Framed by the Law: Experimental Evidence for the Effects of the Salience of the Law on Preferences

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-34
Author(s):  
Tamar Kricheli-Katz

Abstract This Article takes an experimental approach to test whether the salience of the law as a system that governs an interaction affects people’s preferences. I find that when the law is made salient in an interaction people’s preferences are altered: they express more future-oriented preferences and donate less money to charity, as compared to when the law is not salient in an otherwise identical interaction. When the law is salient in an interaction people also prefer ‘products’ over experiences, but this gap is only marginally significant. The findings suggest that the framing of an interaction as legal tends to evoke cultural scripts and implicit rules of behavior (“common knowledge”) that incorporate the shared assumptions in society about the law. In response, participants interpret the interaction as more rational and instrumental and express preferences accordingly.

1. Introduction .—Gamow's elegant deduction by general arguments of the law of radioactive decay by α-particle emission and his subsequent investigations on artificial disintegration suggested to us the desirability of investigating as closely as possible any simple model of a decaying nucleus as a verification of his general approximations. For the model chosen the exact investigation of the decay process is almost trivial. Since we obtained this, now some time ago, Dr. Gamow informed us that he had also obtained equivalent detailed results. Still more recently such results have been published by Kudar. We shall not therefore dwell upon them here. The application of the same ideals, however, to the reverse process of penetration presents points of very definite interest, which we think are well worth discussion. The main point that arises is that the chance of penetration α-particle is or is not equal to a characteristic energy of the nucleus itself. This is a point which is not dealt with by Gamow in his paper. We have discussed it with him, and now put forward the results we have obtained. Since the solution of the decay problem is required in the main discussion of the penetration of α-particles into the nucleus it is included here in 2 for reference. We must emphasise that we claim no novelty, except of detail, for the work of 2; the general lines by now are a matter of fairly common knowledge.


2018 ◽  
pp. 277-329
Author(s):  
Roderick Munday

This chapter concerns the principal rules governing examination in-chief, cross-examination, and re-examination of witnesses. Such an account is not entirely satisfactory because it is concerned with regulations that are either matters of common knowledge or else can be thoroughly mastered only by experience. However, the rules with which it deals have been highly characteristic of the English law of evidence. The elucidation of facts by means of questions put by parties or their representatives to witnesses mainly summoned by them has been an essential feature of the English ‘adversarial’ or ‘accusatorial’ system of justice. The chapter argues that not only is an appreciation of this procedure desirable for its own sake, but it is necessary for a proper understanding of such matters as the law concerning the admissibility of the convictions, character, and credibility of parties and witnesses.


Author(s):  
Robert T. Hanlon

Galileo broke away from Aristotle’s incorrect theories of motion towards his own based on experimental evidence. He employed experimentation to discover the parabolic trajectory of projectile motion and also the Law of Fall. His work helped establish the scientific method and launch the scientific revolution.


Author(s):  
Marco Fabbri ◽  
Matteo Rizzolli ◽  
Antonello Maruotti

Abstract In all legal systems, possession and property are inextricably linked. Game theory captures this relationship in the Hawk–Dove game: players competing for an asset are better off when the possessor plays Hawk and the intruder plays Dove (the bourgeois strategy) so that property can emerge as a spontaneous convention. This theory has been supported by large experimental evidence with animals. This paper presents a lab experiment where possession is manipulated to study the emergence of the property convention with human subjects. We show that the highest coordination emerges when possession is achieved meritoriously and that possession induces only bourgeois coordination (never antibourgeois).


