“Collective Redress” in European Competition Law

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 388-414
Author(s):  
Alexandra P. Mikroulea
Keyword(s):  
Hybrid System ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Mixed System ◽  
Basic Question ◽  
Effective Implementation ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Collective Redress ◽  
Opt Out ◽  
Private Autonomy ◽  
European Competition Law

AbstractOpt-in or opt-out? That is the basic question to be answered. The decision to promote actions of “opt-in” type as opposed to those of the “opt-out” type, for the sake of private autonomy, does not ensure the effective application of european competition law. On the contrary, it may decrease the application’s intensity and effectiveness. Recent reforms among European state members such as in the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway are powerful indications that the opt-out principle may result in the effective implementation of competition law. There is no doubt that a mixed system (hybrid system), providing the court with the power to decide in favour of either the opt-in or the opt-out system, will result in better implementation of competition law. At the present time there are two pending cases in England (Dorothy Gibson and Mastercard) for which the decision on opt-out or opt-in are highly anticipated. Should the court decide, in one or both of the cases, on an opt-out approach, this will bring a momentous reevaluation of the entire collective redress concept.

Has Competition in the Market for Subscription Sports Broadcasting Benefited Consumers? The Case of the English Premier League

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 603-624 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Butler ◽  
Patrick Massey
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Premier League ◽  
Sports Broadcasting ◽  
English Premier League ◽  
Peculiar Nature ◽  
European Competition Law

This paper investigates the peculiar nature of competition in the broadcasting market for live English Premier League matches in the United Kingdom. Following the movement from free-to-air to subscription television in 1992, British Sky Broadcasting secured a monopoly on live broadcasting rights. The exclusive arrangements were later found to be in breach of European competition law and resulted in competition from the start of the 2007-2008 season. However, competition has not reduced prices charged to consumers. Both the overall cost to consumers and the price per game are higher with competing broadcasters than under a monopoly.

scholarly journals Winner of the SLS Annual Conference Best Paper Prize 2013: Bogeymen, lunatics and fanatics: collective actions and the private enforcement of European competition law

Legal Studies ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Wardhaugh
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Culture ◽  
Class Action ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Annual Conference ◽  
Collective Actions ◽  
Class Actions ◽  
Collective Redress ◽  
Authority Figures ◽  
European Competition Law

The European desire to ensure that bearers of EU rights are adequately compensated for any infringement of these rights, particularly in cases where the harm is widely diffused, and perhaps not even noticed by those affected by it, collides with another desire: to avoid the perceived excesses of an American-style system of class actions. The excesses of these American class actions are in European discourse presented as a sort of bogeyman, which is a source of irrational fear, often presented by parental or other authority figures. But when looked at critically, the bogeyman disappears. In this paper, I examine the European (and UK) proposals for collective action. I compare them to the American regime. The flaws and purported excesses of the American regime, I argue, are exaggerated. A close, objective examination of the American regime shows this. I conclude that it is not the mythical bogeyman of a US class action that is the barrier to effective collective redress; rather, the barriers to effective, wide-ranging group actions lie within European legal culture and traditions, particularly those mandating individual control over litigation.

A Channel Apart: Why the United Kingdom has Departed from the European Commission’s Recommendation on Class Actions

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 36-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachael MULHERON
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Class Action ◽  
Reform Agenda ◽  
Class Actions ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Collective Redress ◽  
Opt Out ◽  
The Uk

AbstractOver the course of 2013–15, there have been significant developments in the reform of class actions in Europe. The European Commission published its Recommendation of common principles concerning collective redress in June 2013, whilst the Consumer Rights Act 2015 – which was introduced into the United Kingdom Parliament in January 2014 and obtained Royal Assent on 26 March 2015 – contains a class action for competition law infringements. Although there is some ‘common ground’ between these legislative instruments, their divergences are far more legally significant, and comprise the focus of analysis in this article. Regarding the two topics of standing to sue, and the opt-in versus opt-out approach to forming the class, the approaches of the European Commission and the UK Parliament differ markedly, reflecting the deep policy, political and judicial divisions which have manifested in this area of reform for over a decade. The legislators have also ultimately chosen different scopes of application, with the European Commission preferring a ‘horizontal’ approach to reform, whilst the UK Parliament has pursued a sector-specific reform agenda. In respect of standing to sue and the opt-in versus opt-out debate, there are numerous sound legal and political reasons that manifestly support the UK law-makers’ decision to depart from the 2013 Recommendation. However, in respect of the horizontal-versus-sectoral debate, the topsy-turvy history of reform at both European and domestic levels has resulted, ironically, in both the Commission and UK policy-makers reversing the views which each had initially adopted within the past decade. Undoubtedly, as these reform measures demonstrate, the collective redress landscape is both evolving and controversial.

scholarly journals Private Enforcement and Opt-out System Risks, Rewards and Legal Safeguards

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (18) ◽  
pp. 85-114
Author(s):  
Maria Elisabete Ramos
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Economic Problem ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
National Regulation ◽  
Small Loss ◽  
Collective Redress ◽  
Opt Out ◽  
Compensatory Damages ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Eu

The EU Antitrust Damages Actions Directive does not include provisions for collective redress. Each EU member state is free to provide national regulation on this matter. The Portuguese legal system provided regulation on actio popularis since 1995. The ‘rational apathy’ of individual consumers may lead to non-reparation of damage and be of significant benefit for the company that is in breach of the law. The opt-out models solve the crucial economic problem caused by a large number of consumers or clients who have suffered a small loss because of competition law infringements. Under those circumstances, it is rational to be apathetic, because it can be foreseen that the cost of filing for compensatory damages will exceed the recovery obtained from the defendant. Such rational apathy of the parties injured by competition law infringements favours the wrongfully acting companies by not extracting their illegal gains from them. By not requiring the active consent of each of the claimants, the opt-out model is able to override rational apathy of consumers.

scholarly journals Zajedničko ulaganje (joint venture) i tržišna konkurencija / Joint Venture and Market Competition

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (6) ◽  
pp. 254
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Bogojević
Keyword(s):  
Joint Venture ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Basic Question ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Modern Business ◽  
Business Entities ◽  
European Competition Law ◽  
The Eu

In modern business of the business entities, on the EU market, as well as on the other national markets, it is joint venture is increasingly used as a form of joining of business entities. For a competition law basic question is an effect on the market competition of this joining of the business entities. The effects made by joint ventures on market competition may be positive, which is the case with the invention, the availability of new technologies, increasing of the efficiency, new products etc., or negative, which is the case with market separation or closing of the market for new participants. In European competition law there is an opinion that there is greater possibility of the negative effects on market competition when real or potential competitors make joint venture. Authority for protection of competition on two basis can evaluate joint venture. The first base is joint venture, which is evaluated as concentration of the business entities, and the second base is joint venture, which is evaluated as an agreement between business entities. This paper shall elaborate both basis, paying special attention on its demarcation, as well as the effects they have on market competition. In addition, the paper shall show and explain the most common modalities of the joint venture agreements, and point out their differences between them.

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