Moral Context, Moral Complicity And Ethical Theory

SATS ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-198
Author(s):  
Daniel F. Hartner
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Context ◽  
Philosophical Account ◽  
Moral Domains ◽  
Moral Complicity

AbstractOne of the dominant traditions in normative ethics is characterised by the attempt to develop a comprehensive moral theory that can distinguish right from wrong in a range of cases by drawing on a philosophical account of the good. Familiar versions of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics have emerged from this tradition. Yet such theories often seem to lack the resources needed to evaluate the broader contexts in which moral dilemmas arise, which may cause them to encourage moral complicity. Context-insensitive complicity of this sort receives surprisingly little direct philosophical attention, despite its being a ubiquitous concern for ordinary moral agents and despite the threat it poses to this form of ethical theorising. The present paper sketches the problem more formally and canvasses some leading responses before locating its source in the implicit distinction between moral and non-moral domains at the root of much traditional normative theorising.

Notsituationen als Herausforderung für die Moralphilosophie

2014 ◽  
Vol 62 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Héctor Wittwer
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Emergency Situations ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The One ◽  
Self Defence

AbstractThe fact that the topic of emergency situations has been neglected almost completely by ethical theory raises the question why normative ethics has had so little to say about extreme situations so far. One can assume that this disinterest is not due to the rarity of emergency situations but rather to their peculiar properties. All ethical theories rest on the premise that moral agents make the most of their decisions under normal circumstances. The aim of the paper is to answer the question whether or not normative ethics is able to adequately evaluate emergency situations. In order to do this, different types of extreme situations must be distinguished. It is argued that, on the one hand, self-defence and agreements by which all the participants refrain from certain of their rights in order to enable some of them to survive are morally unproblematic. On the other hand, there are emergency situations that do not allow for a solution which would be morally acceptable to all of the involved persons. Hence, morality itself can be unacceptable under extreme circumstances.

scholarly journals Współzależność analizy etycznej i etyki

Etyka ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 139-158
Author(s):  
John Ladd
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Analytical Data ◽  
Analytical Techniques ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Ethical Analysis ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
The Given

This paper is concerned with the interrelationship between ethical analysis (metaethics) and normative ethics. It is argued that the two cannot be divorced logically and that their separation explains in large part why analytical ethical theory has so little of relevance to say to live moral issues. Two of the bases of the prevailing logical separation of the inquiries are examined critically: first, a de jure basis in which the separation is defended on theoretical grounds, e.g. by intuitionists, emotivists and prescriptivists, and second, a de facto basis in which we find a separation in practice that results from using analytical techniques borrowed from other areas in philosophy (viz. epistemology) that are inappropriate for ethics, e.g. by ordinary language philosophers. The prevailing conception of ethical analysis is criticized on the grounds that both the pre-analytical data and the aims of ethical analysis are sui generis and not to be compared to the data and aims of the other kinds of logical analysis. Problems like ethical relativism, moral dilemmas and akrasia cannot be analysed separately, but are part of the given logical and conceptual analysis of ethics.

scholarly journals The Archangel Delusion. Descriptive Ethics and Its Role in the Education of Ethicists

2021 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 35-49
Author(s):  
Jarosław Kucharski
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Main Question ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Descriptive Ethics ◽  
Moral Theories

The role of ethicists is to provide a genuine ethical theory to help non-ethicists interpret and solve moral dilemmas, to define what is right or wrong, and, finally, to clarify moral values. Therefore, ethicists are taught to address morality with rational procedures, to set aside their moral intuitions and emotions. Sometimes, professional ethicists are prone to falling into the archangel delusion – the belief that they are beyond the influence of their own emotions. This can lead to ousting moral intuitions from the space of ethical reflection, thus making ethicists unaware of them. They may treat intuitive beliefs about morality as an expression of primal moral feelings. The main question pursued in this article, is how those feelings may influence moral theories, which should be developed by professional ethicists. Ethicists may provide an ethical theory which is merely a rationalisation and justification for their own suppressed moral emotions, rather than the effect of genuine, rational moral reasoning. To help ethicists cope with this delusion, a model of cooperation between descriptive and normative ethics is proposed. Ethicists should therefore use the research tools of descriptive ethics to determine their own intuitions, and the moral emotions in which these intuitions are grounded. --------------- Received: 09/06/2021. Reviewed: 23/07/2021. Accepted: 13/08/2021.

Hume and Virtue Ethics

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Definition Of

This chapter shows how Hume’s “sentimentalist” moral theory can be a version of virtue ethics and elaborates the kind of virtue ethics that best describes Hume’s moral philosophy. To accomplish this task, we need a definition of virtue ethics, an account of types of virtue ethical theory, and to place Hume’s ethics within this taxonomy. Three types of virtue ethics, are outlined. Hume is located within a pluralistic virtue ethics where virtue notions are central and a variety of features make traits “naturally fitted” to be approved as virtues. Hume’s virtue ethics is understood as response-dependent, being grounded in an emotional kind of “moral sense” as suitably objective and as conforming to his basic empiricism.

