scholarly journals Transfer Pricing Audit Challenges and Dispute Resolution Effectiveness in Developing Countries with Specific Focus on Zimbabwe

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Favourate Yelesedzani Sebele-Mpofu ◽  
Eukeria Mashiri ◽  
Patrick Korera
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Multinational Enterprises ◽  
Resource Constraints ◽  
Transfer Pricing ◽  
Specific Reference ◽  
Profit Shifting ◽  
Business World ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
The Core ◽  
Arm’S Length Principle

Abstract Base erosion and profit shifting activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) have been a hot issue globally. Topical among the strategies employed by MNEs has been the issue of transfer pricing (TP). Developing countries are argued to be significantly affected by TP manipulation resulting in substantial tax revenues being lost. As a response to curb the unfavourable impacts of transfer mispricing, most developing countries have adopted the OECD TP guidelines and enacted TP legislation to regulate TP activities. The arm’s length principle is the core of TP legislation, yet it has brought challenges for tax administrators and their auditors in enforcing and assessing compliance respectively leading to disputes. In view of the ever-changing business world and continuous efforts by MNEs to minimise their tax obligations through income shifting, it was imperative to assess the factors affecting the effectiveness of TP audits and dispute resolutions as measures to enhance compliance and enforcement in developing countries, with specific reference to Zimbabwe. Findings include the lack of clarity in TP legislation, resource constraints and complexity of transactions, lack of expertise as well as the shortage of comparable data. Developing countries are encouraged to formulate clear TP regulations and invest in the capacitation of revenue authorities.

Simplification in Transfer Pricing

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Aitor Navarro
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Transfer Pricing ◽  
Policy Option ◽  
Profit Shifting ◽  
Accepted Standard

It is the aim of this contribution to sustain that, despite the inherent complexity that the enforcement of the arm’s length rationale entails, it is feasible—and desirable—to introduce simplification measures without abandoning this worldwide accepted standard, especially in the context of developing countries and despite reticence shown by international organizations such as the OECD. Complexity in transfer pricing erodes fairness and equity and promotes profit shifting, which paradoxically constitutes the opposite outcome that this set of rules wants to achieve. This is the reason why it is urgent to propose and encourage the adoption of a means to neutralize unnecessary complexity in this field. The adoption of rebuttable predetermined margins and/or methods is proposed as the best solution in a context in which policymakers want to keep the arm’s length rationale intact. Also, even despite its shortcomings, irrebuttable predetermined safe harbors should be considered potentially feasible and a valid policy option.

Challenges of Monitoring Tax Compliance by Multinational Firms: Evidence from Chile

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 500-505
Author(s):  
Sebastián Bustos ◽  
Dina Pomeranz ◽  
José Vila-Belda ◽  
Gabriel Zucman
Keyword(s):  
Multinational Firms ◽  
Transfer Pricing ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Tax Compliance ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Profit Shifting ◽  
Effective Tax Rates ◽  
Arm’S Length Principle ◽  
Debt Shifting

This paper reviews common challenges of taxing multinational firms, using Chile as a case study. We briefly describe key international tax avoidance methods: profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions through transfer pricing and debt shifting. We discuss the prevalent policy to tax multinationals--the arm's length principle--and alternative proposals using apportionment formulas. Novel data from Chile show that multinationals make up a large share of GDP but report lower profit and effective tax rates than local firms. In 2011, Chile implemented a reform following OECD guidelines to enforce the arm's length principle. We discuss potential effects on tax collection and welfare.

scholarly journals El proyecto BEPS y la planeación fiscal

2019 ◽  
pp. 37-50
Author(s):  
José Luis BÁRCENAS-PUENTE ◽  
Miguel Ángel ANDRADE-OSEGUERA
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Multinational Enterprises ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Tax Planning ◽  
Tax Burden ◽  
Profit Shifting ◽  
Fiscal Planning ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Way

Tax planning seeks, through the application of the law and other sources of law; reduce, eliminate or defer the payment of contributions; under this scheme, it is a lawful activity which constitutes a right for every taxpayer. However, the tax authority does not share this consideration and see decreased revenues as a result of these practices, describes them as illegal. To take out this type of strategy on a large scale, multinational enterprises have managed to reduce their tax burden, especially in developing countries; for this purpose, members of the OECD and the G-20 countries undertaken a series of actions known as "Project BEPS" (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting), in Spanish Base Erosion and location of utilities. This material is intended to expose the legality or illegality of fiscal planning, the contents of the BEPS project and the reactions of Mexico in this regard; in an analytical, critical and purposeful way through of the documental available sourses, using induction meanly. By the way, try it give a general panorama of the theme, providing elements of judgment of wich the reader can support this position.

MULTINATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND ANTI-AVOIDANCE ENFORCEMENT: FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM DEVELOPING ASEAN COUNTRIES

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
ATHIPHAT MUTHITACHAROEN ◽  
KRISLERT SAMPHANTHARAK
Keyword(s):  
Multinational Enterprises ◽  
Transfer Pricing ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Manufacturing Firms ◽  
Profit Shifting ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Firm Level Data ◽  
Avoidance Measures ◽  
Asean Countries

We use firm-level data from ASEAN5 to examine the significance of tax-motivated profit shifting by multinational enterprises and to analyze how anti-avoidance measures mitigate the profit shifting. We show that (1) tax-motivated profit shifting is statistically and economically significant, especially for manufacturing firms, (2) auditing and transfer-pricing scrutiny is more effective in reducing profit shifting than documentation requirement alone and (3) tax-motivated profit shifting is prominent for large firms, while anti-tax avoidance measures result in the absence of profit shifting detected from small manufacturing firms. The findings have important implications for developing countries with weak governance but dependent on MNEs.

scholarly journals Transfer Pricing: Conceptual Thoughts on the Nature of the Multinational Firm

2006 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Brem ◽  
Thomas Tucha
Keyword(s):  
Value Chain ◽  
Multinational Enterprises ◽  
Multinational Firms ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Transfer Pricing ◽  
Multinational Firm ◽  
Value Chains ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Business World ◽  
Clear Cut

This paper deploys Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to elaborate on the shortcomings of ‘mainstream‘ transfer pricing in multinational firms. Departing from the notion that multinationals increasingly (re-)organize their business along multinational value chains irrespective of jurisdictional borders, this paper discusses the nature of the multinational firm and the problem of choosing the right intra-group (transfer) price. The mainstream transfer pricing approach derived from the Arm�s Length Principle (ALP) is deemed inappropriate for globally operating multinational enterprises (MNEs). Referring to the value chain model, the paper suggests that ‘entrepreneurial coordination’ is the key performance feature to be used for valuing business activity and for allocating — for tax transfer pricing purposes — standard mark-ups and residual profits along the value chain. The main findings of this paper are: Neo-classical concepts on marginal pricing may not suffice to establish arm's lengh transfer pricing; the inadequacy between tax-world transfer pricing (getting income allocation right) and business-world transfer pricing (getting management incentives right) might find its explanation in such concepts. MNEs need to be understood as large organizations different from domestic large organizations by the fact that they operate in different jurisdictions and/or institutional environments. Operative business is coordinated along business lines in which value chain processes can e identified. De facto, business-world transfer pricing takes place along such value chains in which tangible and intangible assets are transferred and hence require appropriate pricing from both the tax-world and the business-world perspective. TCE is a worthy candidate for illustrating governance structures and transactional attributes of business between related parties of a multinational group; such features support arguments to establish arm's length transfer pricing. Regularly, a clear cut-off of functional allocation into tax jurisdictions is difficult to achieve because of the high degree of integration into the value chains of the multinational. TCE appears to better distinguish between so-called �routine� and ‘non-routine’ functions. Transactions of the MNE are rarely of an ‘either-or’ feature (either ‘market’ or ‘hierarchy’). Depending upon transactional attributes, the price of such transaction can be assessed by variables describing the institutional and economic context, the transaction-specific contract, the stage of the business process involved, the strategy chosen, and the function pattern (function, risk, assets) Comparable information is rarely found in databases which provide company information. The more non-routine functions and intangibles are involved, the less is the tested function (or business unit) comparable with companies from external databases. Under these data constraints on comparables, the arm�s length tests on transfer pricing will have to resort to internal information if the ALP is intended to remain viable. A next-generation transfer pricing approach may have to make use of patterns of governance to characterize and to value the functional contributions to the overall value chain.

scholarly journals Tax Avoidance through Controlled Foreign Companies under European Union Law with Specific Reference to Poland

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Błażej Kuźniacki
Keyword(s):  
Multinational Enterprises ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Specific Reference ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Legal Analysis ◽  
Profit Shifting ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Effective Prevention ◽  
Foreign Companies

Abstract This article demonstrates that tax avoidance via controlled foreign companies (CFCs) established in the most favourable tax environments among EU Member States such as Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Cyprus, remains a considerable problem. Not only does it affect taxpaying residents in the Member States but, indirectly, all taxpayers regardless of their EU affiliation, US multinational enterprises (MNEs), for example. Focusing on the use Polish taxpayers make of CFCs, this study undertakes a detailed legal analysis of the problem of tax avoidance under EU law by examining empirical data and EU law on tax avoidance. The choice of this topic is largely justified by the exponential rise in tax avoidance schemes through CFCs involving Polish taxpayers since the country’s accession to the EU. The legal analysis brings to light a series of weaknesses in the current EU law that make it possible for both EU and non-EU taxpayers to avoid taxation. As a solution to this problem, the author suggests that CFC rules should be designed so as to tax only “tax avoidance income” from CFCs. This would ensure their compliance with EU law as well as an effective prevention of tax avoidance via CFCs within the framework of EU law. Interestingly, the solution follows from the author’s interpretation of the concept of “wholly artificial arrangements” in favour of the internal market rather than from Action 3 of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project or Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive as adopted by the Council on 12 July 2016.

scholarly journals Profit shifting in Brazil and the impact of tax havens

2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (85) ◽  
pp. 95-108
Author(s):  
Alex A. T. Rathke
Keyword(s):  
Multinational Enterprises ◽  
Transfer Pricing ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Profit Shifting ◽  
Tax Havens ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Pricing Rules ◽  
Robust Least Squares ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Impact

