Born idolaters: The limits of the philosophical implications of the cognitive science of religion

2015 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Jong ◽  
Christopher Kavanagh ◽  
Aku Visala
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Cognitive Constraints ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Work Done

SummaryIn recent years, theoretical and empirical work done under the rubric of the cognitive science of religion (CSR) have led many to conclude that religion (or, at least, some aspects thereof) is “natural”. By this, it is meant that human beings are predisposed to believe in supernatural agents, and that their beliefs about these agents are constrained in various ways. The details about how and why these predispositions and cognitive constraints developed and evolved are still largely unknown, though there is enough of a theoretical consensus in CSR for philosophers to have begun reflecting on the implications of CSR for religious belief. In particular, much philosophical work has been done on the implications of CSR for theism, on both sides of the debate. On one hand, CSR might contribute to defeating particular arguments for theism, or indeed theism altogether; on the other hand, CSR might provide support for specific theological views. In this paper, we argue that the CSR is largely irrelevant for

scholarly journals Religious Belief is Not Natural. Why Cognitive Science of Religion Does Not Show That Religious Belief is Trustworthy

Studia Humana ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 34-44
Author(s):  
Hans Van Eyghen
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
World Religions ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Theories Of Religion ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Afterlife Beliefs

Abstract It is widely acknowledged that the new emerging discipline cognitive science of religion has a bearing on how to think about the epistemic status of religious beliefs. Both defenders and opponents of the rationality of religious belief have used cognitive theories of religion to argue for their point. This paper will look at the defender-side of the debate. I will discuss an often used argument in favor of the trustworthiness of religious beliefs, stating that cognitive science of religion shows that religious beliefs are natural and natural beliefs ought to be trusted in the absence of counterevidence. This argument received its most influential defense from Justin Barrett in a number of papers, some in collaboration with Kelly James Clark. I will discuss their version of the argument and argue that it fails because the natural beliefs discovered by cognitive scientists of religion are not the religious beliefs of the major world religions. A survey of the evidence from cognitive science of religion will show that cognitive science does show that other beliefs come natural and that these can thus be deemed trustworthy in the absence of counterevidence. These beliefs are teleological beliefs, afterlife beliefs and animistic theistic beliefs.

Let’s get physical

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 148-168
Author(s):  
Thomas Ellis
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
The Other ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Animal Kingdom ◽  
Religious Imagination ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Academic Study

The consensus in philosophical and scientific circles is that physicalism is the most warranted position to adopt. With respect to the academic study of religion, physicalism underwrites two complementary approaches, one widely recognized and the other underappreciated in the field at large. While the cognitive science of religion (CSR) enjoys widespread recognition, the ethology of religion does not. This paper employs ethology to explain two submissive behaviours ritual practitioners often perform, that is, ocular aversion and rump presentation. Significantly, the means of submission reflect the practitioner’s perceptions of the intimidating agents’, e.g., deities’, organ of intimidation. As it is in the animal kingdom, so too in the religious imagination, dominant others, especially males, will use their eyes or their phalluses to intimidate.

Atheism and Inferential Bias

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 43-56
Author(s):  
Kelly James Clark
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
The Other ◽  
Thinking Styles ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Intuitive Thinking ◽  
Relevant Evidence ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Psychological Studies

While the cognitive science of religion is well-trodden ground, atheism has been considerably less scrutinized. Recent psychological studies associate atheism with an intellectual virtue, inferentiality (Shenhav 2011; Norenzayan, Gervais, and Trzesniewski 2012; Norenzayan and Gervais 2013; Pennycook 2012). Theism, on the other hand, is associated with an intellectual “vice”, intuitive thinking. While atheism is allied with the attendant claim that atheism is the result of careful rational assessment of the relevant evidence, theism is considered the result of a lack of reflection on the relevant evidence (or careless disregard of the evidence). Atheism, then, is rational, but theism, then, is irrational. In this essay, we will assess the import of these studies and the attendant claims that these differences in thinking styles entail differences in rationality.

