scholarly journals Planned Solvency III Regulation: Should It Be Adopted Outside the European Union?

Author(s):  
Peter Zweifel

Abstract Several countries outside the European Union consider adopting its solvency regulation for their insurance industries. However, Solvency I and (to a lesser extent) Solvency II were found to run the risk of inducing more rather than less risk-taking by insurers (Zweifel, Peter. 2014. “Solvency Regulation of Insurers: A Regulatory Failure?” Journal of Insurance Issues 37 (2): 135–157.). Companies are led to neglect parameters that link them to developments in the capital market when determining their endogenous perceived efficiency frontier (EPEF), causing it to become steeper. Given homothetic risk preferences, senior management is predicted to opt for increased rather than reduced volatility. By way of contrast, if modeled after Basel III for banks, planned Solvency III will ask insurers to take developments in the capital market into account in their formulation of business strategies designed to ensure solvency (Principle 5 of Basel III). In addition, the stipulated decrease in their leverage ratio is shown to reduce the slope of the EPEF for insurers with little solvency capital. Contrary to its predecessors, Solvency III is therefore predicted to make insurers take on less risk, which argues for its for adoption beyond the European Union if properly implemented.

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (6) ◽  
pp. 258
Author(s):  
Peter Zweifel

Basel III, regulating the solvency of banks, is to be fully implemented by 2027 while Solvency III directed at insurers is being prepared. In view of past experience, it will be closely modelled after Basel III. This raises two questions. (i) Will Basel III and Solvency III be more successful than their predecessors? (ii) Is it appropriate to continue regulating the solvency of banks and insurers in the same way? The first question is motivated by an earlier finding that Basel I and II risked inducing more rather than less risk-taking by banks, which also holds for Solvency I and II w.r.t. insurers. The methodology applied was to determine the slope of an endogenous perceived efficiency frontier (EPEF) in (μ^,σ^)-space derived from banks’ and insurers’ optimal adjustment to exogenous changes, in expected returns dμ¯ and volatility dσ¯ on the capital market. Both Basel I and II and Solvency I and II neglected the impact of these developments on banks’ and insurers’ EPEF. This neglect had the effect of steepening the EPEF, causing senior management to opt for an increased rather than reduced value of σ^, and hence a lower solvency level. This issue is resolved by Basel III (Principle 5), which requires banks to take developments in the capital market into account in the formulation of their business strategies designed to ensure solvency. In combination with increased capital requirements, this is shown to result in a reduced slope of their EPEF and hence a reduced risk exposure. However, planned Solvency III may cause the EPEF of highly capitalized insurance companies to become steeper, with a concomitant decrease in their risk-taking and an increase of their solvency level. The second question, concerning the appropriateness of the uniformity of solvency regulation directed at banks and insurers, arises because the parameters determining the slope of the respective EPEF are found to crucially differ. Therefore, the uniformity of Basel and Solvency norms creates the risk of a mistaken regulatory focus.


Author(s):  
Olena Yu. Volkovych ◽  

The article provides a theoretical and legal analysis of the legal support of Ukraine in the context of raising capital by banks in international markets. The author determined that the economic crisis in the country is protracted, the capital market in Ukraine remains largely underdeveloped. The state has taken many steps to overcome the economic crisis, identified priority measures, strategic steps to build a sustainable economy, in particular, many efforts have been made to find free funds to attract investment, but this, as practice shows, was not enough. An important step in building a free and competitive state was the adoption of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Community. This document is the largest international legal document in the history of Ukraine and the largest international agreement with a third country ever concluded by the European Union. In accordance with the Program of Integration of Ukraine into the European Union (hereinafter - the Program), approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine � 1072/2000 of 14.09.2000. Synchronization of internal market transformations of changes in the processes of EU enlargement. First of all, it concerns: reform of executive and judicial bodies and cooperation of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine with courts; administrative and territorial reform; formation of the foundations of regional development policy (including legislation on the distribution of competencies, budgets, taxes); completion of privatization (primarily enterprises of strategic importance for the economy and security of the state and banks); reforming the banking sector as a whole. Thus, in particular, a developed capital market is usually seen as a competitor in the commercial banking sector, as they compete for retention and investment opportunities. However, in today�s financial system, there are complementary relationships between the capital market and banks, as they choose different segments of the financial markets and focus on different types of customers. In the process of writing the article came to the following conclusions. The right direction in the reform of the economic sector is to determine the measures of state investment support should be preceded by a detailed analysis of the effect of the benefits and preferences previously granted to economic entities. Establish the legislative level the provision that the minimum amount of public investment should be equal to the amount of all new debt, i.e., the amount of borrowings during the year may not exceed the amount of budget expenditures to finance investments. Introduce the practice of developing and implementing investment incentive packages. Introduce a practice in which the decision on new borrowings is preceded by public information on which projects have already been used to finance the funds and for which purposes (projects) new borrowings are envisaged. Establish strict control over debt activities.


