The Psychology of Justice

2006 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fiery Cushman ◽  
Liane Young ◽  
Marc Hauser
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Complete Understanding ◽  
Natural Justice ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Distribution Of Resources ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
What Matters

AbstractIn Natural Justice Binmore offers a game-theoretic map to the landscape of human morality. Following a long tradition of such accounts, Binmore’s argument concerns the forces of biological and cultural evolution that have shaped our judgments about the appropriate distribution of resources. In this sense, Binmore focuses on the morality of outcomes. This is a valuable perspective to which we add a friendly amendment from our own research: moral judgments appear to depend on process just as much as outcome. What matters is not just that the butler is dead, but who killed him, how, and for what reason. Thus, a complete understanding of natural justice’ will entail an account not only of evolutionary pressures, but also of the psychological mechanisms upon which they act.

scholarly journals Psychological Mechanisms Forged by Cultural Evolution

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cecilia Heyes
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Developmental Psychology ◽  
Comparative Psychology ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Cultural Learning ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Fit For Purpose ◽  
Nature And Nurture

The adaptive features of cognitive mechanisms, the features that make them fit for purpose, have traditionally been explained by nature and nurture. In the last decade, evidence has emerged that distinctively human cognitive mechanisms are also, and predominantly, shaped by culture. Like physical technology, human cognitive mechanisms are inherited via social interaction and made fit for purpose by culture evolution. This article surveys evidence from developmental psychology, comparative psychology, and cognitive neuroscience indicating that imitation, mentalizing, and language are “cognitive gadgets” shaped predominantly by cultural evolution. This evidence does not imply that the minds of newborn babies are blank slates. Rather, it implies that genetic evolution has made subtle changes to the human mind, allowing us to construct cognitive gadgets in the course of childhood through cultural learning.

scholarly journals A mutualistic approach to morality: The evolution of fairness by partner choice

2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas Baumard ◽  
Jean-Baptiste André ◽  
Dan Sperber
Keyword(s):  
Partner Choice ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Social Mechanisms ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Collective Actions ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
Mutual Help ◽  
Fitness Consequences ◽  
Distribution Of Resources

AbstractWhat makes humans moral beings? This question can be understood either as a proximate “how” question or as an ultimate “why” question. The “how” question is about the mental and social mechanisms that produce moral judgments and interactions, and has been investigated by psychologists and social scientists. The “why” question is about the fitness consequences that explain why humans have morality, and has been discussed by evolutionary biologists in the context of the evolution of cooperation. Our goal here is to contribute to a fruitful articulation of such proximate and ultimate explanations of human morality. We develop an approach to morality as an adaptation to an environment in which individuals were in competition to be chosen and recruited in mutually advantageous cooperative interactions. In this environment, the best strategy is to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation equally. Those who offer less than others will be left out of cooperation; conversely, those who offer more will be exploited by their partners. In line with this mutualistic approach, the study of a range of economic games involving property rights, collective actions, mutual help and punishment shows that participants' distributions aim at sharing the costs and benefits of interactions in an impartial way. In particular, the distribution of resources is influenced by effort and talent, and the perception of each participant's rights on the resources to be distributed.

scholarly journals The sympathetic plot, its psychological origins, and implications for the evolution of fiction

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manvir Singh
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Main Character ◽  
Common Elements ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Common Structure ◽  
Cooperative Partner ◽  
Narrative Patterns ◽  
Psychological Capacities

For over a century, scholars have compared stories and proposed universal narrative patterns. Despite their diversity, nearly all of these projects converged on a common structure: the sympathetic plot. The sympathetic plot describes how a goal-directed protagonist confronts obstacles, overcomes them, and wins rewards. Stories with these features frequently exhibit other common elements, including an adventure and an orphaned main character. Here, I identify and aim to explain the sympathetic plot. I argue that the sympathetic plot is a technology for entertainment that works by engaging two sets of psychological mechanisms. First, it triggers mechanisms for learning about obstacles and how to overcome them. It builds interest by confronting a protagonist with a problem and induces satisfaction when the problem is solved. Second, it evokes sympathetic joy. It establishes the protagonist as an ideal cooperative partner pursuing a justifiable goal, convincing audiences that they should assist the character. When the protagonist succeeds, they receive rewards, and audiences feel sympathetic joy, an emotion normally triggered when cooperative partners triumph. The psychological capacities underlying the sympathetic plot are not story-specific adaptations. Instead, they evolved for purposes like learning and cooperation before being co-opted for entertainment by storytellers and cultural evolution.

scholarly journals Extortion, intuition, and the dark side of reciprocity

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Regan Bernhard ◽  
Fiery Andrews Cushman
Keyword(s):  
Psychological Research ◽  
Human Interaction ◽  
Dark Side ◽  
Social Partner ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Retributive Punishment ◽  
Distribution Of Resources ◽  
Desirable Behavior

Extortion occurs when one person uses some combination of threats and promises to extract an unfair share of benefits from another. Although extortion is a pervasive feature of human interaction, it has received relatively little attention in psychological research. To this end, we begin by observing that extortion is structured quite similarly to far better-studied “reciprocal” social behaviors, such as conditional cooperation and retributive punishment. All of these strategies are designed to elicit some desirable behavior from a social partner, and do so by constructing conditional incentives; the main difference is that the desired behavioral response is an unfair or unjust allocation of resources during extortion, whereas it is often a fair or just distribution of resources for reciprocal cooperation and punishment. Thus, we conjecture, a common set of psychological mechanisms may render these strategies successful. We know from prior work that prosocial forms of reciprocity often work best when implemented inflexibly and intuitively, rather than deliberatively. This both affords long-term commitment to the reciprocal strategy, and also signals this commitment to social partners. We argue that, for the same reasons, extortion is likely to depend largely upon inflexible, intuitive psychological processes. Several existing lines of circumstantial evidence support this conjecture.