The Cognitive Science of Religion and Islamic Theology: An Analysis Based on the Works of al-Ghazālī

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aria Nakissa
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Islamic Theology ◽  
Islamic Studies ◽  
Knowledge Of God ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
The Universe

Abstract Specialists in Islamic studies have taken virtually no interest in the influential emerging field of cognitive science of religion (CSR). The present article addresses this problem by considering how insights from CSR can be used to reconceptualize classical Islamic theology. The article analyzes a number of theological topics, including predestination and the uncreated Qurʾān. However, it focuses on five key Islamic theological claims, namely (1) God is a single first cause who brings the universe into being; (2) God lacks an anthropomorphic body; (3) it is possible to arrive at some knowledge of God independently of scripture through human nature (fiṭra) and reason; (4) God is a bringer of benefit and harm, thereby rewarding, punishing, testing, and blessing human beings; and (5) prophethood exists and it is proven through miracles. In analyzing the preceding theological issues, the article utilizes the Arabic writings of the renowned medieval theologian Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī.

scholarly journals The Epistemic Parity of Religious-Apologetic and Religion-Debunking Responses to the Cognitive Science of Religion

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 466
Author(s):  
Walter Scott Stepanenko
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Argumentative Strategies ◽  
Science Of Religion

Recent work in the cognitive science of religion has challenged some of the explanatory assumptions of previous research in the field. Nonetheless, some of the practitioners of the new cognitive science of religion theorize in the same skeptical spirit as their predecessors and either imply or explicitly claim that their projects undermine the warrant of religious beliefs. In this article, I argue that these theories do no additional argumentative work when compared to previous attempts to debunk religious belief and that these recent debunking efforts are very much motivated by methodological commitments that are shared with canonical research. I contend that these argumentative strategies put debunkers very much on an epistemic par with religious apologists: both advocate responses to the cognitive science of religion that are primarily motivated by methodological commitments.

The cognitive science of religion: a modified theist response

2010 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID LEECH ◽  
AKU VISALA
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Natural Explanation ◽  
Science Of Religion

AbstractCritics of religion have recently claimed that the natural explanation of religious-belief formation offered by the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) is incompatible with theism. Defenders of theism have in turn responded to these claims by arguing for the compatibility of the CSR account with theism. In this paper we propose a modified defence of the compatibility of the CSR account with theism which supplements extant theistic arguments by drawing out the implications of certain points about the nature of CSR explanation which have so far been left relatively unexploited. In developing this defence, we argue that extant atheistic and theistic readings of the CSR can be understood as accepting certain presuppositions, especially about the relative centrality of the CSR account in explaining religious belief, which, we argue, would be detrimental to the theist case were they actually intended, and which should be clearly rejected. We suggest that the theist should argue explicitly from the nature of CSR explanation to its compatibility with theism.

Breaking the Spell: Reconsidering Cognitive and Evolutionary Approaches to Atheism

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 299-327
Author(s):  
Konrad Szocik ◽  
Kyle J. Messick
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Cultural Context ◽  
Scientific Study ◽  
Biological Factors ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Functional Aspects ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Cultural Evolutionary

Abstract The scientific study of nonreligion has been described as being ‘under the spell’ of religion because the vast majority of research investigates nonbelief in respect to belief. This has resulted in a number of problematic theories, including the leading cognitive science of religion (CSR) theory that claims that religious belief is innate, and so to be a nonbeliever is to violate cognitive predispositions. This article critically analyzes innateness theories and encourages the development of further theories that incorporate social, adaptive, cultural, evolutionary, and biological factors in addition to cognitive contributors. This article details the roles of adaptive and functional aspects of nonbelief, the influence of credibility enhancing displays (CRED s), and the influence of cultural context on nonbelief as they are not sufficiently explained by CSR theories. It is proposed that future theories study nonreligion in its own right, instead of respective to religion, so that a broader range of unique characteristics can be accounted for without inaccurately and inadequately phrasing theories in terms of naturalness.

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