Subatomic Particles, Epistemic Stances, and Kantian Antinomies

In Scientific Ontology, Chakravartty diagnoses a “dramatic conflict” between empiricism and metaphysics and aims to overcome that conflict by opting for a modern-day variant of Pyrrhonism, i.e. by appreciating the equal strength (isostheneia) of the arguments for and against the empiricist and metaphysical positions, and by achieving tranquility (ataraxia) by suspending judgment or remaining speechless in the face of that isostheneia. In this paper, I want to argue that instead of remaining speechless in the face of the isostheneia of the arguments for and against the empiricist and metaphysical positions, we should adopt a position that remains underrated in Chakravartty’s analysis: a position that amounts to a modern-day variant of the Kantian combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism, and that like the original Kantian combination, is capable of solving many instances of the dramatic conflict between empiricism and metaphysics and, in particular, a conflict that is the talk of the town in philosophy of science these days—the conflict between ontic-structural realism and Lewisian metaphysics.

Scientific Ontology: Fact or Stance?

ABSTRACTIn this paper, the key tenets of Anjan Chakravartty's book Scientific Ontology are critically discussed. After a brief presentation of the project of stance-based ontology (Section 2), I move on to criticize Chakravartty's account of metaphysical inference (Sections 2 and 3). Then, in Section 4, I take issue with Chakravartty's view that fundamental debates in metaphysics inevitably lead to irresolvable disagreement, while in Section 5, the concept of epistemic stance is scrutinized, noting that there are problems in Chakravartty's account of the rationality of stance-choice. Finally, Section 6 is about the implications of stance-based ontology for the scientific realism debate.

Extending the Ladder of Stances: Comments on Chakravartty's Scientific Ontology

ABSTRACTI raise questions about Chakravartty's voluntarism about stances: supposing that we recognize a hierarchy of stances, voluntarism might be at once true (in an ultimate sense) but misleading when it comes to the practical tenability of pursuing certain debates in the philosophy of science, such as the debate about scientific realism or how to ‘naturalize’ metaphysics.

A Thousand Flowers on the Road to Epistemic Anarchy: Comments on Chakravartty's Scientific Ontology

ABSTRACTI introduce the symposium on Anjan Chakravartty's Scientific Ontology by summarizing the book's main claims. In my commentary, I first challenge Chakravartty's claim that naturalized metaphysics cannot be indexed to science simpliciter. Second, I argue that there are objective truths regarding what conduces to particular epistemic aims, and that Chakravartty is therefore too permissive regarding epistemic stances and their resultant ontologies. Third, I argue that it is unclear what stops epistemic stances from having unlimited influence. Finally, I argue that Chakravartty's epistemic stance voluntarism is inadequately motivated and lacks empirical support for its psychological content.

Risk, Reward, and Scientific Ontology: Reply to Bryant, Psillos, and Slater

ABSTRACTScientific Ontology: Integrating Naturalized Metaphysics and Voluntarist Epistemology contends that ontological commitments associated with scientific inquiry are infused with philosophical commitments. Interpretations of scientific ontology involve (what I call) metaphysical inferences, and furthermore, there are different ways of making these inferences, on the basis of different but nonetheless rational epistemic stances. If correct, this problematizes any neat distinction between naturalized and other metaphysics, and dissolves any presumption of there being a uniquely correct answer to ontological questions connected to the sciences. In this paper, I consider some weighty challenges to these contentions by Amanda Bryant, Stathis Psillos, and Matthew Slater.

The return of metaphysics as a subject matter of historical ontology: analytical review (ending)

The second part of the article continues the analytical and historiographical overview of the problems that are substantively related to the question of the role, meaning and historical fate of metaphysics. The author focuses on the phenomenon of the return of metaphysics to the philosophy of our time. The author traces the gradual rehabilitation of metaphysical problems in post-positivist studies of sci-ence. An attempt is made to differentiate these studies from the viewpoint of the opposition between internalism and externalism. The author shows the limits of this differentia-tion and highlights the mixed type of re-search, which focuses on the interaction of “external” and “internal” determinants of knowledge. It is shown that the postpositivist idea of the background knowledge extends not only to scientific (empirical) knowledge, but also to its philosophical (theoretical) justification, which is recognized by many re-searchers as historically and culturally conditioned. This opens up the possibility of a historical critique of the ontological presuppositions of the epistemological (transcendental) justification of science. Such presuppositions are considered in relation to the dis-course of negative ontology, which prohibits the cognitive experience of transcendent be-ing. The author shows that the criticism of these assumptions is carried out in the form of a regressive transcendental argument, which, comparing them with a new, philo-sophically revised scientific ontology, reveals their historically limited character. Thus, the regressive transcendental argument allows us to go beyond the negative ontology of the transcendental justification of science. This leads to the replacement of historical epistemology, whose subject matter is limited to knowledge and its historically mobile structures, with historical ontology, which returns to the description and explanation of reality. The author considers the concepts of new re-alism in the context of historical ontology and traces the connection of the new realism with the post-metaphysical and metametaphysical discourses.

Positing numerosities may be metaphysically extravagant; positing representation of numerosities is not

Clarke and Beck (C&B) assume that approximate number system (ANS) representations should be assigned referents from our scientific ontology. However, many representations, both in perception and cognition, do not straightforwardly refer to such entities. If we reject C&B's assumption, many possible contents for ANS representations besides number are compatible with the evidence C&B cite.

Distributed Cognition, Porous Qualia and Modernist Narrative

This chapter’s purpose is two-fold: to propose an approach to distributed cognition as qualia and to probe modernist narratives and cultural history for insights about such qualia’s effects. Following Daniel Dennett’s distinction between scientific ontology, dependent on empirically verifiable (or falsifiable) truth, and ‘manifest ontology,’ or the truth of what someone is experiencing, the chapter takes fictional narratives as the manifest truth of ‘porous qualia,’ or what it is like to feel we extend beyond our skin. Drawing on Arnold Bennett, James Joyce, and Virginia Woolf, the chapter defines three modes of porous qualia termed projecting, responding, and circulating, ranging from the most minimal forms to the most penetrating and innovative. Against the background of aggressively unified nationalisms, these modes culminate in Woof’s use of rhythmic repetitive touch to adumbrate a new communal modelling that combines feelings of connectiveness with respect for difference in individual lives.