Chapter VI. Logismoi of the Rational Part of the Soul

2021 ◽  
pp. 251-277
Keyword(s):  
Rational Part

scholarly journals Universal geometric coefficients for the four-punctured sphere (Extended Abstract)

2015 ◽  
Vol DMTCS Proceedings, 27th... (Proceedings) ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily Barnard ◽  
Emily Meehan ◽  
Shira Polster ◽  
Nathan Reading
Keyword(s):  
Cluster Algebra ◽  
Short List ◽  
Nous Permet ◽  
Rational Part ◽  
International Audience

International audience We construct universal geometric coefficients for the cluster algebra associated to the four-punctured sphere and obtain, as a by-product, the $g$ -vectors of cluster variables. We also construct the rational part of the mutation fan. These constructions rely on a classification of the allowable curves (the curves which can appear in quasi-laminations). The classification allows us to prove the Null Tangle Property for the four-punctured sphere, thus adding this surface to a short list of surfaces for which this property is known. The Null Tangle Property then implies that the shear coordinates of allowable curves are the universal coefficients. We compute these shear coordinates to obtain universal geometric coefficients. Nous construisons des coefficients géométriques universels pour l’algèbre amassée associée à la sphère privée de 4 points, et obtenons ce faisant les $g$-vecteurs des variables d’amas. Nous construisons aussi la partie rationnelle de l’éventail de mutation. Ces constructions reposent sur la classification des courbes admissibles (les courbes qui peuvent apparaître dans les quasi-laminations). Cette classification nous permet de prouver la “Null Tangle Property” pour la sphère privée de 4 points, ajoutant ainsi cette surface à la courte liste de surfaces pour lesquelles cette propriété est connue. La “Null Tangle Property” implique alors que les coordonnées de décalage des courbes admissibles sont les coefficients universels. Nous calculons ces coordonnées de décalage pour obtenir les coefficients géométriques universels.

Aristotle

2020 ◽  
pp. 34-50
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Detailed Account ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Rational Part ◽  
Human Good ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Right

Aristotle agrees with Plato that virtue requires the cooperation of the rational and the non-rational parts of the soul, and that the virtuous person is always better off than the non-virtuous, even though virtue alone is not sufficient for happiness. To strengthen Plato’s argument for this claim, he offers a more detailed account of the nature of happiness, and of the relation between virtue and happiness. Since happiness is the supreme human good, it should be identified with rational activity in accordance with virtue in a complete life, in which external circumstances are favourable. A virtue of character is the appropriate agreement between the rational and the non-rational parts of the soul, aiming at fine action (i.e., action that promotes the common good). This requirement of appropriate agreement distinguishes virtue from continence (mere control of the rational over the non-rational part). To show that a life of virtue, so defined, promotes the agent’s happiness, Aristotle argues that one’s own happiness requires the right kind of friendship with others, in which one aims at the good of others for their own sake.

Plato

2020 ◽  
pp. 24-33
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Difficult Case ◽  
Rational Part ◽  
Human Good ◽  
Good For ◽  
Other Regarding

Plato rejects Socrates’ belief that knowledge of the good is sufficient for being virtuous; he argues that human souls have a non-rational part (emotions, impulses), and that the virtues require not only knowledge, but also the correct training of the non-rational part. He rejects Socrates’ belief that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Instead he argues that the virtuous person is always happier than anyone else. He defends this view in the most difficult case, the other-regarding virtue of justice. Plato recognizes that one may plausibly argue that my justice is good for other people, but harmful to me. None the less he rejects this argument. The appropriate relation between the rational and the non-rational parts of the soul promotes both the agent’s good and the good of others; that is why the just person is happier than anyone else. Those who suppose that the just person may be worse off by being just do not understand the character of the human good.