An Introduction to Evolutionary Perspectives on Religion

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Liddle ◽  
Todd K. Shackelford
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Costly Signaling ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Costly Signaling Theory ◽  
Evolved Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Complementary Nature ◽  
Evolution Of Religion ◽  
Counterintuitive Concepts ◽  
Evolutionary Perspectives

Given that religious beliefs and behaviors are so pervasive and have such a powerful influence, it is vital to try to understand the psychological underpinnings of religiosity. This chapter introduces the topic of evolutionary perspectives on religion, beginning with an attempt to define “religion,” followed by a primer on evolutionary psychology and the concept of evolved psychological mechanisms. With this framework in place, the chapter then provides an overview of key adaptationist and byproduct hypotheses of various components of religion, highlighting the complementary nature of these hypotheses and their roles in forming a cohesive understanding of the evolution of religion. Concepts introduced in this chapter include hyperactive agency detection, minimally counterintuitive concepts, in-group cooperation, costly signaling theory, gods as moralizing agents, and cultural evolution.

scholarly journals Noncompliance With Safety Guidelines as a Free-Riding Strategy: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach to Cooperation During the COVID-19 Pandemic

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jose C. Yong ◽  
Bryan K. C. Choy
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
The Social ◽  
Evolved Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Game Theoretic

Evolutionary game theory and public goods games offer an important framework to understand cooperation during pandemics. From this perspective, the COVID-19 situation can be conceptualized as a dilemma where people who neglect safety precautions act as free riders, because they get to enjoy the benefits of decreased health risk from others’ compliance with policies despite not contributing to or even undermining public safety themselves. At the same time, humans appear to carry a suite of evolved psychological mechanisms aimed at curbing free riding in order to ensure the continued provision of public goods, which can be leveraged to develop more effective measures to promote compliance with regulations. We also highlight factors beyond free riding that reduce compliance rates, such as the emergence of conspiratorial thinking, which seriously undermine the effectiveness of measures to suppress free riding. Together, the current paper outlines the social dynamics that occur in public goods dilemmas involving the spread of infectious disease, highlights the utility and limits of evolutionary game-theoretic approaches for COVID-19 management, and suggests novel directions based on emerging challenges to cooperation.

scholarly journals Modern moral judgments show traces of both ancient and culturally recent sanctioning systems

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boyoung Kim ◽  
John Voiklis ◽  
Bertram F Malle
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Group Living ◽  
Modern Human ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Modern Times ◽  
Norm Violations ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
First Time ◽  
Historical Origins

Modern human societies demand enforcement of social and moral norms using two types of sanctions that have distinct historical origins. Informal sanctions (e.g., chiding a relative) have existed since the dawn of humanity, whereas formal sanctions (e.g., punishment by the state) emerged more recently—over the last few thousand years, when laws began to separate norm violations into illegal and non-illegal violations. However, little research has investigated the psychological mechanisms underlying people’s use of these two distinct systems of sanctions. We show for the first time that these different cultural histories have left detectable traces in people’s moral judgments of today. When considering formal sanctions, people are experts in discriminating among illegal violations of varying severity, which is an adaptation to the culturally recent introduction of authority and law. When considering light informal sanctions (e.g., disapproval), people are experts in discriminating among non-illegal violations of varying severity, which serves the regulation of countless social norms of modern times. Most strikingly, when considering heavy informal sanctions (e.g., lashing out), people show equal discrimination expertise for both illegal and non-illegal violations, which likely reflects the moral responses of ancient group living.

Random isn't real: How the patchy distribution of ecological rewards may generate “incentive hope”

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurel Symes ◽  
Thalia Wheatley
Keyword(s):  
Natural Environment ◽  
Random Distribution ◽  
Spatiotemporal Distribution ◽  
Patchy Distribution ◽  
Distribution Of Resources

AbstractAnselme & Güntürkün generate exciting new insights by integrating two disparate fields to explain why uncertain rewards produce strong motivational effects. Their conclusions are developed in a framework that assumes a random distribution of resources, uncommon in the natural environment. We argue that, by considering a realistically clumped spatiotemporal distribution of resources, their conclusions will be stronger and more complete.

Social transmission bias and the cultural evolution of folk-economic beliefs

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Hirshleifer ◽  
Siew Hong Teoh
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Social Transmission ◽  
Cognitive Approach ◽  
Economic Problems ◽  
Economic Attitudes ◽  
The Social ◽  
Economic Beliefs ◽  
Over Time

AbstractEvolved dispositions influence, but do not determine, how people think about economic problems. The evolutionary cognitive approach offers important insights but underweights the social transmission of ideas as a level of explanation. The need for asocialexplanation for the evolution of economic attitudes is evidenced, for example, by immense variations in folk-economic beliefs over time and across individuals.

Cautiously optimistic rationalism may not be cautious enough

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin F. Landy
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Judgments

Abstract May expresses optimism about the source, content, and consequences of moral judgments. However, even if we are optimistic about their source (i.e., reasoning), some pessimism is warranted about their content, and therefore their consequences. Good reasoners can attain moral knowledge, but evidence suggests that most people are not good reasoners, which implies that most people do not attain moral knowledge.

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