Guilt, Shame, and Satisfaction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonore Stump
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Christian Theology ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

The project of this book requires the ethics and value theory presupposed in Christian theology, and for purposes of the book the author takes the ethics and value theory of Aquinas as exemplary. It is an ethics that accepts an objective goodness which is tied to the nature of God and which is founded on a correlation of being and goodness. In its normative ethics, it is built around the virtues; but it is a non-Aristotelian virtue ethics, and it privileges relationship and the second-personal among the things it values most. Its most central virtue is love, and all the rest of its normative ethical theory rests on this virtue. This chapter contains an account of love, and it explains guilt and shame in terms of that account of love. It also considers the remedies for guilt and shame, including forgiveness, satisfaction or penance, and the remaining stain on the soul.

The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Moral Reason ◽  
Future Research ◽  
New Directions ◽  
Moral Theories

This handbook contains thirty-two previously unpublished contributions to consequentialist ethics by leading scholars, covering what’s happening in the field today as well as pointing to new directions for future research. Consequentialism is a rival to such moral theories as deontology, contractualism, and virtue ethics. But it’s more than just one rival among many, for every plausible moral theory must concede that the goodness of an act’s consequences is something that matters even if it’s not the only thing that matters. Thus, all plausible moral theories will accept both that the fact that an act would produce good consequences constitutes a moral reason to perform it and that the better that act’s consequences the greater the moral reason there is to perform it. Now, if this is correct, then much of the research concerning consequentialist ethics is important for ethics in general. For instance, one thing that consequentialist researchers have investigated is what sorts of consequences matter: the consequences that some act would have or the consequences that it could have—if, say, the agent were to follow up by performing some subsequent act. And it’s reasonable to suppose that the answer to such questions will be relevant for normative ethics regardless of whether the goodness of consequences is the only thing that matters (as consequentialists presume) or just one of many things that matter (as nonconsequentialists presume).

scholarly journals The potential of virtue ethics in ethical education in Slovakia

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 67-84
Author(s):  
Barbora Baďurová
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Ethical Education

Virtue ethics is an approach to normative ethics that emphasizes the great character traits of moral agents. As many authors have pointed out, this approach also has great potential in contemporary ethical education. The following text will focus on the possibility practically utilising virtue ethics in ethical education in Slovakia. One of the most influential figures in the development of this topic in Slovakia is Ladislav Lencz, who also created key texts for teachers of ethical education. His concept is based primarily on a pedagogical and psychological basis, inspired by Spanish psychologist R.R. Olivar’s concept of prosociality. However, some of L. Lencz’s texts also display elements of virtue ethics. This article will point out the possibilities of implementing virtue ethics in ethical education.

Influentialism

2019 ◽  
pp. 216-224
Author(s):  
Richard Corry
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Middle Ground ◽  
Causal Influence ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory ◽  
Power And Influence

This final chapter puts the ontology of power and influence to use beyond metaphysics by suggesting that the concept of causal influence may be helpful in the field of normative ethics. In particular, it is argued that the ontology of causal influence opens up the possibility of a novel category of normative ethical theory called influentialism. Influentialism stands in contrast to the traditional categories of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. The aim is not to argue that influentialism is preferable to these traditional categories, but simply to put the theory on the table for consideration. However, it is argued that influentialism has some promising features that make it worthy of consideration. In particular, influentialism seems to occupy a middle ground between consequentialism and deontology and is able to combine seemingly incompatible intuitions from these two categories.

Moral Perfectionism: Ethical Theory from a Pragmatic Approach

Human Affairs ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Mougán
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Practical Rationality ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Pragmatic Approach ◽  
Moral Objectivity ◽  
Human Subjectivity ◽  
Moral Perfectionism

Moral Perfectionism: Ethical Theory from a Pragmatic ApproachThis article tries to rescue the perfectionist approach to moral theory from the pragmatic tradition and inspiration. Based on the philosophy of Dewey and taking into account authors like H. Putnam or S. Cavell, it tries to defend the idea that pragmatism allows us to understand moral perfectionism in a new way. In that way, perfectionism is bound to a certain interpretation of practical rationality, and a new understanding of moral objectivity and human subjectivity. Finally, moral perfectionism is not a theory that aims to solve all moral dilemmas but provides an understanding of how to face up to the problems of ordinary moral life.

scholarly journals Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant’s Ethical Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Timmermann
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Conflict ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Ethical Duty ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
Explicit Discussion

Abstract: This paper explores the possibility of moral conflict in Kant’s ethics. An analysis of the only explicit discussion of the topic in his published writings confirms that there is no room for genuine moral dilemmas. Conflict is limited to nonconclusive ‘grounds’ of obligation. They arise only in the sphere of ethical duty and, though defeasible, ought to be construed as the result of valid arguments an agent correctly judges to apply in the situation at hand. While it is difficult to determine in theory what makes some of them stronger than others, these ‘grounds’ can account for practical residue in conflict cases and for a plausible form of agent regret. The principle that ‘ought implies can’ survives intact.

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