Misselling in Self-placement and Bank Resolution under BRRD2

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 522-557
Author(s):  
Ugo Malvagna ◽  
Antonella Sciarrone Alibrandi
Keyword(s):  
Investor Protection ◽  
Regulatory Environment ◽  
Bank Resolution ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Retail Investors ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Effective Integration

Abstract1. Bank crises and the treatment of retail investors in the BRRD era. – 2. The problem of misselling in the context of self-placement of securities issued by banks. – 3. The (loose) interplay between investor protection and bank resolution in the current regulatory environment. – 4. The Single Resolution Board’s policy on the treatment of retail clients’ holdings for the purpose of MREL eligibility. – 5. Art. 44 a BRRD 2 on the «selling of subordinated eligible liabilities to retail clients». – 6. The need for a more effective integration between investor protection and bank resolution discipline: from an ex-post to an ex-ante approach. The role of product governance under MiFID 2. – 7. Concluding remarks.

Monopoly Regulation Under Relaxed Pareto Efficiency

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 162-176
Author(s):  
Ismail Saglam
Keyword(s):  
Marginal Cost ◽  
Regulatory Environment ◽  
Pareto Dominance ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Monopoly Regulation ◽  
Dominance Relationships ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Pareto Axiom ◽  
Set Of Points

Baron and Myerson (BM; 1982, Econometrica, 50(4), 911–930) propose an incentive-compatible, individually rational and ex ante socially optimal direct-revelation mechanism to regulate a monopolistic firm with unknown costs. Their mechanism is not ex post Pareto dominated by any other feasible direct-revelation mechanism. However, there also exist an uncountable number of feasible direct-revelation mechanisms that are not ex post Pareto dominated by the BM mechanism. To investigate whether the BM mechanism remains in the set of ex post undominated mechanisms when the Pareto axiom is slightly weakened, we introduce the ∈-Pareto dominance. This concept requires the relevant dominance relationships to hold in the support of the regulator’s beliefs everywhere except for a set of points of measure ∈, which can be arbitrarily small. We show that a modification of the BM mechanism which always equates the price to the marginal cost can ∈-Pareto dominate the BM mechanism at uncountably many regulatory environments, while it is never ∈-Pareto dominated by the BM mechanism at any regulatory environment.

Competence over Control

2020 ◽  
pp. 78-99
Author(s):  
Alexander Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
International Level ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Over Time

The UN Security Council increasingly authorizes weapons inspections to enforce nonproliferation. These are cases of indirect governance, where the Council (the governor) relies on separate bodies (intermediaries) to conduct inspections in states of concern (targets). Despite the risks, the Council often seems willing to forego control in return for gaining the benefits of a competent intermediary that can address its ambitious policy goals and capability deficits. These cases point to important differences between preexisting intermediaries (such as the IAEA and OPCW) and ad hoc intermediaries created for specific tasks (such as the inspection commissions that operated in Iraq). The latter are far more amendable to control, both ex ante and ex post. Over time, we see increasing goal divergence between the governor and intermediaries, driven mainly by the shifting interests of Security Council members, but we also see the competence of intermediaries increase as they gain on-the-ground experience, making control more difficult. The collective nature of the Security Council further complicates control efforts, creating a temptation for individual members to interfere unilaterally with intermediaries and targets. The analysis suggests that the role of sovereign, strategic targets deserves more attention in the study of indirect governance at the international level.

scholarly journals Measuring sustainability under regime shift uncertainty: a resilience pricing approach

2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (6) ◽  
pp. 707-719 ◽  
Author(s):  
KARL-GÖRAN MÄLER ◽  
CHUAN-ZHONG LI
Keyword(s):  
Growth Model ◽  
Regime Shift ◽  
Shadow Price ◽  
Annual Review ◽  
Dynamic Economy ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Welfare Measures ◽  
Sustainability Measurement

ABSTRACTThis paper is concerned with the theory of resilience pricing and sustainability measurement in the presence of risk for regime shift in a dynamic economy–environment system. Following Holling (Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, vol. 4, 1973, pp. 1–23), we consider resilience as the maximal perturbation that the system can absorb without flipping into a qualitatively different state. Using a multisector growth model under uncertainty, we derive the shadow price of resilience that affects the probabilities of the system to flip in the future. We also analyze the role of resilience on sustainability with both ex-ante and ex-post welfare measures.

scholarly journals Ex Post (In) Efficient Negotiation and Breakdown of Trade

2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (5) ◽  
pp. 291-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajkamal Iyer ◽  
Antoinette Schoar
Keyword(s):  
Allocative Efficiency ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Study Methodology

This paper examines frictions in contract renegotiation and its implications for allocative efficiency of contracts. Using a novel audit study methodology, we find that contracting parties in general are reluctant to engage in hold up. However, many efficient renegotiations of contracts also do not happen for the fear of being seen as extracting surplus. We also find that ex ante contracts are structured to mitigate losses arising from breach risk rather than hold up. The results also highlight that role of norms of fairness and reputation concerns in sustaining transactions in settings where contracts are primarily incomplete.

scholarly journals Ex Ante and Ex Post Evaluations: Two Sides of the Same Coin?

