Kant’s Epistemological Reorientation of Ontology

Kant Yearbook ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chong-Fuk Lau
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Complex Theory ◽  
Ontological Realism ◽  
Causal Framework ◽  
Empirical Realism

Abstract This paper analyzes Kant’s epistemological reorientation of ontology, explaining in what sense Kant’s complex theory of transcendental idealism and empirical realism should be understood as an ontological realism under the framework of epistemological idealism. The paper shows that Kant’s concept of existence is only applicable to empirical objects in the spatiotemporal causal framework. Accordingly, not only things in themselves, but also epistemic conditions such as the transcendental subject and the faculties of sensibility and understanding cannot be said to exist. They are theoretical constructs in the transcendental discourse to account for the normative conditions of objective cognition and reality.

Kantian Realisms: The Noumenal, Causation and Grounding

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison Assiter
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Transcendental Realism ◽  
Empirical Realism

This chapter outlines a strong version of ‘realism’ against what Meillassoux labels ‘correlationism’. It suggests, however, that the critiques made by certain realists of the Kantian noumenal can be answered. It begins by defending Kantian ‘empirical realism’ against the critiques of some realists. Then it moves on to claim that Kant’s arguments for transcendental idealism are stronger than those for Bhaskar’s transcendental realism. The chapter suggests, more controversially, that if one takes seriously Kant’s notion of ‘spontaneous causation’, it is possible to offer a Kantian defence of the ‘grounding’ of the phenomenal in the noumenal. Finally, it argues that Kant offers a stronger form of realism than is generally supposed by his critics.

scholarly journals El espacio en cuanto forma de los fenómenos y la tesis de la receptividad: mutua implicación

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 270
Author(s):  
Diana Gloria Contreras Gallegos
Keyword(s):  
Space Form ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Full Treatment ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
Empirical Realism

Mi objetivo es hacer notar que existe un nexo de mutua implicación entre dos tesis kantianas: la tesis de la receptividad (nuestro conocimiento depende de que seamos afectados por los objetos) y la tesis del espacio en cuanto forma de los fenómenos. Un tratamiento completo de la tesis de la receptividad implica el idealismo trascendental de Kant en torno al espacio. Desde mi lectura, ello en absoluto afecta al realismo empírico kantiano. Para mostrar lo anterior, exploro aquí la segunda consecuencia ("b) a la que Kant arriba tras haber presentado sus argumentos en favor de la naturaleza a priori e intuitiva del espacio en la Estética Trascendental.  Palabras clave:  espacio, forma de la intuición, receptividad, idealismo trascendental, realismo empírico   Abstract: My purpose in this paper is to point out that there is a mutual implication between two Kantian thesis: the Receptivity Thesis (our knowledge depends on being affected by objects) and the thesis of the space at a form of the phenomena; so that, a full treatment of the receptivity thesis implies Kant's transcendental idealism of space. On my reading this doesn't compromise Kant's empirical realism. In order to show this I explore here the second consequence ("b") that Kant arrives after he shows his arguments in favour of the space in the Transcendental Aesthetics.   Keywords: space, form of intuition, receptivity, transcendental idealism, empirical realism 

scholarly journals Is the Kantian Transcendentalism Idealism? Kant's Conceptual Realism

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Sergey Katrechko
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order System ◽  
Realistic Interpretation ◽  
Conceptual Realism ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
Empirical Realism ◽  
Empirical Idealism

In my paper I argue, relying on Kantian definitions and conceptual distinctions, the thesis that Kantian transcen-dental philosophy, which he characterizes as a second-order system of transcendental idealism, is not [empirical] idealism, but a form of realism (resp. compatible with empirical realism [A370-1]). As arguments in favor of this “realistic” thesis, I consistently develop a realistic interpretation of the Kant’s concept of appearance (the theory of “two aspects”), as well as of Kantian Copernican revolution, of his theory of intuition as cognitive ability which 'giving' ‘us objects, of the concept of double affection and noumenal causality.

Real realism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Zahavi
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Speculative Realism ◽  
The World ◽  
Natural Realism ◽  
Empirical Realism ◽  
Two Alternatives

How much of an anti-realist is Husserl? Or to put it differently, how many of our realist intuitions can his transcendental idealism accommodate? In Chapter 6, I contrast Husserl’s position with two allegedly realist views, namely speculative realism and neuro-representationalism, and argue that Husserl’s theory might be in a better position to defend our natural realism than either of these two alternatives. I next discuss to what extent Husserl’s endorsement of transcendental idealism is motivated by his attempt to safeguard the objectivity of the world of experience and ward off a form of global scepticism. As will become clear, not unlike Kant, Husserl did not merely think that transcendental idealism and empirical realism are compatible, he also thought that the latter requires the former.

scholarly journals Subatomic Particles, Epistemic Stances, and Kantian Antinomies

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Henschen
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism ◽  
Subatomic Particles ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Town ◽  
Epistemic Stances ◽  
Empirical Realism ◽  
Scientific Ontology

AbstractIn Scientific Ontology, Chakravartty diagnoses a “dramatic conflict” between empiricism and metaphysics and aims to overcome that conflict by opting for a modern-day variant of Pyrrhonism, i.e. by appreciating the equal strength (isostheneia) of the arguments for and against the empiricist and metaphysical positions, and by achieving tranquility (ataraxia) by suspending judgment or remaining speechless in the face of that isostheneia. In this paper, I want to argue that instead of remaining speechless in the face of the isostheneia of the arguments for and against the empiricist and metaphysical positions, we should adopt a position that remains underrated in Chakravartty’s analysis: a position that amounts to a modern-day variant of the Kantian combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism, and that like the original Kantian combination, is capable of solving many instances of the dramatic conflict between empiricism and metaphysics and, in particular, a conflict that is the talk of the town in philosophy of science these days—the conflict between ontic-structural realism and Lewisian metaphysics.

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