State Sovereignty and Federal Sentencing

2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-61
Author(s):  
Stephen R. Sady

This article addresses one of the most difficult areas of federal sentencing law: concurrent and consecutive sentences in dual state and federal prosecutions. Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act, the Supreme Court in Ponziset out the norm of full comity and mutual respect for the respective judgments of state and federal courts. In implementing the SRA, the Bureau of Prisons has interpreted statutes to, in effect, assert federal supremacy over state judgments, claiming the authority to execute a sentence as consecutive even where the federal judgment is silent on the issue and the state judgment calls for concurrency. This practice violates the separation of powers and the required comity for state and federal law enforcement authority. When viewed together, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Setserand Bond establish that the Bureau of Prisons must defer to a state court judge’s concurrency decision when the federal judgment is silent on the question. First, Setseremphasized that the concurrent/consecutive decision is a core judicial function, highlighting the separation of powers problems inherent in the Executive Branch both prosecuting a defendant and determining the amount of time the prisoner will serve. Second, in limiting the scope of federal law enforcement pursuant to a treaty, Bondheld that, absent a clear statement from Congress, federal law does not override "the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers." In the sentencing context, because Congress has not authorized intrusion into state sentencing power, the BOP has no authority to trump a state judgment of concurrency because only the state has the power to say how much, or how little, punishment the defendant should receive for a violation of a state statute. To avoid serious constitutional questions, the courts should construe any of three federal sentencing statutes -- 18 U.S.C. §§ 3584, 3585(b), and 3621(e) -- in a manner that restores the constitutional balance and protects prisoners from over-incarceration.

Author(s):  
Vladislav Topilin ◽  
Roman Fedorov

The article is devoted to the problems of the legal status of the prosecutor’s office in the system of separation of powers. In the study, the author uses grammatical (philological, linguistic) logical, systematic and other methods of scientific knowledge. The author proposes to separate the prosecutor’s office into a separate (supervisory) branch of government, which will not belong to either the executive branch or the judicial branch, as a result of which the state will receive an independent state structure that will be able to exercise its supervisory functions independently of anyone, which will allow for better and faster suppression of possible violations by any branch of government, as well as improve the work of the state apparatus as a whole.


Author(s):  
Max Felker-Kantor

The LAPD’s postwar model of policing routinely served as a standard for departments across the country. Backed by federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration funds and support from newly elected law-and-order governor Ronald Reagan, the LAPD led the way in bolstering its paramilitary function through riot control plans, the use of helicopters, and the invention of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams, which was quickly adopted by other departments. At the same time, the department sought to legitimize the iron fist with the velvet glove of community relations and improved officer training. As this chapter shows, the LAPD engaged in a process of militarization and enhanced its martial capacity while expanding its reach through community relations programs.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
James R. Skillen

In April 2014, near Bunkerville, Nevada, Cliven Bundy and hundreds of armed supporters faced off with federal law enforcement officers who were removing his trespassing cattle from federal lands. Bundy described himself as the victim of a rogue federal government that trampled the US Constitution and deprived him of basic rights, and he was ready to “take this country back by force.”...


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-271
Author(s):  
Cedric Jenart ◽  
Mathieu Leloup

Alternative dispute resolution procedures before the European Court of Human Rights – The state agent, a member of the executive branch, tasked with representing the respondent state – Judicial and legislative branches of the respondent state limited or bound by concessions by the state agent – Convention framework effectively increases the power of the executive branch to the detriment of the other branches of government in the respondent state – Tension with national separation of powers – Possible solutions on a national and international level


Author(s):  
Alfonso Iglesias

According to the act of state doctrine, national courts must refrain from prosecuting the validity of official acts carried out by a foreign state within its own territory, except if it commits violations of international norms with broad consensus of international society, such as, for example, a case of genocide. Both its judicial self-restraint character and its reflection in the judicial deference to the executive branch would justify the ex officio application of the act of state doctrine by the courts. This doctrine is neither a rule nor a legal obligation required by international law, although it arises from the relevance of the international rule of territorial sovereignty of the state. It was not introduced by a constitutional or legislative provision, but is a common law principle developed mainly by Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions on the basis of considerations of international comity, respect for the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, separation of powers, and the choice of law freedom. To some extent, the legal basis of the doctrine of immunity for acts of state was analogous to the basis of immunity granted to the foreign sovereign state and its agents. The underlying rationale of this doctrine consists in preventing domestic courts from issuing adverse judgments against foreign governments that could embarrass international relations and interfere with the conduct of foreign affairs by the executive branch power. The doctrine of the act of state (and that of the political question) has important differences with the immunity of the foreign state: (1) This immunity is per se a general rule of public international law of a customary nature accepted and applied universally—in addition to being regulated in various international conventions, one of them of universal vocation—unlike the doctrines cited, which are not regulated by national legislations or by international codification efforts. (2) The moment of operation is also different, since the immunity of the foreign state functions ex ante as a procedural exception to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court of the territorial state (or court of the forum), which for that reason is obliged to recognize its lack of competence to try the case before it, while the doctrines of the state act and the political question act later—only if the defendant does not enjoy immunity—when the court is already exercising its competence and knowing the merits of the case. (3) The application of the immunity of the foreign state requires that the foreign state be sued before the courts of the forum, whereas the act of state doctrine does not require that the foreign state itself be a party to the proceedings, but it is sufficient to question the validity of an internal act of the foreign state during the judicial proceedings.


2020 ◽  
pp. 009102601990052
Author(s):  
Helen H. Yu

Recent scholarship has examined the barriers women experience in well-known federal law enforcement agencies. However, there is scant research that examines a unique subgrouping of agents within the federal Offices of Inspectors General (OIGs). Drawing on survey data from 249 female agents, this study compares responses between female agents working in the OIGs and female agents working in all other federal law enforcement agencies to differentiate their experiences. Findings suggest that female agents in the OIGs experience less occupational barriers, namely, reduced number of relocations and incidences of sexual harassment, as well as higher agency adoption of family-friendly policies to promote work–life balance, resulting in women’s higher representation at those agencies.


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