scholarly journals The potential of virtue ethics in ethical education in Slovakia

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 67-84
Author(s):  
Barbora Baďurová
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Ethical Education

Virtue ethics is an approach to normative ethics that emphasizes the great character traits of moral agents. As many authors have pointed out, this approach also has great potential in contemporary ethical education. The following text will focus on the possibility practically utilising virtue ethics in ethical education in Slovakia. One of the most influential figures in the development of this topic in Slovakia is Ladislav Lencz, who also created key texts for teachers of ethical education. His concept is based primarily on a pedagogical and psychological basis, inspired by Spanish psychologist R.R. Olivar’s concept of prosociality. However, some of L. Lencz’s texts also display elements of virtue ethics. This article will point out the possibilities of implementing virtue ethics in ethical education.

Moral Context, Moral Complicity And Ethical Theory

SATS ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-198
Author(s):  
Daniel F. Hartner
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Context ◽  
Philosophical Account ◽  
Moral Domains ◽  
Moral Complicity

AbstractOne of the dominant traditions in normative ethics is characterised by the attempt to develop a comprehensive moral theory that can distinguish right from wrong in a range of cases by drawing on a philosophical account of the good. Familiar versions of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics have emerged from this tradition. Yet such theories often seem to lack the resources needed to evaluate the broader contexts in which moral dilemmas arise, which may cause them to encourage moral complicity. Context-insensitive complicity of this sort receives surprisingly little direct philosophical attention, despite its being a ubiquitous concern for ordinary moral agents and despite the threat it poses to this form of ethical theorising. The present paper sketches the problem more formally and canvasses some leading responses before locating its source in the implicit distinction between moral and non-moral domains at the root of much traditional normative theorising.

Justice as a Personal Virtue and Justice as an Institutional Virtue: Mencius’s Confucian Virtue Politics

2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 (4) ◽  
pp. 277-294
Author(s):  
Yong Huang
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Affirmative Answer ◽  
The State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Social Policies ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Government

AbstractIt has been widely observed that virtue ethics, regarded as an ethics of the ancient, in contrast to deontology and consequentialism, seen as an ethics of the modern (Larmore 1996: 19–23), is experiencing an impressive revival and is becoming a strong rival to utilitarianism and deontology in the English-speaking world in the last a few decades. Despite this, it has been perceived as having an obvious weakness in comparison with its two major rivals. While both utilitarianism and deontology can at the same time serve as an ethical theory, providing guidance for individual persons and a political philosophy, offering ways to structure social institutions, virtue ethics, as it is concerned with character traits of individual persons, seems to be ill-equipped to be politically useful. In recent years, some attempts have been made to develop the so-called virtue politics, but most of them, including my own (see Huang 2014: Chapter 5), are limited to arguing for the perfectionist view that the state has the obligation to do things to help its members develop their virtues, and so the focus is still on the character traits of individual persons. However important those attempts are, such a notion of virtue politics is clearly too narrow, unless one thinks that the only job the state is supposed to do is to cultivate its people’s virtues. Yet obviously the government has many other jobs to do such as making laws and social policies, many if not most of which are not for the purpose of making people virtuous. The question is then in what sense such laws and social policies are moral in general and just in particular. Utilitarianism and deontology have their ready answers in the light of utility or moral principles respectively. Can virtue ethics provide its own answer? This paper attempts to argue for an affirmative answer to this question from the Confucian point of view, as represented by Mencius. It does so with a focus on the virtue of justice, as it is a central concept in both virtue ethics and political philosophy.

Moral psychology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Slote
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Psychological Issues ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Weakness ◽  
Moral Requirements ◽  
Wrong Action

Moral psychology as a discipline is centrally concerned with psychological issues that arise in connection with the moral evaluation of actions. It deals with the psychological presuppositions of valid morality, that is, with assumptions it seems necessary for us to make in order for there to be such a thing as objective or binding moral requirements: for example, if we lack free will or are all incapable of unselfishness, then it is not clear how morality can really apply to human beings. Moral psychology also deals with what one might call the psychological accompaniments of actual right, or wrong, action, for example, with questions about the nature and possibility of moral weakness or self-deception, and with questions about the kinds of motives that ought to motivate moral agents. Moreover, in the approach to ethics known as ‘virtue ethics’ questions about right and wrong action merge with questions about the motives, dispositions, and abilities of moral agents, and moral psychology plays a more central role than it does in other forms of ethical theory.

No Character or Personality

2003 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilbert Harman
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Business Ethics ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Academic Discipline ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Personality Theory

Abstract:Solomon argues that, although recent research in social psychology has important implications for business ethics, it does not undermine an approach that stresses virtue ethics. However, he underestimates the empirical threat to virtue ethics, and his a priori claim that empirical research cannot overturn our ordinary moral psychology is overstated. His appeal to seemingly obvious differences in character traits between people simply illustrates the fundamental attribution error. His suggestion that the Milgram and Darley and Batson experiments have to do with such character traits as obedience and punctuality cannot help to explain the relevant differences in the way people behave in different situations. His appeal to personality theory fails, because, as an intellectual academic discipline, personality theory is in shambles, mainly because it has been concerned with conceptions of personality rather than with what is true about personality. Solomon’s rejection of Doris’s claims about the fragmentation of character is at odds with the received view in social psychology. Finally, he is mistaken to think that rejecting virtue ethics implies rejecting free will and moral responsibility.

