scholarly journals Risk taking by agents: The role of ex-ante and ex-post accountability

2014 ◽  
Vol 123 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monique M.H. Pollmann ◽  
Jan Potters ◽  
Stefan T. Trautmann
Keyword(s):  
Ex Post ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 78-99
Author(s):  
Alexander Thompson

The UN Security Council increasingly authorizes weapons inspections to enforce nonproliferation. These are cases of indirect governance, where the Council (the governor) relies on separate bodies (intermediaries) to conduct inspections in states of concern (targets). Despite the risks, the Council often seems willing to forego control in return for gaining the benefits of a competent intermediary that can address its ambitious policy goals and capability deficits. These cases point to important differences between preexisting intermediaries (such as the IAEA and OPCW) and ad hoc intermediaries created for specific tasks (such as the inspection commissions that operated in Iraq). The latter are far more amendable to control, both ex ante and ex post. Over time, we see increasing goal divergence between the governor and intermediaries, driven mainly by the shifting interests of Security Council members, but we also see the competence of intermediaries increase as they gain on-the-ground experience, making control more difficult. The collective nature of the Security Council further complicates control efforts, creating a temptation for individual members to interfere unilaterally with intermediaries and targets. The analysis suggests that the role of sovereign, strategic targets deserves more attention in the study of indirect governance at the international level.


2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (6) ◽  
pp. 707-719 ◽  
Author(s):  
KARL-GÖRAN MÄLER ◽  
CHUAN-ZHONG LI

ABSTRACTThis paper is concerned with the theory of resilience pricing and sustainability measurement in the presence of risk for regime shift in a dynamic economy–environment system. Following Holling (Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, vol. 4, 1973, pp. 1–23), we consider resilience as the maximal perturbation that the system can absorb without flipping into a qualitatively different state. Using a multisector growth model under uncertainty, we derive the shadow price of resilience that affects the probabilities of the system to flip in the future. We also analyze the role of resilience on sustainability with both ex-ante and ex-post welfare measures.


2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (5) ◽  
pp. 291-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajkamal Iyer ◽  
Antoinette Schoar

This paper examines frictions in contract renegotiation and its implications for allocative efficiency of contracts. Using a novel audit study methodology, we find that contracting parties in general are reluctant to engage in hold up. However, many efficient renegotiations of contracts also do not happen for the fear of being seen as extracting surplus. We also find that ex ante contracts are structured to mitigate losses arising from breach risk rather than hold up. The results also highlight that role of norms of fairness and reputation concerns in sustaining transactions in settings where contracts are primarily incomplete.


2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lut Mergaert ◽  
Rachel Minto

This article engages with two themes of contemporary EU governance: the role of evaluations within an effective and coherent policy–making process and the EU's constitutionalised commitment to promoting gender equality in all its activities (Article 8 TFEU). It focuses on the interface between ex ante and ex post evaluation and the contribution of evaluations to policy learning, with particular attention to the promotion of gender equality. A case study approach is followed, with EU research policy as the object of analysis.