Soul in Islamic philosophy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shams C. Inati
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Islamic Philosophy ◽  
Ibn Sina ◽  
Ibn Rushd ◽  
Rational Part ◽  
Important Position ◽  
Ultimate Objective ◽  
The Universe

The discussion of the human soul, its existence, nature, ultimate objective and eternity, occupies a highly important position in Islamic philosophy and forms its main focus. For the most part Muslim philosophers agreed, as did their Greek predecessors, that the soul consists of non-rational and rational parts. The non-rational part they divided into the plant and animal souls, the rational part into the practical and the theoretical intellects. All believed that the non-rational part is linked essentially to the body, but some considered the rational part as separate from the body by nature and others that all the parts of the soul are by nature material. The philosophers agreed that, while the soul is in the body, its non-rational part is to manage the body, its practical intellect is to manage worldly affairs, including those of the body, and its theoretical intellect is to know the eternal aspects of the universe. They thought that the ultimate end or happiness of the soul depends on its ability to separate itself from the demands of the body and to focus on grasping the eternal aspects of the universe. All believed that the non-rational soul comes into being and unavoidably perishes. Some, like al-Farabi, believed that the rational soul may or may not survive eternally; others, like Ibn Sina, believed that it has no beginning and no end; still others, such as Ibn Rushd, believed that the soul with all its individual parts comes into existence and is eventually destroyed.

The Subject of the Virtues

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. H. Irwin
Keyword(s):  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Rational Part ◽  
The Subject

Aristotle divides the soul into a rational and a non-rational part, and this division underlies his theory of the virtues. Virtues of character are virtues of the non-rational part. Mediaeval students of Aristotle express this view by saying that the passions are the subject of the virtues. Virtues of character require the agreement of the passions with the rational part of the soul. In a virtuous person, the rational part achieves ‘indirect rationality’, so that it agrees with the ‘direct rationality’ of the desires of the rational part. The capacity of the non-rational part for listening to reason in this way supports Aquinas’ argument for making the passions the ‘subject’ of some virtues of character.

Perfection and the Psychophysical Process of Habituation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariska Leunissen
Keyword(s):  
Rational Part ◽  
Psychological Capacities ◽  
Scientific Treatment ◽  
Qualitative Changes

Chapter 5 offers a psychophysical account of how habituation changes the bodies and souls of men and makes them virtuous, by building on Aristotle’s discussion of habituation as a form of perfection in Physics VII 3, which is the only extended natural scientific treatment of the processes of habituation in the corpus. Character virtue, then, is a proportionate, unified, and stable relation that exists among the capacities that are constitutive of the perceptive part of the soul, have all individually undergone qualitative changes so that each is in the best condition possible, and are suitably obedient to the rational part of the soul, which is practically wise. The perfection that brings about this kind of psychological relation is very hard to achieve because it involves the alteration of many psychological capacities, each of which requires its own particular kind of training from infancy onward.

scholarly journals Feynman rules for the rational part of the QCD 1-loop amplitudes

2009 ◽  
Vol 2009 (04) ◽  
pp. 072-072 ◽  
Author(s):  
P Draggiotis ◽  
M.V Garzelli ◽  
C.G Papadopoulos ◽  
R Pittau
Keyword(s):  
Rational Part ◽  
Feynman Rules ◽  
Loop Amplitudes

Teleology and the Parts of the Soul

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Payne
Keyword(s):  
Rational Part ◽  
Different Parts

This chapter seeks to describe the particular sort of psychic conflict that allows Socrates to distinguish different parts of the soul. In Republic 4 Socrates argues that the soul has roughly the same parts as the best city. The resulting parts of the soul (appetite, spirit, and desire) are described as capable of acting for such ends as pleasure, honor, and knowledge. The function of the rational part, calculation, is described in detail. Two sorts of unity between parts of the soul are described. A weak unity characterizes a soul whose parts are capable of helping each other carry out their own tasks but often interfere with each other. A strong unity characterizes the virtuous soul whose parts actively help each other achieve their different ends. In the virtuous soul, each part acts for the sake of achieving the end of strong unity.

Clever Villains

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cinzia Arruzza
Keyword(s):  
Rational Part ◽  
Negative Role ◽  
The City

This chapter addresses the role of the tyrannical man’s rational part. Based on the discussion in Book VI of the Republic concerning the danger for the city represented by corrupted philosophical natures and other passages (such as the reference to the role of intelligence in vicious people, at 519a1–b5), this chapter explores the hypothesis that the tyrant may be endowed with strong intellectual capabilities. Seen in this light, the tyrant may be an example of reason’s complete moral perversion and his intellectual capabilities may play an important and negative role. The chapter further explores the nature of the madness attributed to the tyrant and its connection to bad beliefs concerning the good, of which Thrasymachus’ and Glaucon’s defense of injustice and tyranny are exemplary.

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