Author(s):  
Łukasz Chyla

The new Prospectus Regulation and the information efficiency of capital markets in the European UnionThe economic analysis of law suggests that one of the main obstacles to the strengthening of European Capital Markets are, on the one hand, the entry barriers for capital companies seeking financial support, and on the other, lack of proper information protection for investors, which discourages them from placing money on the financial markets. The current regulation is flawed for at least several reasons. First, there are many differentiating regimes within European Union. Second, the current regulation imposes too many requirements and information obligations on listed companies, which significantly increases transaction costs and makes searching for funding on the capital markets unprofitable for many players. As a result, some of them target other alternative methods of obtaining funds from investors such as FinTechs, Blockchain, Tokens, which in turn weakens the investors protection. As a consequence, the capital outflow from capital markets makes them even less competitive. Third, most of retail investors are practically unable to digest the significant amount of detailed information presented by publicly-listed companies due to the current prospectus obligations, which, in consequence, discourages them from further investments on the capital market. The main goal of the paper is to evaluate numerous issues related to current regulation on European capital markets in terms of information requirements that create “barriers to entry” for public companies and, at the same time, fail to establish a proper information order and transparency obligations — therefore discouraging retail investors from investing in the capital markets. Another goal of the paper is to present the perspectives of the upcoming Prospectus Regulation within European Capital Markets which aims to harmonize the transparency obligations and thus, to unlock effective and cheap funding in the capital market, and as a consequencestimulate the Europe’s economic growth. Nowa Regulacja Prospektowa a efektywność informacyjna na rynku kapitałowym w Unii EuropejskiejEkonomiczna analiza prawa sugeruje, że jedną z głównych przeszkód wzmocnienia europejskich rynków kapitałowych są z jednej strony bariery wejścia dla spółek kapitałowych ubiegających się o finansowanie, z drugiej zaś brak odpowiedniej ochrony informacyjnej inwestorów, który zniechęca ich do lokowania pieniędzy na rynkach finansowych. Obecne regulacje prospektowe są wadliwe z co najmniej kilku powodów. Po pierwsze, w Unii Europejskiej istnieje wiele systemów różniących się od siebie w fundamentalnych kwestiach. Po drugie, obecne rozporządzenie nakłada zbyt wiele wymogów i obowiązków informacyjnych na spółki notowane na giełdzie, co znacznie zwiększa koszty transakcyjne i sprawia, że poszukiwanie funduszy na rynkach kapitałowych jest nieopłacalne dla wielu mniejszych graczy. W rezultacie niektóre z nich celują w inne, alternatywne metody pozyskiwania funduszy od inwestorów takich jak FinTechs, Blockchain, Tokens, co z kolei osłabia ogólną ochronę inwestorów na rynku kapitałowym. W konsekwencji odpływ kapitału z rynków kapitałowych powoduje, że są one jeszcze mniej konkurencyjne. Po trzecie, większość inwestorów detalicznych praktycznie nie jest w stanie przeanalizować znacznej ilości szczegółowych informacji przedstawianych przez spółki notowane na giełdzie ze względu na obowiązki prospektowe, co w konsekwencji zniechęca ich do dalszych inwestycji na rynku kapitałowym. Głównym celem artykułu jest ocena licznych zagadnień związanych z bieżącymi regulacjami dotyczącymi europejskich rynków kapitałowych pod kątem wymagań informacyjnych, które tworzą „bariery wejścia” dla spółek publicznych, a jednocześnie nie ustanawiają odpowiedniego porządku informacyjnego i przejrzystości zobowiązania — zniechęcając tym samym inwestorów detalicznych do inwestowania na rynkach kapitałowych. Innym celem artykułu jest przedstawienie perspektyw nadchodzącego rozporządzenia w sprawie prospektu emisyjnego na europejskich rynkach kapitałowych, który ma zharmonizować obowiązki w zakresie przejrzystości, a tym samym uwolnić od efektywnego i taniego finansowania na rynku kapitałowym, a w konsekwencji stymulować wzrost europejskiej gospodarki.


Author(s):  
Răzvan Hoinaru ◽  
Mihnea Năstase

Abstract There is a considerable amount of publications written on rolling back the EU supra state, national sovereignty regain, and strategic (mis)conceptions for analysing Brexit scenarios for both the UK and the EU. Many articles present a unilateral point of view with a tendency to be normative. The presentation of only one-sided political, historical, and business perspectives can be very dangerous, limiting understanding and constructive approaches. This also happens with macro-economic analyses that are used fit for purpose. David Cameron’s political calculation to call for a referendum regarding the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union has had complex ramifications. With causes that have led to the British citizens’ decision that range from multiple crises in the European Union, member states’ inability for burden and risk sharing, to the lack of trust portrayed by European institutions and a confusing internal rhetoric. With a City of London remaining undecided and continuously evaluating the value at risk of Brexit, and in the absence of a new European financial center, it is important to make sense of the arguments of both in and out supporters. Thus, this article attempts to present a more integrated approach, spanning across politics, trade, private businesses and social attitudes. This paper looks beyond international relations between nations and takes into consideration the international relations between corporations and their business strategies.


2017 ◽  
Vol 65 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 436-452
Author(s):  
Jelena Kočović ◽  
Marija Koprivica ◽  
Blagoje Paunović

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 860-878
Author(s):  
Ulf Brunnbauer ◽  
Andrew Hodges

In 2012, the large Uljanik shipyard in Pula (Croatia) was finally privatized, as a result of pressure from the European Union. The new owners were the workers (and pensioners) of the shipyard. History seemed to have come full circle: thanks to ‘privatization’, a previously ‘socially owned’ Yugoslav enterprise returned once again into the hands of workers. Yet, a closer look reveals that much has changed both on the shop floor and in the business strategies of the firm. In this article, we discuss performances of transformation relating to the Uljanik shipyard over the period from 1970 to the present, drawing on archival research, observations made in Pula and interviews with Uljanik workers. The article reveals how workers, managers and state officials understood their roles on the stage of this enterprise, and how they interrelated. Various important paradoxes relating to the ‘transformation’ from Yugoslav self-management to self-managed capitalism are revealed in the process. These experiences help to explain the difficulties in restructuring shipbuilding in Croatia today.


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