry storage facility. Air including the sea salt particles goes into the dry storage facility (Figure 1). Concerning the concrete overpack, air goes into the cask body and cools the canister. Air goes along the canister surface and is in contact with the surface directly. In this case, the sea salt in the air attaches to the surface and then there is the concern about the occurrence of the SCC. For the concrete overpack, the canister including the spent fuel is sealed by the welding. The loss of sealability caused by the SCC has to be avoided. To evaluate the SCC for the canister, it is necessary to make clear the amount of the sea salt particles coming into the storage building and the concentration on the canister. In present, the evaluation on that point is not sufficient. In this study, the concentration of the sea salt particles in the air and on the surface of the storage facility are measured inside and outside of the building. For the measurement, two sites of the dry storage facility using the metal cask are chosen. This data is applicable for the evaluation on the SCC of the canister to realize the interim storage using the concrete overpack.

Safety Aspects of a Dry Interim Storage Facility for Spent Fuel Cernavoda NPP

1997 ◽  
pp. 171-175
Author(s):  
Maria Radu ◽  
Marcela Stanciu ◽  
Adrian Panait ◽  
Traian Barbu ◽  
Silvia Mateescu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Storage Facility ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Safety Aspects ◽  
Interim Storage
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