The Subject of the Virtues
Aristotle divides the soul into a rational and a non-rational part, and this division underlies his theory of the virtues. Virtues of character are virtues of the non-rational part. Mediaeval students of Aristotle express this view by saying that the passions are the subject of the virtues. Virtues of character require the agreement of the passions with the rational part of the soul. In a virtuous person, the rational part achieves ‘indirect rationality’, so that it agrees with the ‘direct rationality’ of the desires of the rational part. The capacity of the non-rational part for listening to reason in this way supports Aquinas’ argument for making the passions the ‘subject’ of some virtues of character.
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1966 ◽
Vol 25
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pp. 363-371
1966 ◽
Vol 27
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pp. 159-161
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1973 ◽
Vol 31
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pp. 122-123
1970 ◽
Vol 28
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pp. 26-27
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1969 ◽
Vol 27
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pp. 152-153
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1973 ◽
Vol 31
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pp. 380-381
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