1912 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-85
Author(s):  
James Brown Scott ◽  
George F. Seward

It is common knowledge that the United States was originally settled either by God-fearing men and women fleeing from persecution, or by political refugees who were unable to bring about reforms which they believed essential to good government and were unwilling to comply with the state of affaire existing in the Old World, or, finally, by those who, unfortunate at home, were desirous of bettering their condition in the New World. The Pilgrim and the Puritan, the Episcopalian and the Catholic, the Quaker, the Presbyterian and the Lutheran settled the Atlantic Coast. The roundhead and the cavalier, the rich and the poor and the inmate of the debtor’s prison found themselves side by side upon a plane of equality without the traditions and the conservatism of an older world. Whether the colony was composed of Puritans and manifested intolerance to the protestant brother of a different faith; whether the settlement remained loyal to the Church of England, as Virginia, or favored the Catholic, as Maryland, or freely accepted the law-abiding without questioning his religion, as the Quakers of Pennsylvania, the principle of religious toleration steadily gained ground, and by the time of the Revolution it may be said generally that religious differences ceased to influence men or their conduct toward each other, by virtue of a conception of liberty which embraced not merely the right to and protection of property but the freedom of thought, of speech and of public worship. The example of Virginia, which in 1786 established religious freedom by statute, profoundly influenced the Federal Government and the various States of the Union; for, by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, it is provided that “Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” and the States of the American Union have, in their various Constitutions, placed the same restriction upon their legislatures. The amendment of the Constitution and the like provisions in State Constitutions were not dictated by indifference or hostility to the principles of the Christian religion, but aimed to prevent not merely the establishment of any one form of religion, however widely spread, but to establish upon a firm footing the right before the law of every religious sect.


10.1596/27691 ◽  
2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustavo Henrique de Adrade ◽  
Miriam Bruhn ◽  
David McKenzie

Author(s):  
Werner Güth

Mechanism design is the game theoretic jargon for institutional design and the even older tradition (in German) of ‘Ordnungspolitik’ (institutional design policy). When implementing institutions or mechanisms (or simply rules of conduct) such regulation should usually be codified by complementing the law appropriately. This article first derives and discusses legal rules as traditionally justified and implemented legally. This is then confronted with game theoretic mechanism design, relying on Dominance Solvability or the Revelation Principle. It is argued that the Revelation Principle is very useful for welfaristic or, more generally, consequentialistic explorations of what is attainable but offers no practical basis for legal mechanism design due to its unrealistic common knowledge restrictions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARTIN HILPERT ◽  
DAVID CORREIA SAAVEDRA

Why is semantic change in grammaticalization typically unidirectional? It is a well-established finding that in grammaticalizing constructions, more concrete meanings tend to evolve into more schematic meanings. Jäger & Rosenbach (2008) appeal to the psychological phenomenon of asymmetric priming in order to explain this tendency. This article aims to evaluate their proposal on the basis of experimental psycholinguistic evidence. Asymmetric priming is a pattern of cognitive association in which one idea strongly evokes another (i.e. paddle strongly evokes water), while that second idea does not evoke the first one with the same force (water only weakly evokes paddle). Asymmetric priming would elegantly explain why semantic change in grammaticalization tends to be unidirectional, as in the case of English be going to, which has evolved out of the lexical verb go. As yet, empirical engagement with Jäger & Rosenbach's hypothesis has been limited. We present experimental evidence from a maze task (Forster et al.2009), in which we test whether asymmetric priming obtains between lexical forms (such as go) and their grammaticalized counterparts (be going to). On the asymmetric priming hypothesis, the former should prime the latter, but not vice versa. Contrary to the hypothesis, we observe a negative priming effect: speakers who have recently been exposed to a lexical element are significantly slower to process its grammaticalized variant. We interpret this observation as a horror aequi phenomenon (Rohdenburg & Mondorf 2003).


2019 ◽  
pp. 187-204
Author(s):  
James D. Morrow

The complexity of cross-domain deterrence is a major barrier to establishing coordinated expectations about violations and consequences. For a system of cross-domain deterrence to work, actors must understand what actions will trigger a response, what the response is likely to be, and how willing the respondent is to act. Any such system is likely to be less robust than Cold War nuclear deterrence because of the number of domains involved, constraints on revealing secret capabilities or even the identity of the challenger, and a propensity for provocations that fall below the established threshold of response. This chapter recommends using an analogy to the law of war rather than to nuclear deterrence to understand the possibilities of setting up a workable regime of cross-domain deterrence, even as the author is pessimistic about the ability of any collective regime to adequately manage the complexity of cross-domain deterrence.


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