scholarly journals Hukum Internasional tentang Genosida dalam Perspektif Fikih Dauly

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (01) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Nimas Masrullail Miftahuddini Ashar

Abstract: This article discusses about the genocide in international law on the dauliy jurisprudence perspective. International law governs the genocide crime in the Rome Statute which is applied for the state parties. The Rome Statute becomes the basis for the International Criminal Court (ICC) which is responsible for handling the case of genocide and other cases listed in the Rome Statute. Based on article 77 of the Rome Statute, genocide perpetrator will be liable to imprison of not more than 30 years, or a lifetime (under certain condition). In addition, the offender will be liable to fine and confiscation. Based on this, international law governing the genocide can be quite fair because there is no difference in the position of judge and imposing sanction, but when it is viewed from the dauliy jurisprudence perspective, sanction given to the perpetrator of genocide is considered not to be commensurate with the conducted crime.Keywords: Dauliy Jurisprudence, Genocide, International Law

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshiaki Kitano

This paper aims to discuss the legal basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court while viewing the topic as one of the issues demonstrating the current status of general international law concerning the creation of obligations for non-party states. The table of contents included in this part 5 is as follows: Chapter 3 Examination of the Preparatory Work of the Statute (Continued) (Section 2 Analysis of the Relevant Discussions Conducted in the Preparatory Work of the Statute (Continued) (2. Discussions on the State-Consent Requirements and Legal Basis for the Proposed ICC’s Exercise of Jurisdiction ((A) Exercise of Jurisdiction in the Cases of the State Parties’ Referral or Prosecutor’s Initiative))).


Author(s):  
Micheal G Kearney

Abstract In 2018, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) held that conduct preventing the return of members of the Rohingya people to Myanmar could fall within Article 7(1)(k) of the Statute, on the grounds that denial of the right of return constitutes a crime against humanity. No international tribunal has prosecuted this conduct as a discrete violation, but given the significance of the right of return to Palestinians, it can be expected that such an offence would be of central importance should the ICC investigate the situation in Palestine. This comment will review the recognition of this crime against humanity during the process prompted by the Prosecutor’s 2018 Request for a ruling as to the Court’s jurisdiction over trans-boundary crimes in Bangladesh/Myanmar. It will consider the basis for the right of return in general international law, with a specific focus on the Palestinian right of return. The final section will review the elements of the denial of right of return as a crime against humanity, as proposed by the Office of the Prosecutor in its 2019 Request for Authorization of an investigation in Bangladesh/Myanmar.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 111 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 111 sets out measures in the event of escape of a convicted person. The Rome Statute combines ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ approaches to State cooperation, allowing either the State of enforcement or the Court itself to intervene, depending on the circumstances. The Court may choose to return the escaped prisoner to the original State of enforcement, or to change the State of enforcement. Given the Court's authority to oversee and review enforcement in a general sense, even if this provision were not included in the Statute the consequences of escape would probably be the same.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 108 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 108 prohibits the prosecution, punishment, or extradition of a sentenced person to a third State for conduct engaged in prior to the person's delivery to the State of enforcement. However, the Court is allowed to dispense with this requirement if it is so requested by the State of enforcement. When the State of enforcement wishes to prosecute or enforce a sentence against a sentenced person for any conduct engaged in prior to that person's transfer, it shall notify its intention to the Presidency and transmit the relevant documents. In the event of a request for extradition made by another State, the State of enforcement shall transmit the entire request to the Presidency with a protocol containing the views of the sentenced person obtained after informing the person sufficiently about the extradition request.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 107 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 107 governs the transfer of the person following completion of the sentence. When a released prisoner is not a national of the State of enforcement, and is not authorized to remain there, two possible scenarios arise: transfer to a State ‘which is obliged to receive him or her’ and transfer to a State ‘which agrees to receive him or her’. Transfer of a released person to a third State upon completion of sentence will invariably require agreement. Absent such agreement, the individual will remain in the State of enforcement. In deciding upon transfer, the wishes of the released prisoner are to be taken into account.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 103 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 103 deals with State enforcement of sentences. The enforcement regime of the International Criminal Court is premised on three broad principles: sentences are served in the prison facilities of States and are subject to their laws; enforcement of the sentence is subject to the supervision of the Court; and the sentence imposed by the Court is binding upon the State of enforcement. The provisions of the Statute governing enforcement are quite succinct, and much of the detail on the issue appears in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 101 sets out the principle of speciality, which is part of the customary law governing extradition between States. The rationale for the principle of speciality ‘is to protect State sovereignty’. For this reason, the rule is limited to the scenarios in which the person is arrested and is surrendered as a result of a request submitted by the Court to the State. It is inapplicable if the suspect has appeared voluntarily. The State that surrenders the individual to the Court may be asked to waive the rule of speciality if the Court seeks to proceed with respect to crimes that were not part of the original request for surrender.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 27 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 27 consists two paragraphs that are often confounded but fulfil different functions. Paragraph 1 denies a defence of official capacity, i.e. official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall not exempt a person from criminal responsibility under the Statute. Paragraph 2 amounts to a renunciation, by States Parties to the Rome Statute, of the immunity of their own Head of State to which they are entitled by virtue of customary international law. In contrast with paragraph 1, it is without precedent in international criminal law instruments.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 127 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 127 addresses the withdrawal of a State Party from this Statute. A State may withdraw from the Rome Statute by providing a written notification to the depositary, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The withdrawal takes effect one year after receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General, unless a later date is specified. There have been no notifications of withdrawal from the Rome Statute. The Statute does not indicate whether a notice of withdrawal can itself be withdrawn, thereby returning the State to ordinary status as a Party. Withdrawal does not affect the continuation of the Statute with respect to other States Parties, even if the number of them falls below the threshold of sixty.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 92 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 92 grants the Court authority, ‘[i]n urgent cases’, to request the provisional arrest of the person sought, pending presentation of the request for surrender and the documents supporting the request as specified in article 91. When a request is made to a State in accordance with article 92, the Registrar ‘invites’ the State to inform him or her of the arrest, and ‘to provide, inter alia’, personal details and other information concerning the arrest, including a confirmation of ‘the information given to the arrested person in respect of his or her rights’.


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