How do Surrealistic Visual Ads Induce Marvelous Response? : The Formation of Perceptual Belief Through Depaysement

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 115-142
Author(s):  
Euijin Ahn
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Belief

Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism

2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Barel
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Belief ◽  
Philosophical Theory ◽  
The Face ◽  
External Form ◽  
Sceptical Argument

This paper explores the bearing of Tyler Burge’s notion of perceptual entitlement on the problem of scepticism. Perceptual entitlement is an external form of warrant, connected with his perceptual anti-individualism. According to his view, an individual can be entitled to a perceptual belief without having reasons warranting the belief. On the face of it, this suggests that the view may have anti-sceptical resources. In short, the question is whether Burge’s notion of perceptual entitlement allows us to outright deny that we in our philosophical theory need a reason to reject the sceptical scenario. The answer to this question is ‘no’. However, as I go on to show, Burge’s position includes further resources that allow for an anti-sceptical argument.

A. J. Ayer on the Argument from Illusion

1973 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-280
Author(s):  
P. L. McKee
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Belief ◽  
Perceptual Error ◽  
Physical Surface

In his paper “Has Austin Refuted the Sense-Datum Theory?” A. J. Ayer contends that the argument from illusion calls attention to perspectival distortion, perceptual misidentification and elusive perceptual belief only in order to establish the possibility of perceptual error. Pointing to our occasional perceptual failures reminds us that perceptual error is always logically possible—that any particular perceptual belief to the effect that one is perceiving a physical surface could be mistaken. This in turn is thought by Ayer to show that the ordinary belief that we perceive physical surfaces requires qualification—along lines urged by sense-datum philosophers—to the effect that even in those situations properly described for non-philosophical purposes as perceptions of physical surfaces it cannot be physical surfaces that are literally present to one's senses. Ayer believes that this can be established, for any given case, by the possibility of perceptual error alone.

scholarly journals Skeptical appeal: the source-content bias

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Popular Culture ◽  
Perceptual Belief ◽  
Present Evidence ◽  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
Specific Combination ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Content Bias

Radical skepticism is the view that we know nothing, or at least next to nothing. Nearly no one actually believes that skepticism is true. Yet it has remained a serious topic of discussion for millennia and it looms large in popular culture. What explains its persistent and widespread appeal? How does the skeptic get us to doubt what we ordinarily take ourselves to know? I present evidence from two experiments that classic skeptical arguments gain potency from an interaction between two factors. First, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly than perceptual belief. Second, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly when its content is negative (i.e. that something is not the case) than when it’s positive (i.e. that something is the case). It just so happens that potent skeptical arguments tend to focus our attention on negative inferential beliefs, and we are especially prone to doubt that such beliefs count as knowledge. That is, our cognitive evaluations are biased against this specific combination of source and content. The skeptic sows seeds of doubt by exploiting this feature of our psychology.

scholarly journals Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as

2015 ◽  
pp. 123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Enrique Kalpokas
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Perceptual Belief ◽  
Main Thesis

According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thesis of the article: seeing-as cannot be explained by the conception of experience defended by Rorty, Davidson and Brandom.

scholarly journals A Better Disjunctivist Response to the ‘New Evil Genius’ Challenge

2017 ◽  
Vol 94 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 101-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kegan J. Shaw
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Perceptual Belief ◽  
Diagnostic Problem ◽  
Order Problem ◽  
First Order ◽  
The Third ◽  
Diagnostic Problems ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Trait Level

This paper aims for a more robust epistemological disjunctivism (ed) by offering on its behalf a new and better response to the ‘new evil genius’ problem. The first section articulates the ‘new evil genius challenge’ (neg challenge) to ed, specifying its two components: the ‘first-order’ and ‘diagnostic’ problems for ed. The first-order problem challenges proponents of ed to offer some understanding of the intuition behind the thought that your radically deceived duplicate is no less justified than you are for adopting her perceptual beliefs. In the second section, the author argues that blamelessness explanations are inadequate to the task and offer better explanations in their place—that of ‘trait-level virtue’ and ‘reasonability’. The diagnostic problem challenges proponents of ed to explain why it is that classical internalists disagree with them about how to interpret new evil genius considerations. The proponent of ed owes some error theory. The author engages this problem in the third section, arguing that classical internalists are misled to overlook disjunctivist interpretations of new evil genius thinking owing to a mistaken commitment to a kind of ‘vindicatory’ explanation of proper perceptual belief.

Phenomenal Presence

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Perceptual Belief ◽  
Perceptual Awareness ◽  
The Third ◽  
Spatial Properties ◽  
Perceptual Presence

Many different features figure consciously in our perceptual experiences, in the sense that they make a subjective difference to those experiences. These features range from colours and shapes to volumes and backsides, from natural or artefactual kinds to reasons for perceptual belief, and from the existence and externality of objects to the relationality and wakefulness of our perceptual awareness of them. The topic of this collection of essays is the different ways in which features like these can be phenomenally present in perceptual experience. In particular, the focus is on features that are less often discussed, and the perceptual presence of which is less obvious because they are out of view or otherwise easily overlooked, features given in a non-sensory manner, and features that are categorical in the sense that they pertain to all perceptual experiences alike (such as their justificatory power, their wakefulness, or the externality of their objects). The book is divided into four parts, each dealing with a different kind of phenomenal presence. The first addresses the nature of the presence of perceptual constancies and variations, while the second investigates the determinacy and ubiquity of the presence of spatial properties in perception. The third part deals with the presence of hidden or occluded aspects of objects, while the last part of the volume discusses the presence of categorical aspects of perceptual experience. Together, the contributions provide a thorough examination of which features are phenomenally present in perception, and what it is for them to figure in experience in this way.

scholarly journals The Myth of Stochastic Infallibilism

Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Adam Michael Bricker
Keyword(s):  
Signal Detection ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Random Error ◽  
Signal Detection Theory ◽  
Detection Theory ◽  
Perceptual Belief ◽  
Important Lesson ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Perceptual Systems ◽  
The Way

Abstract There is a widespread attitude in epistemology that, if you know on the basis of perception, then you couldn't have been wrong as a matter of chance. Despite the apparent intuitive plausibility of this attitude, which I'll refer to here as “stochastic infallibilism”, it fundamentally misunderstands the way that human perceptual systems actually work. Perhaps the most important lesson of signal detection theory (SDT) is that our percepts are inherently subject to random error, and here I'll highlight some key empirical research that underscores this point. In doing so, it becomes clear that we are in fact quite willing to attribute knowledge to S that p even when S's perceptual belief that p could have been randomly false. In short, perceptual processes can randomly fail, and perceptual knowledge is stochastically fallible. The narrow implication here is that any epistemological account that entails stochastic infallibilism, like safety, is simply untenable. More broadly, this myth of stochastic infallibilism provides a valuable illustration of the importance of integrating empirical findings into epistemological thinking.

FIXING PERCEPTUAL BELIEF

2009 ◽  
Vol 59 (235) ◽  
pp. 292-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald Vision
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Belief
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document