scholarly journals The Archangel Delusion. Descriptive Ethics and Its Role in the Education of Ethicists

2021 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 35-49
Author(s):  
Jarosław Kucharski

The role of ethicists is to provide a genuine ethical theory to help non-ethicists interpret and solve moral dilemmas, to define what is right or wrong, and, finally, to clarify moral values. Therefore, ethicists are taught to address morality with rational procedures, to set aside their moral intuitions and emotions. Sometimes, professional ethicists are prone to falling into the archangel delusion – the belief that they are beyond the influence of their own emotions. This can lead to ousting moral intuitions from the space of ethical reflection, thus making ethicists unaware of them. They may treat intuitive beliefs about morality as an expression of primal moral feelings. The main question pursued in this article, is how those feelings may influence moral theories, which should be developed by professional ethicists. Ethicists may provide an ethical theory which is merely a rationalisation and justification for their own suppressed moral emotions, rather than the effect of genuine, rational moral reasoning. To help ethicists cope with this delusion, a model of cooperation between descriptive and normative ethics is proposed. Ethicists should therefore use the research tools of descriptive ethics to determine their own intuitions, and the moral emotions in which these intuitions are grounded. --------------- Received: 09/06/2021. Reviewed: 23/07/2021. Accepted: 13/08/2021.

Author(s):  
Mark Timmons

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics features new work in the field of normative ethical theory. This eighth volume features chapters which collectively address the following topics: the irreplaceable value of human beings, interpersonal morality and conceptions of welfare, what it is for something to be good for an animal (including humans), the relation between good will and right action, moral advice and joint agency, moral responsibility and wrongdoing, the basis of equality, the role of needs claims in ethical theory, threshold conceptions of deontology, prudential reasons, the significance of evaluative beliefs, and Stoic conceptions of insults....


Etyka ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 139-158
Author(s):  
John Ladd

This paper is concerned with the interrelationship between ethical analysis (metaethics) and normative ethics. It is argued that the two cannot be divorced logically and that their separation explains in large part why analytical ethical theory has so little of relevance to say to live moral issues. Two of the bases of the prevailing logical separation of the inquiries are examined critically: first, a de jure basis in which the separation is defended on theoretical grounds, e.g. by intuitionists, emotivists and prescriptivists, and second, a de facto basis in which we find a separation in practice that results from using analytical techniques borrowed from other areas in philosophy (viz. epistemology) that are inappropriate for ethics, e.g. by ordinary language philosophers. The prevailing conception of ethical analysis is criticized on the grounds that both the pre-analytical data and the aims of ethical analysis are sui generis and not to be compared to the data and aims of the other kinds of logical analysis. Problems like ethical relativism, moral dilemmas and akrasia cannot be analysed separately, but are part of the given logical and conceptual analysis of ethics.


Author(s):  
Armin Pircher Verdorfer ◽  
Martin Fladerer ◽  
Clarissa Zwarg

While traditional approaches have described ethical decision-making in organizations mainly as being the result of rational deliberative thought, a steadily growing body of research indicates that moral decision-making is strongly influenced by moral intuitions and emotions. The moral intuition approach typically has two aspects: the process through which moral intuitions emerge and their content. With regard to the process, moral intuitions represent fast, automatic, evaluative reactions that are emotionally charged. An important tenet of moral intuition research refers to the primacy of intuition—the notion that moral intuitions generally drive moral decision-making. Accordingly, moral intuitions are described as starting points for rational reflection processes that follow later. On this basis, it has also been argued that the interplay of moral intuition and deliberation is malleable. Specifically, the well-formed moral intuitions of experts are thought to differ from the naive moral intuitions of novices. With increasing experience and reflection about the moral issues in one’s experiences, deliberation increasingly enables individuals to shift between intuitions and reasoning and to monitor, test, weigh, and reject both intuitions and reasons. The content of moral intuition refers to the foundations of morality, which are the underlying moral domain, specifying what individuals view as morally right or wrong. The most commonly referenced account in this field, Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), argues that moral intuitions are a function of evolutionarily developed, innate predispositions to master multiple social problems that interact with social and cultural influences. These predispositions, or moral foundations, include care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity. While empirical work on the role of moral intuition in organizations is still at an early stage, several areas have been identified that may particularly benefit from integrating moral intuition process and content. For instance, the moral intuition perspective can aid the understanding and prevention of processes through which unethical behaviors and practices, such as corruption, may be justified and normalized in organizations. Furthermore, the moral intuition perspective is increasingly used to study the moral leadership process, most notably the link between leader moral foundations and moral leader behaviors, as well as the role of (mis)fit between leader and follower moral foundations. Moral emotions are an inherent element of the moral intuition process and refer to the welfare of others and the promotion of a functioning society. It is thought that individuals experience moral emotions when they or others have violated moral standards. These emotions build the motivational force for moral action and are often placed in five clusters: other‐praising (e.g., gratitude), other‐suffering (e.g., sympathy), other‐condemning (e.g., contempt), self‐condemning (e.g., guilt), and self-approving (e.g., moral pride) moral emotions.