Author(s):  
Antonio DEL MORAL GARCÍA

LABURPENA: Zigor zuzenbideak ustelkeriaren kontrako borrokan izan behar duen paperak osagarria behar du izan, baina ez esklusiboa edo baztertzailea. Zigor zuzenbidea ez da nahikoa ustelkeriari aurre egiteko, eta arriskua dago zuzenbidea bera eta zigor prozesua usteltzeko, oinarrizko berme batzuk baztertuta. Zigor zuzenbidea ezinbestekoa da ataza horri aurre egiteko, baina prebentziozko beste gizarte eta, bereziki, lege neurri batzuk hartu behar dira, alegia: gardentasuna, aurretiazko eta geroko kontrol eragingarri profesionalizatuak … Ikuspuntu hori oinarri izaki, testuak zenbait figura aztertzen ditu euren hutsuneak eta aukerak detektatzeko, ustelkeriarekin lotutako jarrerak jazartzeko garaian. Figurok hauexek dira: batetik, zigor zuzenbide substantiboan, zigor zuzenbidearen azken aldaketak, konfiskazioa; bestetik, zuzenbide prozesalean, aldiz, justizia azkartzeko neurriak edo damutuak; eta azkenik, zuzenbide organikoan, berriz, fiskaltza eta herri akzioa. RESUMEN: El papel del derecho penal en la lucha contra los fenómenos de corrupción ha de ser complementario y no exclusivo o excluyente. Sólo con derecho penal no solo no se vence a la corrupción sino que se corre el peligro de corromper al mismo derecho y proceso penal laminando algunas de sus garantías básicas. El Derecho penal es imprescindible para esa tarea pero ha de acompañarse de otras medidas preventivas más eficaces tanto sociales como singularmente legales: transparencia, controles eficaces previos y posteriores profesionalizados… Desde ese punto de partida el texto hace un recorrido por algunas instituciones de derecho penal sustantivo (últimas reformas penales, decomiso); procesal (medidas de agilización, arrepentidos) y orgánico (ministerio fiscal, acción popular) para revisar sus déficits y posibilidades en la represión de conductas ligadas a la corrupción. ABSTRACT: The role of Criminal Law in the fight against corruption phenomena has to be complementary and not exclusive or excluding. With just Criminal Law not only the corruption is not won but there is danger that the same Law and Criminal procedure get corrupted by grinding some of their basic guarantees. Criminal Law is essential for that purpose but it has to be helped by preventive measures more efficient both socially and specifically legal: transparency, professional ex ante and ex post efficient controls. From that start, the text shows some of the substantive Criminal law institutions (last criminal reforms, confiscation), procedural law institutions (measures for facilitation, repentants) and organic law institutions (public prosecutor office, popular action) in order to review their deficits and possibilities in the punishment of those behaviours linked to corruption.


2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (4) ◽  
pp. 1398-1413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander W Cappelen ◽  
James Konow ◽  
Erik Ø Sørensen ◽  
Bertil Tungodden

Choices involving risk significantly affect the distribution of income and wealth in society. This paper reports the results of the first experiment, to our knowledge, to study fairness views about risk-taking, specifically whether such views are based chiefly on ex ante opportunities or on ex post outcomes. We find that, even though many participants focus exclusively on ex ante opportunities, most favor some redistribution ex post. Many participants also make a distinction between ex post inequalities that reflect differences in luck and ex post inequalities that reflect differences in choices. These findings apply to both stakeholders and impartial spectators. (JEL D63, D81, H23)


Author(s):  
Anna Cieslak ◽  
Annette Vissing-Jorgensen

Abstract Since the mid-1990s, negative stock returns comove with downgrades to the Fed’s growth expectations and predict policy accommodations. Textual analysis of FOMC documents reveals that policy makers pay attention to the stock market. The primary mechanism is their concern with the consumption wealth effect, with a secondary role for the market predicting the economy. We find little evidence of the Fed overreacting to the market in an ex post sense (reacting beyond the market’s effect on growth expectations). Although policy makers are aware that the Fed put could induce risk-taking, moral hazard considerations appear not to significantly affect their decision-making ex ante.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 522-557
Author(s):  
Ugo Malvagna ◽  
Antonella Sciarrone Alibrandi

Abstract1. Bank crises and the treatment of retail investors in the BRRD era. – 2. The problem of misselling in the context of self-placement of securities issued by banks. – 3. The (loose) interplay between investor protection and bank resolution in the current regulatory environment. – 4. The Single Resolution Board’s policy on the treatment of retail clients’ holdings for the purpose of MREL eligibility. – 5. Art. 44 a BRRD 2 on the «selling of subordinated eligible liabilities to retail clients». – 6. The need for a more effective integration between investor protection and bank resolution discipline: from an ex-post to an ex-ante approach. The role of product governance under MiFID 2. – 7. Concluding remarks.


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