scholarly journals The Possibility of Virtue

2012 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 377-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Alzola
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Good ◽  
Observational Equivalence ◽  
Business Context ◽  
Overt Behavior

ABSTRACT:To have a virtue is to possess a certain kind of trait of character that is appropriate in pursuing the moral good at which the virtue aims. Human beings are assumed to be capable of attaining those traits. Yet, a number of scholars are skeptical about the very existence of such character traits. They claim a sizable amount of empirical evidence in their support. This article is concerned with the existence and explanatory power of character as a way to assess the possibility of achieving moral virtue, with particular attention paid to business context. I aim to unsettle the so-called situationist challenge to virtue ethics. In the course of this article, I shall defend four claims, namely, that virtues are more than just behavioral dispositions, that at least some virtues may not be unitary traits, that psychologists cannot infer virtues from overt behavior, and that the situationist data do not account for the observational equivalence of traits. Since it rests on a misconception of what virtue is, the situationist objection remains unconvincing.

Respecting Different Ways of Life: A Daoist Ethics of Virtue in the Zhuangzi

2010 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 1049-1069 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong Huang
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
The West ◽  
Pluralistic Society ◽  
Common Misconception ◽  
Contemporary Life ◽  
Important Trait ◽  
Moral Discourses ◽  
Ways Of Life

As the ethics of virtue, with a focus on cultivating admirable traits of character instead of commanding adherence to rigid rules, becomes increasingly popular in contemporary moral discourses, scholars have tried to find evidence of virtue ethics in such ancient traditions as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. This article explores the possibility of a virtue ethics in a tradition that has been largely neglected, Chinese Daoism, by focusing on one of the most important classics in this tradition, the Zhuangzi. Contrary to a common misconception of the Zhuangzi as skeptical, relativistic, and therefore empty of any guide to moral life, it presents a solid normative ethics through various stories, and this normative ethics is a virtue ethics. The most important trait of character in this Daoist virtue ethics is respect for different ways of life—a virtue not discussed in any familiar versions of virtue ethics in the West and yet most valuable to contemporary life in a global and pluralistic society.

scholarly journals Do Algorithms Shape Character? Considering Algorithmic Ethical Subjectivation

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 205630511876830 ◽  
Author(s):  
João Carlos Magalhães
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
End Users ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Crisis ◽  
Computational Algorithms ◽  
Moral Agents

Moral critiques of computational algorithms seem divided between two paradigms. One seeks to demonstrate how an opaque and unruly algorithmic power violates moral values and harms users’ autonomy; the other underlines the systematicity of such power, deflating concerns about opacity and unruliness. While the second paradigm makes it possible to think of end users of algorithmic systems as moral agents, the consequences of this possibility remain unexplored. This article proposes one way of tackling this problem. Employing Michel Foucault’s version of virtue ethics, I examine how perceptions of Facebook’s normative regulation of visibility have transformed non-expert end users’ ethical selves (i.e., their character) in the current political crisis in Brazil. The article builds on this analysis to advance algorithmic ethical subjectivation as a concept to make sense of these processes of ethical becoming. I define them as plural (encompassing various types of actions and values, and resulting in no determinate subject), contextual (demanding not only sociomaterial but also epistemological and ethical conditions), and potentially harmful (eventually structuring harms that are not externally inflicted by algorithms, but by users, upon themselves and others, in response to how they perceive the normativity of algorithmic decisions). By researching which model(s) of ethical subjectivation specific algorithmic social platforms instantiate, critical scholars might be able to better understand the normative consequences of these platforms’ power.

scholarly journals THE LIMITATIONS OF NORMATIVE ETHICS: ANTHROPOCENTRISM IN KIM STANLEY ROBINSON’S 2312

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (6) ◽  
pp. 1040-1047
Author(s):  
Rajesh K ◽  
Rajasekaran V
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Code Of Ethics ◽  
Research Process ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Quantum Computers ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Utilitarian Approach

Purpose of the study: The present study mainly argues the limitations of normative ethics and analyzes the anthropocentrism in Kim Stanley Robinson’s 2312 based on the actions or duties of the characters. Methodology: The article used normative ethics as a methodology. Normative ethics is the study of ethical actions that has certain rules and regulations about how we ought to do and decide. So, this study has chosen a normative ethic that consists of three ethical theories Utilitarian approach, Kantian ethics and Virtue ethics to judge duties that are right and wrong.   Main Findings: As a result, normative ethics compact with a one-dimensional approach. All three ethics deal with its own specific code of ethics. Utilitarianism has focused on good outcomes. Kantian ethics has paid attention to good rules with duty. Virtue ethics focused on the good people but all three theories have a strong common objective of focusing on only human beings (sentient entities) and omit other entities (plants and animals). So all normative ethics have certain limitations and do their duties without thinking about consequences and situations. In conclusion, this code of normative ethics has provoked as anthropocentric. In addition that Swan’s actions and the rational behavior made her miserably failed in Mercury through the construction of the biome and creation of quantum computers. So this cause, in the end, the space people want to move from space to earth to rebuild the biome. Applications of this study: The prudent study analyses the normative ethics in a detailed manner under the Utilitarian approach, Kantian ethics and Virtue ethics. These philosophical domains can be benefitted for researchers to practice and implement during the research process in Humanities and Social Sciences especially. Novelty/Originality of this study: The study analyzed the anthropocentric attitude of the character Swan in 2312 based on her actions or duties through the code of normative ethics (Utilitarianism, Kantian ethics and Virtue ethics).

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