This series aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new chapters that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This eighth volume brings together thirteen new essays that collectively cover a range of fundamental topics in the field, including: the irreplaceable value of human beings, interpersonal morality and conceptions of welfare, what it is for something to be good for an animal (including humans), the relation between good will and right action, moral advice and joint agency, moral responsibility and wrongdoing, the basis of equality, the role of needs claims in ethical theory, threshold conceptions of deontology, prudential reasons, the significance of evaluative beliefs, and Stoic conceptions of insults. This volume features chapters by Ben Bramble, Samantha Brennan, Talbot Brewer, Dale Dorsey, Patricio A. Fernandez, Guy Fletcher, Christine M. Korsgaard, Chelsea Rosenthal, Grant J. Rozeboom, Roy Sorensen, Julie Tannenbaum, and Alex Worsnip.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 49-65
Author(s):  
Monique Lanoix

Over three decades ago, Carol Gilligan’s seminal book In a Different Voice provided feminist theorists with a powerful new approach to address the shortcomings of traditional moral theories. With a focus on concrete situations, an ethics of care can attend to the specifics of moral dilemmas that might otherwise be glossed over. As feminist reflection on moral and political philosophizing has progressed, another challenge has emerged. Recent feminist scholarship proposes non-ideal theories as preferable action-guiding theories. In this paper, I examine Kittay’s call for a version of care ethics as a naturalized ethics that comes from lived experience, in order to draw out the salient characteristics of the caring agent. This allows me to show how Kittay’s key assertion that “we are all some mother’s child” resonates with Ricoeur’s framing of self-esteem, which is, in turn, anchored on a notion of solicitude. Secondly, I make the case that care ethics can benefit from Ricoeur’s little ethics as it helps buttress the goal of good caring practices. Finally, care ethics, with its emphasis on the universality of care needs, helps to strengthen the central role of solicitude for the political sphere.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Mark Timmons

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics features new work in normative ethical theory. This 11th volume includes chapters on the following topics: the significance of appreciation; the objective/subjective debate over wrongness; requests as a kind of wrong; the puzzle of taking comfort in the travails of others; finding meaning in one’s life; the boundaries of morality in light of the legitimacy of non-moral partialist pursuits; the value of moral testimony to those who testify; the category of “ordinary” wrongs that are not blameworthy; the practical role of Kant’s Categorical Imperative; the possibility of non-moral blame; reasons to reject the category of subjective obligation; how to understand the point of ethical theory; and the justification of social moral rules....


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2(2)) ◽  
pp. 11-24
Author(s):  
Dariusz Juruś

In this paper I compare two contemporary moral theories; virtue ethics and the ethics of care. They both reject traditional ethical positions – Kantian ethics and utilitarianism. Virtue ethics focuses on the question what person should I be, instead, as in the case of Kantian ethics and utilitarianism, what should I do. It holds that value concepts (good, value) in contrary to deontological concepts (duty, obligation) are fundamental in ethical theory. Ethics of care, in rejecting a position based on justice, emphasises the role of care in human relations. It concentrates on personal relationships like love, friendship and charity. Virtue ethics emphasises the crucial role of individual character in moral life, whereas ethics of care holds that relations between people based on attentiveness, responsiveness and respect are the most important in moral life.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 290-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Svensson ◽  
Lieven J. R. Pauwels ◽  
Frank M. Weerman ◽  
Gerben J. N. Bruinsma

In this study we examine to what extent within-individual changes in parental monitoring, bonds with parents and school, and rule-breaking peers can explain within-individual changes in morality. We distinguish between three key dimensions of morality: moral values, anticipated shame, and anticipated guilt. We use data from the SPAN project, a two-wave panel study among 616 adolescents (ages 12–19) from secondary schools in The Hague, The Netherlands. Employing a fixed-effects model, we found that within-individual changes in parental monitoring, bonds with parents and school, and rule-breaking peers are significantly related to within-individual changes in moral values, anticipated shame, and anticipated guilt. These findings emphasize the important role of family, school, and the peer group in the development of morality during adolescence. Implications of these findings are discussed.


SATS ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-198
Author(s):  
Daniel F. Hartner

AbstractOne of the dominant traditions in normative ethics is characterised by the attempt to develop a comprehensive moral theory that can distinguish right from wrong in a range of cases by drawing on a philosophical account of the good. Familiar versions of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics have emerged from this tradition. Yet such theories often seem to lack the resources needed to evaluate the broader contexts in which moral dilemmas arise, which may cause them to encourage moral complicity. Context-insensitive complicity of this sort receives surprisingly little direct philosophical attention, despite its being a ubiquitous concern for ordinary moral agents and despite the threat it poses to this form of ethical theorising. The present paper sketches the problem more formally and canvasses some leading responses before locating its source in the implicit distinction between moral and non-moral domains at the root of much traditional normative theorising.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Sticker

Kant was a keen psychological observer and theorist of the forms, mechanisms and sources of self-deception. In this Element, the author discusses the role of rationalizing/Vernünfteln for Kant's moral psychology, normative ethics and philosophical methodology. By drawing on the full breadth of examples of rationalizing Kant discusses, the author shows how rationalizing can extend to general features of morality and corrupt rational agents thoroughly (albeit not completely and not irreversibly). Furthermore, the author explains the often-overlooked roles common human reason, empirical practical reason and even pure practical reason play for rationalizing. Kant is aware that rationality is a double-edged sword; reason is the source of morality and of our dignity, but it also enables us to seemingly justify moral transgressions to ourselves, and it creates an interest in this justification in the first place. Finally, this Element discusses whether Kant's ethical theory itself can be criticised as a product of rationalizing.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document