A Criticism on Consequentialism - Focusing on the Issues of Integrity, Distributive Justice, and Commutative Justice -

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 135-171
Author(s):  
Gyuha Choi ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 459-476
Author(s):  
Stephen A. Smith

In The Foundations of Private Law James Gordley argues that the modern private law in common and civil law jurisdictions is best explained on the basis of a neo-Aristotelian theory first developed by a group of 16th century Spanish thinkers known as the ‘late scholastics’. The concepts of distributive and commutative justice that, according to Gordley, lay at core of the scholastics’ theory and that explain, respectively, modern property law and the law of obligations (contract, tort, unjust enrichment), though ignored and disparaged for much of the 19th and 20th centuries, are today familiar to most private law scholars (thanks in part to Gordley’s earlier work). Yet Gordley’s understanding of these concepts and, in particular, of their relationship both to one another and to the apex idea of ‘living a distinctively human life’ is unique, setting his account apart not just from utilitarian and other ‘modern’ accounts of private law, but also from other neo-Aristotelian theories (e.g., those of Ernest Weinrib or Jules Coleman). In Gordley’s presentation, commutative (or ‘corrective’) justice is derived from distributive justice and distributive justice is derived from the idea of the distinctively human life. Confidently traversing a wide range of historical, comparative and theoretical materials, the book’s argument is at once ambitious, learned, and elegantly presented. But as a theoretical account of the foundations of the modern private law it is unpersuasive. The book’s own account of property law suggests that in practice the idea of distributive justice does little, if any, work in explaining the rules we actually have. Nor is it clear how, if at all, distributive justice flows from the allegedly foundational idea of the ’distinctively human life’. As for commutative justice, it is not clear why, if is derived from distributive justice in the way Gordley believes, the courts should care about it. Finally, but perhaps most significantly, Gordley’s conception of commutative justice is unable to account for central features of the law of obligations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 77 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 643-656
Author(s):  
Ricardo Tavares Silva

The problem of the distribution (in a broad sense) of the coronavirus vaccines – concerning the criterion by which the beneficiaries of the vaccine are selected – constitute a particular case of the general problem of the distribution of social goods. For this reason, it is necessary to discuss whether the selection criterion to be adopted is that of commutative justice or that of distributive justice and, consequently, whether the approach to the problem must follow an individualist perspective or a collectivist perspective, such as it happens regarding the general problem of the distribution of social goods. Therefore, problem of the distribution of the coronavirus vaccines is still a problem of social justice. In this essay, I will rehearse an application of each of these criteria to the problem at hand.


1999 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Dabrock

Abstract This article offers a critical appreciation of a theory of justice puttoward by 0. Höffe. Höffe suggests that commutative justice forms the basis for every understanding of justice, not only in market relationships but also in the legal and social state. Beginning with Räffes' application of his theory to the health system, this article argues that Höffes' theory is not empirically sufficent; nor does it suffice in the discourse of Iegitimation for law and state. Distributive justice can only be excluded as the fundamental justice for legal and state function at the cost of participation and solidarity. The paradigm change for which Höffe calls cannot, therefore, count upon the support of Christian social ethics


1992 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald Winch

AbstractBy contrast with those for whom the Wealth of nations marks the origin of economics as an autonomous science, this article argues that Smith's significance lies in his attempt to repossess political economy by restoring its links with the sciences of morals and natural jurisprudence — those concerns which are characteristic of his writings as a moral philosopher. The case proceeds by re-examining two topics derived from these sciences. The first begins with Smith's ungenerous treatment of his mercantile predecessors as a clue to what he believed was distinctive about his own system. Smith was antagonistic to precisely those rationalist, utilitarian and reductive models of behaviour based on self-interest that he is held to have in common with mercantile writers; he was answering rather than joining those who felt it necessary to isolate and legitimate rational economic self-seeking. The second topic turns on Smith's natural jurisprudence: his application of the criteria of natural justice when criticizing mercantile policies and institutions, where the emphasis falls on the negative injunctions of commutative justice rather than the positive ones of distributive justice. The separation of the ethics of the Theory of moral sentiments from the Wealth of nations, therefore, tells us more about Smith's successors than Smith himself.


2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
MANUEL WÖRSDÖRFER

Variations and disparities between von Hayek and Ordoliberalism can be detected on diverse levels: 1. philosophy of science; 2. setting dissimilar priorities; 3. social philosophy; 4. genesis of norms; and, 5. notion of freedom. Therefore, it is possible to make an important distinction within neoliberalism itself, which contains at least two factions: von Hayek’s evolutionary liberalism, and German Ordoliberalism. The following essay not only takes the neoliberal separation of different varieties as granted; it proceeds further. It focuses on the topic of justice and elaborates the (slightly) differing conceptions of justice within neoliberalism. Thus, the specific contribution of the paper is that it adds a sixth dimension of difference (which is highly interconnected with the differing conceptions of genesis of norms). In this paper, I emphasize the (often neglected) subtle differences between von Hayek, Eucken, Röpke, and Rüstow, with special emphasis on their theories of justice. In this regard, I focus not only on Eucken and von Hayek; in addition, I include the concepts of justice developed by Rüstow and Röpke, as well, and, in consequence, broaden the perspective incorporating Eucken as a member of the Freiburg School of Law and Economics, and Rüstow and Röpke as representatives of Ordoliberalism in the wider sense. The paper tackles these topics in three steps. After briefly examining and discussing the existing literature and providing a literature overview on the decade-long debate on von Hayek and Ordoliberalism, I then describe von Hayek’s conception of commutative justice; particularly, justice of rules and procedures (rather than end-state justice). Then, I examine Eucken’s, Rüstow’s, and Röpke’s theories of justice, which consist of a mixture of commutative and distributive justice. Then, I draw a comparison between the ideas of justice developed by Eucken, Röpke, Rüstow, and von Hayek. The essay ends with a summary of my main findings.


2017 ◽  
Vol 112 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
LISA HERZOG

This article reintroduces a long-forgotten argument into the debate about social justice: Durkheim's argument from “organic solidarity,” as presented inThe Division of Labor in Society. “Organic solidarity” is solidarity based on differentiation. According to Durkheim, it grows out of the division of labor, but only if the latter happens “spontaneously.” Social inequality creates obstacles to such spontaneity because it distorts prices, such that they are perceived as unjust, and it undermines equality of opportunity. Hence, Durkheim's argument connects commutative justice and distributive justice. The article argues that Durkheim's argument is plausible, interesting, and relevant for today. After presenting the argument, discussing its structure and methodology, and evaluating its plausibility by drawing on related contemporary debates, it focuses on the problem of theperceptionof social justice and the possibility of ideological distortions. It concludes by sketching the research program that follows from Durkheim's argument.


Author(s):  
Estelle R. Jorgensen

In this chapter, responses to three interrelated questions are sketched: Why should music educators be interested in justice? What is meant by the term “social justice” and what are the sorts of social justice? How should music educators act on behalf of justice? The case is made for a multifaceted view of justice broadly construed. Aspects of distributive justice, communitarian justice, commutative justice, contributive justice, procedural justice, retributive justice, restorative justice, poetic justice, instrumental justice, legal justice, divine justice, and justice viewed through natural law are applied to notions of social justice from the perspective of education and music education. Several practical steps in working against injustice and toward justice in and on behalf of music education are offered.


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