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lut Mergaert ◽  
Rachel Minto
Keyword(s):  
Gender Equality ◽  
Research Policy ◽  
Study Approach ◽  
Post Evaluation ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Policy Making Process ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Two Sides

This article engages with two themes of contemporary EU governance: the role of evaluations within an effective and coherent policy–making process and the EU's constitutionalised commitment to promoting gender equality in all its activities (Article 8 TFEU). It focuses on the interface between ex ante and ex post evaluation and the contribution of evaluations to policy learning, with particular attention to the promotion of gender equality. A case study approach is followed, with EU research policy as the object of analysis.

scholarly journals Risk taking by agents: The role of ex-ante and ex-post accountability

2014 ◽  
Vol 123 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monique M.H. Pollmann ◽  
Jan Potters ◽  
Stefan T. Trautmann
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante

Justicia penal y corrupción: déficits, resultados, posibilidades

2016 ◽  
pp. 43-75
Author(s):  
Antonio DEL MORAL GARCÍA
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Preventive Measures ◽  
Criminal Procedure ◽  
Public Prosecutor ◽  
Procedural Law ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Exclusive Or ◽  
Derecho Penal

LABURPENA: Zigor zuzenbideak ustelkeriaren kontrako borrokan izan behar duen paperak osagarria behar du izan, baina ez esklusiboa edo baztertzailea. Zigor zuzenbidea ez da nahikoa ustelkeriari aurre egiteko, eta arriskua dago zuzenbidea bera eta zigor prozesua usteltzeko, oinarrizko berme batzuk baztertuta. Zigor zuzenbidea ezinbestekoa da ataza horri aurre egiteko, baina prebentziozko beste gizarte eta, bereziki, lege neurri batzuk hartu behar dira, alegia: gardentasuna, aurretiazko eta geroko kontrol eragingarri profesionalizatuak … Ikuspuntu hori oinarri izaki, testuak zenbait figura aztertzen ditu euren hutsuneak eta aukerak detektatzeko, ustelkeriarekin lotutako jarrerak jazartzeko garaian. Figurok hauexek dira: batetik, zigor zuzenbide substantiboan, zigor zuzenbidearen azken aldaketak, konfiskazioa; bestetik, zuzenbide prozesalean, aldiz, justizia azkartzeko neurriak edo damutuak; eta azkenik, zuzenbide organikoan, berriz, fiskaltza eta herri akzioa. RESUMEN: El papel del derecho penal en la lucha contra los fenómenos de corrupción ha de ser complementario y no exclusivo o excluyente. Sólo con derecho penal no solo no se vence a la corrupción sino que se corre el peligro de corromper al mismo derecho y proceso penal laminando algunas de sus garantías básicas. El Derecho penal es imprescindible para esa tarea pero ha de acompañarse de otras medidas preventivas más eficaces tanto sociales como singularmente legales: transparencia, controles eficaces previos y posteriores profesionalizados… Desde ese punto de partida el texto hace un recorrido por algunas instituciones de derecho penal sustantivo (últimas reformas penales, decomiso); procesal (medidas de agilización, arrepentidos) y orgánico (ministerio fiscal, acción popular) para revisar sus déficits y posibilidades en la represión de conductas ligadas a la corrupción. ABSTRACT: The role of Criminal Law in the fight against corruption phenomena has to be complementary and not exclusive or excluding. With just Criminal Law not only the corruption is not won but there is danger that the same Law and Criminal procedure get corrupted by grinding some of their basic guarantees. Criminal Law is essential for that purpose but it has to be helped by preventive measures more efficient both socially and specifically legal: transparency, professional ex ante and ex post efficient controls. From that start, the text shows some of the substantive Criminal law institutions (last criminal reforms, confiscation), procedural law institutions (measures for facilitation, repentants) and organic law institutions (public prosecutor office, popular action) in order to review their deficits and possibilities in the punishment of those behaviours linked to corruption.

scholarly journals Contractual Incompleteness for External Risks

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Susheng Wang
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Incomplete Contract ◽  
Employment Contract ◽  
Control Option ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Contractual Incompleteness ◽  
Incentive Problems

In a model with internal and external risks together with incentive problems, this paper investigates the role of a risky environment on contractual incompleteness. We consider a typical employment contract with an extra control option. This option is contractable ex ante, exercisable ex post, and good for incentives. But, the employer may choose not to have it in a contract. We identify some interesting circumstances under which the option is not in the optimal contract. Our main findings are that (1) external risks determine contractual incompleteness, and (2) a complete contract can better handle incentives, while an incomplete contract can better handle external risks. Hence, our analysis of incomplete contracts is somewhat consistent with Williamson's (1985) idea of low-powered incentives inside the firm and high-powered incentives outside the firm.

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