scholarly journals On what a theory of natural law is supposed to be

2020 ◽  
pp. 167-200
Author(s):  
Michael Pakaluk
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Natural Teleology ◽  
Law And Morality ◽  
The Law ◽  
John Finnis ◽  
The Many ◽  
Locus Classicus

A theory may properly be called a theory of natural law, if either it functions as such a theory is expected to function; or it has the expected content; or it is a plausible interpretation of a theory generally acknowledged to be in the tradition of natural law. It functions as such a theory if it supports appeals to natural law intended to ‘contextualize’ human law. It has the expected content, if it adverts to providential, natural teleology as the basis for a law given to us prior to convention. It would clearly be located in the tradition, and rightly accounted as such a theory, if it were a plausible interpretation of Aquinas’ Treatise on Law, which is the locus classicus for the philosophical treatment of natural law. But the ‘New Natural Law,’ first expounded in Natural Law and Natural Rights (NLNR) of John Finnis, meets none of these criteria. NLNR seems best construed, then, as a contribution to the «law and morality » debate, not a theory of natural law. It gives merely another ‘method of ethics’ along with the many others put forward in the 20th c. If so, the philosophical work needed for a persuasive, contemporary revival of natural law still remains to be done.

scholarly journals John Finnis y la defensa ética del «Rule of Law». «Natural Law and Natural Rights» y otros escritos posteriores

2020 ◽  
pp. 435-461
Author(s):  
Carlos-I. Massini-Correas
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
John Finnis

En el presente artículo, escrito en homenaje a los 40 años de la aparición de la primera edición de Natural Law and Natural Rights de John Finnis, se estudian varias de las versiones elaboradas por el iusfilósofo australiano para analizar, explicitar, desarrollar y defender la noción de rule of law. Luego de este desarrollo, se efectúa una valoración de las aportaciones de Finnis en este punto, en especial las referidas al carácter principalmente ético de ese instituto, y a la maestría con la que ha sabido integrar la tradición clásico-realista del iusnaturalismo, los planteos metodológicos de la analytical jurisprudence y la reflexión contemporánea sobre la idea del gobierno limitado por el derecho.

PERSONS PURSUING GOODS

Legal Theory ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 13 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 285-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven D. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
Legal Authority ◽  
Basic Goods ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
Law And Morality ◽  
Basic Good ◽  
Theory Of Law

John Finnis's powerfully and deservedly influential modern classic, Natural Law and Natural Rights, expounds a theory of law and morality that is based on a picture of “persons” using practical reason to pursue certain “basic goods.” While devoting much attention to practical reason and to the goods, however, Finnis says little about the nature of personhood. This relative inattention to what “persons” are creates a risk—one that Finnis himself notices—of assuming or importing an inadequate anthropology. This essay suggests that the “new natural law” developed by Finnis suffers in places from the inadvertent adoption of (or, more likely, acquiescence in) a flawed anthropology—an anthropology under the thrall of modern individualistic commitments. To explain this suspicion, this article discusses three difficulties (or so they seem to me) in his natural law theory: difficulties in accounting for the basic good of friendship, for obligations we owe to others, and for legal authority. These difficulties may seem disconnected, but this article suggests that they may all reflect an inadequate anthropology—one that Finnis does not exactly embrace (in fact, I suspect that he would reject it) but that is pervasive today and that in places may affect his theorizing.

scholarly journals ¿Qué tipo de bien es John Finnis? Un estudio sobre el bien personal y común en «Natural Law and Natural Rights»

2020 ◽  
pp. 637-668
Author(s):  
Brian McCall
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
John Finnis

Natural Law and Natural Rights, de John Finnis ha tenido un impacto significativo en el campo de la filosofía del derecho, especialmente en algunos temas concretos. En alguna medida sus tesis recuperaron para el iusnaturalismo la relevancia que estos planteamientos tuvieron, al menos, durante cinco décadas. Sin embargo, dicha recuperación significó algo más que la clásica comprensión de una ley natural inclusiva de la ley positiva y de mayor espectro referencial que ésta. En el discurso académico y popular el enfoque de Finnis, sus colaboradores y discípulos constituye, de hecho, una «nueva» ley natural. En este artículo se analiza el origen y fundamento de la ley natural (la clásica y la «nueva»): en particular, el concepto de «bien» (tanto individual como común) que se asume en Natural Law and Natural Rights. La definición de este concepto y su papel en los preceptos primarios de la ley natural son fundamentales y determinantes de cara a la elaboración y desarrollo de los argumentos subsiguientes. La primera parte destaca la gran contribución del libro en el campo iusfilosófico: la defensa de la objetividad del bien. La segunda explora la comprensión de Finnis del concepto de bien y, en particular, las formas en que reinterpreta o se aparta de Tomás de Aquino y Aristóteles. La tercera parte describe cómo tales diferencias afectan a un ejercicio de comprensión del bien común.