ABSTRACT We investigate tax-induced profit shifting in Brazil and the impact of tax havens on the shifting behavior of firms. Profit shifting research in Brazil is virtually non-existent, although the shifting incentives in Brazil are prominent. Our research fills this gap with evidences in the novel Brazilian context. Profit shifting is a tax-minimization strategy where multinational enterprises perform intra-firm transactions to allocate taxable profits to low-tax locations. Brazil combines a remarking set of profit shifting incentives, especially a high corporate tax rate, extremely complex tax system, and distinguished transfer pricing rules. Further researches may leverage from the shifting incentives in Brazil, since it provides opportunities to investigate additional factors that affect the shifting behavior of firms. We analyze 989 transaction-by-country observations for the period of 2010-2017. Baseline analysis follows the robust least squares approach with controlling covariates. Linear estimate model derives from the conventional Cobb-Douglas production function, to analyze the impact of shifting incentives on profit maximization. We find that Brazilian firms have a high level of intra-firm transactions with related parties located in low-tax countries, especially with tax havens. It represents a strong evidence of profit shifting behavior in Brazilian firms.

scholarly journals DOES THE RECENTLY IMPLEMENTED REGULATION ON COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING DETER TAX AVOIDANCE?

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nala Kurniawan ◽  
◽  
Anggari Saputra ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Multinational Enterprises ◽  
Transfer Pricing ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Profit Shifting ◽  
Percentage Point Increase ◽  
Point Increase ◽  
Private Disclosure ◽  
Tax Payments

To adhere with Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action 13, Indonesia enacted regulations concerning Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR) to address the issue of tax avoidance. Those regulations introduced the requirement of CbCR in Indonesia, where Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) operating in Indonesia are required to provide tax authorities with geographic breakdown of their profitability, tax payments, and activities wherever they operate. Using the newly implemented CbCR in Indonesia as a treatment for private disclosure requirement, this study examines the effect of CbCR on MNEs tax avoidance. Employing EUR 750 million consolidated revenue threshold for disclosure and utilizing regression discontinuity design as well as difference-in-differences analysis, we document a 4-8 percentage point increase in effective tax rates among affected MNEs, thus reflecting a decrease in tax avoidance in treatment firms. Our findings contribute (i) to the recent empirical literature on how CbCR as a private disclosure affects corporate tax avoidance behavior and (ii) to the policy evaluation whether CbCR regulation has achieved its objective.

scholarly journals Revised OECD Transfer pricing Guidelines and the Czech tax policy

2011 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 301-308
Author(s):  
Veronika Solilová
Keyword(s):  
Czech Republic ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Multinational Enterprises ◽  
Transfer Pricing ◽  
Practical Application ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
Arm’S Length Principle ◽  
Transfer Prices

In applying the international principles to the taxation of Multinational Enterprises, one of the most difficult issues that have arisen is the establishment for tax purposes of appropriate transfer prices. Transfer prices are significant for both taxpayers and tax administrations because they determine in large part the income and expenses, and therefore taxable profits, of associated enterprises in different tax jurisdictions. The Committee on Fiscal Affairs, which is the main tax policy body of the OECD, has issued a number of reports relating to the transfer pricing issues. The most important are the Transfer pricing Guidelines for multinational enterprises and tax authorities which was published in 1995. These Guidelines focus on the application of the arm’s length principle to evaluate the transfer pricing of associated enterprises, the analysis of the methods for evaluating whether the conditions of commercial and financial relations within Multinational Enterprises satisfy the arm’s length principle and discussion of the practical application of those methods. Simply, these Guidelines focus on the main issues of principle that arise in the transfer pricing area. The Committee on Fiscal Affairs continues its work in this area, on 22 July 2010 approved and released the proposed revisions to Chaps. I through III of these Guidelines and simultaneously published a new Chap. IX related to business restructuring. The revisions are the result of several years of work on comparability and the use of profit-based methods. The revised text will have a significant impact on the application of transfer pricing analysis and transfer pricing methods. The paper is focused on significant changes of newly approved Guidelines with aim to evaluate how the Czech Republic began applying the principles set out in the revised text of these Guidelines.

scholarly journals The Harmonisation of Transfer Pricing: the Obstacles, the Arm's Length Principle and the OECD Guidelines

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Duran Timms
Keyword(s):  
Multinational Enterprises ◽  
Transfer Pricing ◽  
Legal Obligation ◽  
Fair Share ◽  
Pricing Rules ◽  
Arm’S Length Principle ◽  
Significant Obstacle ◽  
Domestic Law

<p>This essay argues that the complete harmonisation of transfer pricing rules with the arm’s length principle is unattainable for three reasons. First, states are not under a legal obligation to apply the principle outside of treaty or domestic law. Second, the theoretical shortcomings of the principle are creating a divergence from the OECD guidelines on how the principle should be applied. Third, the perception held by states that multinational enterprises are not paying a fair share of tax is also creating a divergence from the OECD guidelines on the principle. The resultant divergence is a significant obstacle to transfer pricing harmonisation.</p>

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