scholarly journals PODE O NATURALISMO REDUCIONISTA DE DAVID COPP ACOMODAR O REALISMO E O CONSTRUTIVISMO MORAL?

2015 ◽  
pp. 37
Author(s):  
Evandro Barbosa
Keyword(s):  
David Copp

Segundo David Copp, o cenário moral requer a compreensão de três aspectos inter-relacionados básicos: identificar a natureza dos juízos morais, especificar a justificação dessas decisões e determinar o papel da sociedade moral neste esquema. Para isso, o autor discute a necessidade de uma teoria cognitivista da linguagem normativa (standard based theory), assim como uma teoria da justificação dos códigos morais (society centered theory). O propósito deste artigo é analisar em que medida a teoria moral de Copp consegue acomodar a metodologia construtivista sobre as bases realistas de seu naturalismo moral sem desmantelar seu propósito naturalista de relacionar (e reduzir) propriedades morais à propriedades naturais.

Political Legitimacy and the Duty to Obey the Law

2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 373-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Durning
Keyword(s):  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
David Copp ◽  
The Law ◽  
Legitimate State ◽  
Sense Of Urgency

A growing number of political and legal theorists deny that there is a widespread duty to obey the law. This has lent a sense of urgency to recent disagreements about whether a state's legitimacy depends upon its ‘subjects’’ having a duty to obey the law. On one side of the disagreement, John Simmons, Robert Paul Wolff, David Copp, Hannah Pitkin, Leslie Green, George Klosko, and Joseph Raz hold that a state could only be legitimate if the vast majority of its subjects have a duty to obey the law. On the other side, M.B.E. Smith, Jeffrey Reiman, Kent Greenawalt, Christopher Morris, Rolf Sartorius, Jeremy Waldron, Christopher Wellman, William Edmundson and Allen Buchanan claim that a state could be legitimate even if its subjects lacked a duty to obey the law.This disagreement contains two separate disputes. One is a linguistic dispute about the meaning of ‘legitimacy,’ or about what it means to call something a ‘legitimate state.’ The other is a Substantive dispute about whether the various aspects of legitimacy are linked together. Since discussing the linguistic dispute will help us examine the Substantive dispute, let us consider it first.

Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Disarmament. David Copp

Ethics ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 98 (3) ◽  
pp. 610-612
Author(s):  
Jeff McMahan
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
David Copp

Morality, Reason and Truth. David Copp , David Zimmerman

Ethics ◽  
1986 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 878-880
Author(s):  
Marcia Baron
Keyword(s):  
David Copp

Afterword: Whither Moral Philosophy?

1995 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 273-337
Author(s):  
Jocelyne Couture ◽  
Kai Nielsen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Ethical Naturalism ◽  
Philippa Foot ◽  
David Copp

Most of the essays collected here are essays in metaethics seeking in exacting and interesting ways to resolve problems raised by the familiar options in metaethics we outlined in our Introduction. Richard Brandt, for example, forcefully argues, going much against the at least modestly holistic grain of our time, for a foundationalism (noncognitivist though it be) which would be foundational in both metaethics and normative ethics. R.M. Hare makes a brief but systematic defense, which is both spirited and clear, of his prescriptivism (a species of what we, following tradition, have called ‘noncognitivism,’ but which he argues should instead be called ‘nondescriptivism’). His arguments here for his position - call it nondescriptivism or noncognitivism- are directed forcefully against ethical naturalism (descriptivism) and specifically against the naturalism of Philippa Foot. Nicholas Sturgeon and David Copp contribute elaborate and rigorously argued defenses of ethical naturalism, or, as they might prefer to call it, ‘moral realism.’

scholarly journals For Society – Against Morality?

1997 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anton Leist
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Direct Contact ◽  
Radical Change ◽  
Structural Features ◽  
Critical Assessment ◽  
Fundamental Level ◽  
Moral Content ◽  
David Copp ◽  
The Individual

AbstractMorality and society in moral philosophy are rarely brought into direct contact, at least not at a fundamental level of justification. David Copp develops an account of practical and moral rationality that could constitute a radical change. According to Copp moral theory has tobe ‘society-centered’ rather than focussing on the individual. This article is devoted to the moral content and structural features of a socially centered moral theory, and along those lines to its critical assessment. Concluding, it will seek to present an argument why moral philosophy ought not place society at the centre of its view.

Collective Reasons and Agent-Relativity

Utilitas ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Alexander Dietz
Keyword(s):  
Group Action ◽  
Causal Role ◽  
David Copp

Abstract Could it be true that even though we as a group ought to do something, you as an individual ought not to do your part? And under what conditions, in particular, could this happen? In this article, I discuss how a certain kind of case, introduced by David Copp, illustrates the possibility that you ought not to do your part even when you would be playing a crucial causal role in the group action. This is because you may have special agent-relative reasons against participating that are not shared by the group as a whole. I defend the claim that these are indeed cases in which you ought not to do your part in what the group ought to do. I then argue that we can expect these cases to produce a troubling kind of rational conflict.

Moral Reasons and Rational Status

2007 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 171-196
Author(s):  
Joshua Gert
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Holy Grail ◽  
Moral Behaviour ◽  
David Copp ◽  
Rational Status

The question “Why be moral?” is open to at least three extremely different interpretations. One way to distinguish these interpretations is by picturing the question as being asked by, respectively, Allan, who is going to act immorally unless he can be convinced to act otherwise, Beth, who is perfectly happy to do what is morally required on a certain occasion but who wants to know what is it about the act that makes it morally required, and Charles, who is trying to understand why rational people act morally. An answer to the question as understood by Allan is, for some, the holy grail of moral philosophy, and it is also perhaps the default understanding of the question. The question as asked by Beth is what David Copp, in his contribution to this volume, calls the “why-think-morality-requires-this” question. The question as asked by Charles can be called the “what-rationally-justifies-moral-behaviour” question. Charles’ question, importantly, is about rational permissibility, and it is most pointed when moral behaviour requires sacrifice.

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