scholarly journals Analysis of a duopoly game with heterogeneous players participating in carbon emission trading

2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lingrui Zhao ◽  
Jixiang Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Control Method ◽  
Chaotic Behavior ◽  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Heterogeneous Players ◽  
Stable Conditions ◽  
Carbon Emission Trading

In this paper, a price competition model with two heterogeneous players participating in carbon emission trading is formulated. The stable conditions of the equilibrium points of this system are discussed. Numerical simulations are used to show bifurcation diagrams, strange attractors, and sensitive dependence on initial conditions. We observe that the speed of adjustment of bounded rational player may change the stability of the Nash equilibrium and cause the system to behave chaotically. In addition, we find that the price of emission permits plays an important role in the duopoly game. The chaotic behavior of the system has been stabilized on the Nash equilibrium point by applying delay feedback control method.

scholarly journals Complex Dynamics of Mixed Triopoly Game with Quantity and Price Competition

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Jing Wang ◽  
Zhenhua Bao ◽  
Junqing Huang ◽  
Yujing Song
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Control Method ◽  
Complex Dynamics ◽  
Chaotic Behavior ◽  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
Public Firm ◽  
Feedback Control Method

This article investigates the dynamics of a mixed triopoly game in which a state-owned public firm competes against two private firms. In this game, the public firm and private firms are considered to be boundedly rational and naive, respectively. Based on both quantity and price competition, the game’s equilibrium points are calculated, and then the local stability of boundary points and the Nash equilibrium points is analyzed. Numerical simulations are presented to display the dynamic behaviors including bifurcation diagrams, maximal Lyapunov exponent, and sensitive dependence on initial conditions. The chaotic behavior of the two models has been stabilized on the Nash equilibrium point by using the delay feedback control method. The thresholds under price and quantity competition are also compared.

scholarly journals Dynamics Analysis of Game and Chaotic Control in the Chinese Fixed Broadband Telecom Market

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jia Liu ◽  
Guoliang Liu ◽  
Na Li ◽  
Hongliang Xu
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Control Method ◽  
Chaotic Behavior ◽  
Spillover Effect ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point ◽  
Heterogeneous Players ◽  
Existence And Stability ◽  
Feedback Control Method

This paper considers a dynamic duopoly Cournot model based on nonlinear cost functions. The model with heterogeneous players and the spillover effect is applied to the Chinese fixed broadband telecom market. We have studied its dynamic game process. The existence and stability of the Nash equilibrium of the system have been discussed. Simulations are used to show the complex dynamical behaviors of the system. The results illustrate that altering the relevant parameters of system can affect the stability of the Nash equilibrium point and cause chaos to occur. With the use of the delay feedback control method, the chaotic behavior of the model has been stabilized at the Nash equilibrium point. The analysis and results will be of great importance for the Chinese fixed broadband telecom market.

scholarly journals Complexity Analysis of a 3-Player Game with Bounded Rationality Participating in Nitrogen Emission Reduction

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jixiang Zhang ◽  
Xuan Xi
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Control Method ◽  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Stable Region ◽  
Nitrogen Emissions ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point ◽  
The Stability

In this paper, a decision-making competition game model concerning governments, agricultural enterprises, and the public, all of which participate in the reduction of nitrogen emissions in the watersheds, is established based on bounded rationality. First, the stability conditions of the equilibrium points in the system are discussed, and the stable region of the Nash equilibrium is determined. Then, the bifurcation diagram, maximal Lyapunov exponent, strange attractor, and sensitive dependence on the initial conditions are shown through numerical simulations. The research shows that the adjustment speed of three players’ decisions may alter the stability of the Nash equilibrium point and lead to chaos in the system. Among these decisions, a government’s decision has the largest effect on the system. In addition, we find that some parameters will affect the stability of the system; when the parameters become beneficial for enterprises to reduce nitrogen emissions, the increase in the parameters can help control the chaotic market. Finally, the delay feedback control method is used to successfully control the chaos in the system and stabilize it at the Nash equilibrium point. The research of this paper is of great significance to the environmental governance decisions and nitrogen reduction management.

scholarly journals Did carbon emission trading system reduce emissions in China? An integrated approach to support policy modeling and implementation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lin Aihua ◽  
Pier Paolo Miglietta ◽  
Pierluigi Toma
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Control Method ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Integrated Approach ◽  
Provincial Government ◽  
Sustainable Growth ◽  
Synthetic Control ◽  
Local Conditions ◽  
Carbon Emission Trading ◽  
The Impact

AbstractAs the highest carbon emission country in the world, it is particularly important to investigate the implementation effect of China’s carbon emission trading (CET) system. Because of the complexity to figure out the counterfactual effect when a single unit is treated, the counterfactual and causal effects of the CET system on the carbon emissions are seldom identified. In order to overcome the weakness that counterfactual effect is difficult to be verified and policy persistence is difficult to be estimated, Synthetic Control Method (SCM) and Regression Discontinuity (RD) are combined to better understand and evaluate the impact of CET system in China. Through the analysis, it is found that CET system is effective in China, but the effect is driven by economic development, energy consumption, FDI and other variables. Because of the differences in economic, geographical, technological and environmental conditions in various areas, each Chinese provincial government should formulate a targeted policy according to local conditions, ensuring an economic and environmentally sustainable growth in the future.

Examining the Impact and Influencing Channels of Emission Trading Pilot Markets in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 136-136
Author(s):  
Qiong Wu ◽  
Kanittha Tambunlertchai ◽  
Pongsa Pornchaiwiseskul
Keyword(s):  
Total Factor Productivity ◽  
Co2 Emission ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Synergy Effect ◽  
Factor Productivity ◽  
Plan Period ◽  
Carbon Emission Trading ◽  
The Impact

The global warming has become a serious issue in the world since the 1980s. The targets for the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol cover emissions of the six main greenhouse gasses (GHGs). China is the world's largest CO2 emitter and coal consumer and was responsible for 27.3 percent of the global total CO2 emission and 50.6 percent of the global total coal consumption in 2016 (BP, 2017). As China plays an important role in the global climate change, China has set goals to improve its environmental efficiency and performance. In 2011, the Chinese government for the first time announced an intent to establish carbon emission trading market in China. Eight regional emission trading schemes have been operating since 2013 (seven pilot markets during the 12th Five Year Plan period and one pilot market during the 13th Five Year Plan period) including provinces of Guangdong, Hubei, and Fujian, and cities of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Chongqing. The goal of these regional emission trading pilot markets is to help the government establish an efficient carbon emission trading scheme at national level. Some researchers have been focused on examining the impact of emission trading schemes in China using CGE model by constructing different scenarios and ex-ante analysis using data prior to emission trading pilot markets implementation. While this paper tries to conduct an ex-post analysis with data of 2005-2017 to evaluate the impact of emission trading pilot markets in China at provincial level using difference-in-difference (DID) model. By including both CO2 and SO2 as undesirable outputs to calculate Malmquist-Luenberger (ML) Index to measure green total factor productivity, this paper plans to evaluate the impact of carbon emission trading pilot markets in China via emission reduction, regional green development, synergy effect and influencing channels. This paper tries to answer the following research questions: (1) Do emission trading pilot markets reduce CO2 emission and increase regional green total factor productivity? (2) Is there any synergy effect from emission trading pilot markets? (3) What are the influencing channels of emission trading pilot markets? Keywords: Emission trading, CO2 emissions, Different-in-difference

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