What the Trade Pioneers Missed: Money

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron James

Abstract Matias Risse and Gabriel Wollner’s On Trade Justice largely neglects the role of money and central banking in ‘trade fairness.’ This article rehearses why J. M. Keynes thought money and global central banking matters for national capacity, and suggests that this helps answer Risse and Wollner’s chief objection to Aaron James’s Fairness in Practice.

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-23
Author(s):  
Miomir Jakšić

Abstract The article discusses the status and role of regulatory bodies and the aftermaths of their independence and accountability to the public and the parliament. The author analyses different legal statuses of regulatory bodies in Montenegro and Serbia in the central banking and energy sectors and concludes that it is necessary that national constitutions, as the highest legal acts in each state, prescribe in a separate article that “Regulatory bodies are independent and accountable to Parliament”. Relevant separate legal acts should closely define the procedures for establishing, enforcing, and sanctioning of possible breaching of: 1) independence of regulatory bodies, 2) accountability of regulatory bodies to the parliament, and 3) transparency of their activities.


Ekonomia ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 9-25
Author(s):  
Arkadiusz Sieroń

The Role of Cantillon Effect in EconomicsThe aim of this article is to examine the role of the Cantillon effect in economics. The literature of economic theory lacks the detailed discussion of the implications of the first-round effect for economics. This paper attempts to fill this gap. The article is mainly theoretical, but considerations presented are illustrated by relevant empirical data. Based on the analysis, the author concludes that the effect of Cantillon develops particularly the theory of money and inflation, the theory of banking and central banking, the theory of business cycle and price bubbles, the theory of income distribution and income and wealth inequalities, and the theory of public choice.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-78
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Szunke

The changes in the modern monetary policy, which took place at the beginning of the twenty-first century, in response to the global financial crisis led to the transformation of the place and the role of central banks. The strategic aim of the central monetary institutions has become preventing financial instability. So far, central banks have defined financial stability as a public good, which took care independently of other monetary purposes (Pyka, 2010). Unconventional monetary policy resulted in changes the global central banking. The aim of the study is to identify a new paradigm of the role and place of the central bank in the financial system and its new responsibilities, aimed at countering financial instability.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 122-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Csaba Lentner ◽  
Pál Péter Kolozsi

The global financial crisis highlighted the limitations of the mainstream economic thinking. The post-crisis reflection has not resulted yet in any new paradigm, however, several new, still separate, innovative approaches appeared in the field of public finances and economic governance. The aim of the paper is to provide a structured presentation of these new innovative approaches, which can serve as a potential basis of a new way of thinking about economic and financial governance and the innovation of public finances. The paper reviews the relevant international literature published after the global financial crisis and, as a result, presents the innovations, especially in respect of the role of the state, the renewal of central banking, the reassessment of the stability and geopolitical aspects of economic policy, the relevance of confidence and cooperation in public policy, the increasing role of the public sector concerning the sustainability of economic development and the renaissance of institutional economics. Based on these new approaches, the paper concludes that the smart, inclusive and sustainable, innovation-led growth requires the rethinking of the role, the functions, the objectives and the instruments of public policy and economic governance.


2003 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Young Sik Kim

This paper provides an explanation for the supervisory role of the central bank in a monetary general equilibrium model of bank liquidity provision. Under incomplete information on the individual banks' liquidity needs, individual banks find it optimal to invest solely in bank loans holding no cash reserves, and rely on the interbank market for their withdrawal demands. Using the costly state verification approach under uncertainty in aggregate liquidity demands, the supervisory role of the central bank as a large intermediary arises as an incentive-compatible arrangement by which banks hold the correct level of cash reserves. First, it takes up a delegated monitoring role for the banking system. Second, it engages in discount-window lending at a penalty rate, where the discount margin covers exactly the monitoring cost incurred. Finally, under the central banking mechanism, currency premium no longer exists in the sense that currency is worth the same as deposits having an equal face value.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 446-460 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger E.A. Farmer

I review the contribution and influence of Milton Friedman's 1968 presidential address to the American Economic Association. I argue that Friedman's influence on the practice of central banking was profound and that his arguments in favour of monetary rules were responsible for 30 years of low and stable inflation in the period from 1979 through 2009. I present a critique of Friedman's position that market economies are self-stabilizing and I describe an alternative reconciliation of Keynesian economics with Walrasian general equilibrium theory from that which is widely accepted today by most neoclassical economists. My interpretation implies that government should intervene actively in financial markets to stabilize economic activity.


1984 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H. Timberlake
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 593-610
Author(s):  
David M. Woodruff

Robert C. Hockett’s “franchise view” argues, convincingly, that the capacity of banks or quasi-bank financial entities to create money rests on the laws, regulations, and guarantees of the state under which they operate. Fred Block advocates the use of this insight as a beachhead for establishing the legitimacy of locally embedded, nonprofit lenders whose investments would be dedicated to public purposes. However, given the pervasive influence of “everyday libertarianism,” which fosters blindness to the public character of private economic power, this commentary warns of possible counterproductive consequences of this proposal unless it is fused to the democratization of central banking. An end to central bank independence would highlight the ineliminable role of the state in the market and make that role easier to reshape. It would also end the dynamic whereby monetary easing provides political cover for damaging fiscal austerity and thus lead to better democratic deliberation on the contours of policy.


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