Проблема морального содержания права в концепции Дж. Финниса

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 71
Author(s):  
V. Yu. Perov ◽  
A. D. Sevastianova
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Human Flourishing ◽  
Moral Content ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Common ◽  
Law And Morality ◽  
John Finnis

The law and morality the interrelation issue has been the subject for many discussions, recent works in the philosophy field and law ethics of renowned authors as H. Hart, L. Fuller and J. Finnis, who contributed significantly to the topic. The key question about the moral content of law is examined within the polemics between theorists of legal positivism and natural law legal theorists. This article touches upon this issue by the example of the concept of John Finnis, one of the most brilliant contemporary law philosophers, his neo-naturalistic concept of natural law includes some ideas of modern positivism. J. Finnis claims natural law appears as a set of principles of practical reasonableness for the ordering of human life and the human community. Law acts as a method to ensure “the common good” of the community and is based on seven self-evident, as he believes the basic human goods necessary for the human flourishing. The requirements of practical reasonableness compose the content of natural law, contain recommendations on how to carry out these self-evident goods. For Finnis, the aim of law is to provide conditions, according to the requirements of practical reasonableness, in which these seven goods can be realized. It is outlined that J. Finnis regards law as a social institute which purpose is to regulate human affairs, and thus to promote the creation of a community where everyone could realize the seven fundamental goods for humankind.

Law and morality

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
N.E. Simmonds
Keyword(s):  
Social Environment ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Political Community ◽  
The Political ◽  
Liberal Tradition ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Fundamental Goal ◽  
Law And Morality ◽  
The Law ◽  
Harmful Effects

Within the tradition of natural law thinking which finds its roots in the philosophies of Aristotle and Aquinas, the political community has generally been understood in terms of a fundamental goal: that of fostering the ethical good of citizens. Law, on this conception, should seek to inculcate habits of good conduct, and should support a social environment which will encourage citizens to pursue worthy goals, and to lead valuable lives. Pragmatic considerations may sometimes suggest the wisdom of restraint in the pursuit of these goals, and citizens may therefore, on appropriate occasions, be left free to indulge depraved tastes or otherwise fall short of acceptable standards. Such pragmatic arguments for the freedom to engage in vice, however, do not call into question the legitimacy of the state’s concern with individual morality. By contrast the liberal tradition has tended to place constraints of principle upon the scope and aims of the law. The most influential such attempt was J.S. Mill’s advocacy of ‘the harm principle’: that the law may forbid only such behaviour as is liable to cause harm to persons other than the agent. Many difficulties surround this and other, more recent, attempts to formulate and defend constraining principles. For instance, should one take into account only the immediate effects of behaviour, or more remote and diffuse effects as well? Thus it is argued that immoral behaviour which in the short term ‘harms nobody’ may, in the long run, lead to a decline in morality in society at large and thereby to diffuse harmful effects.

scholarly journals El bien común político en «Natural Law and Natural Rights» en cotejo doctrinal con el tomismo

2020 ◽  
pp. 611-635
Author(s):  
Sergio-Raúl Castaño
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
John Finnis

El objeto del presente artículo consiste, en primer término, en el análisis de la noción de bien común y de bien común político, tal como es presentada por John Finnis en Natural Law and Natural Rights. Para enseguida, en un segundo momento, contrastar dicha concepción con la sostenida por Tomás de Aquino y algunos destacados exégetas contemporáneos del pensamiento del Aquinate, hasta 1980. Queda abierto el debate científico-filosófico acerca de la validez sistemática, «en las cosas mismas» (Husserl), que quepa reconocer a una y a otra posición.

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