scholarly journals The Direct Applicability of SADC Community Law in South Africa and Zimbabwe: A Call for Supranationality and the Uniform Application of SADC Community Law

Author(s):  
Tshidi Phooko

The Southern African Development Community Tribunal (SADC Tribunal) became operational in 1992 and delivered several judgments against Zimbabwe. Some of those decisions are yet to be enforced. The attempt to enforce them contributed to the demise of the SADC Tribunal. The tension between community law and domestic law, international law and national law, and community law and international law is as old as the hills. The monist and dualist theories of international law assist in attempting to clarify the nature of the relationship between international law and municipal law. However, there is no guidance when it comes to community law and national law. This paper will explore on how SADC Community law can be applied uniformly by South Africa and Zimbabwe including all other SADC member states. This will be done through decided cases with specific reference to South Africa and Zimbabwe. In order to learn best practices from other jurisdictions, the paper will to the extent relevant, make reference to the East African Court of Justice, the European Union (EU) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The discourse will conclude by making a proposal for the adoption of a revised Protocol on the SADC Tribunal that will assist in clarifying the nature of the relationship between SADC Community law and national laws of SADC member states.

2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-227
Author(s):  
Biancamaria Raganelli ◽  
Pierre de Gioia Carabellese

The Covid pandemic has raised various legal issues, fueling the scientific debate on the relationship between fundamental rights and freedoms in the global emergency context. Moreover, a case law has started developing within the different jurisdictions. Additionally, constitutional Courts, in different countries, have ruled over potential conflicts of interest among central powers and local ones, and even some decisa of the Court of Justice of the European Union have started “blossoming” in this area. Against the backdrop of this analysis, the paper discusses the main legal problems sparked off by the declaration of the state of emergency, with a focus on the main EU jurisdictions and with glimpses of non-EU countries. The aim of this is to discuss the balance between fundamental rights and liberties in decisa in different legal systems, as well as the interpretation given to principles of proportionality of the public health measures, adequacy, precaution and loyal collaboration and the relationship between freedom and limits to public power. Bearing this in mind, the purpose of the work is to demonstrate that, first and foremost, in Europe there is room for both a formal and a substantial recognition of common rights and liberties in terms of interpretation and application of constitutional traditions, shared by the different Member States. The relevant adherence to these principles is guaranteed by the European Court of Justice. Second, the recovery after the pandemic is an open challenge. An important opportunity for Europe and its Member States is materialising, and this is to take a step forward on the bumpy path toward a European Political Union capable of strengthening a structure weakened by several earthquakes. A path and a project still plenty of pitfalls that needs to regroup around a central core increasing unification among European peoples (art. 1 TEU), which has never meant to be an alternative to national identity. Received: 24.11.2021Accepted: 13.12.2021


2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dionysios Spinellis

The judgment of the European Court of Justice of 13 September 2005 decided an important institutional conflict in the Union. At the request of the Commission, the Court annulled the Council’s Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA on the protection of the environment through criminal law. In so doing, the Court acknowledged that the member states can be obliged under Community law and its system of conditions to impose criminal sanctions if this is necessary to protect Community law. It is beyond doubt that they thus can be obliged under Union law and its conditions. The underlying questions are about the relationship between the first and third pillars and the logic of each.


2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
H.U. Jessurun d'Oliveira ◽  
Gerard René de Groot ◽  
Anja Seling

This reference for a preliminary ruling raises for the first time the question of the extent of the discretion available to the Member States to determine who their nationals are. In so far as citizenship of the European Union, which depends, admittedly, on enjoyment of the status of national of a Member State, is established by the Treaty, can the powers of the Member States to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality still be exercised without any right of supervision for Community law? That is, in essence, the point at issue in this case. This case therefore calls for clarification of the relationship between the concepts of nationality of a Member State and of citizenship of the Union, a question which, it need hardly be emphasised, to a large extent determines the nature of the European Union.


Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

The European Union was born as an international organization. The 1957 Treaty of Rome formed part of international law, although the European Court of Justice was eager to emphasize that the Union constitutes “a new legal order” of international law. With time, this new legal order has indeed evolved into a true “federation of States.” Yet how would the foreign affairs powers of this new supranational entity be divided? Would the European Union gradually replace the member states, or would it preserve their distinct and diverse foreign affairs voices? In the past sixty years, the Union has indeed significantly sharpened its foreign affairs powers. While still based on the idea that it has no plenary power, the Union’s external competences have expanded dramatically, and today it is hard to identify a nucleus of exclusive foreign affairs powers reserved for the member states. And in contrast to a classic international law perspective, the Union’s member states only enjoy limited treaty-making powers under European law. Their foreign affairs powers are limited by the exclusive powers of the Union, and they may be preempted through European legislation. There are, however, moments when both the Union and its states enjoy overlapping foreign affairs powers. For these situations, the Union legal order has devised a number of cooperative mechanisms to safeguard a degree of “unity” in the external actions of the Union. Mixed agreements constitute an international mechanism that brings the Union and the member states to the same negotiating table. The second constitutional device is internal to the Union legal order: the duty of cooperation.


2020 ◽  
pp. 203228442097974
Author(s):  
Sibel Top ◽  
Paul De Hert

This article examines the changing balance established by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) between human rights filters to extradition and the obligation to cooperate and how this shift of rationale brought the Court closer to the position of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in that respect. The article argues that the ECtHR initially adopted a position whereby it prioritised human rights concerns over extraditions, but that it later nuanced that approach by establishing, in some cases, an obligation to cooperate to ensure proper respect of human rights. This refinement of its position brought the ECtHR closer to the approach adopted by the CJEU that traditionally put the obligation to cooperate above human rights concerns. In recent years, however, the CJEU also backtracked to some extent from its uncompromising attitude on the obligation to cooperate, which enabled a convergence of the rationales of the two Courts. Although this alignment of the Courts was necessary to mitigate the conflicting obligations of European Union Member States towards both Courts, this article warns against the danger of making too many human rights concessions to cooperation in criminal matters.


2008 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 529-560 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Cygan

AbstractThis article examines how recent judgments of the European Court of Justice have interpreted the concept of a service of general interest in Article 86(2) EC in the delivery of healthcare services. The article explores how and why the Court has afforded greater latitude to Member States in organizational matters by not applying competition rules. By contrast, the Court has actively promoted patient mobility and has not applied the derogation in Article 86(2) EC where it would restrict the free movement of services. Does the Court's policy of protecting individual rights undermine the ability of Member States to deliver a universal healthcare service within finite resources?


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 330
Author(s):  
Luis Ignacio Gordillo Pérez

Resumen: Este trabajo realiza un análisis crítico de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia respecto del Derecho internacional. Para ello, analiza los acuerdos internacionales y otras fuentes afines, la problemática derivada de los acuerdos firmados por los Estados miembros con terceros Estados, la relación entre el Derecho de la UE y el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos y, finalmente, el valor que el Tribunal confiere al Derecho internacional general y a la Carta de Naciones Unidas. La conclusión fundamental será que el principio básico que guía la jurisprudencia del TJ es la reivindicación y protección de su propia autonomía.Palabras clave: monismo, dualismo, pluralismo, autonomía, acuerdos mixtos, Dictamen 2/13, Dictamen 2/15.Abstract: This paper critically analyzes the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union on International law. To that end, it analyzes international agreements and other related sources, the problems arising from agreements signed by Member States with third States, the relationship between EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights, and finally the value that the Court confers on general international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The fundamental conclusion will be that the basic principle guiding the jurisprudence of the CJEU is the claim and protection of its own autonomy.Keywords: monism, dualism, pluralism, autonomy, mixed agreements, Opinion 2/13, Opinion 2/15.


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 472-486
Author(s):  
Elizaveta Samoilova

Abstract With all eyes on the recent global COVID-19 pandemic, another pandemic has been growing in the shadows: violence against women. The Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention creates a legal framework in order to protect women against all forms of violence. Its ratification process, however, has faced considerable challenges, particularly in the Central and Eastern European Member States. This article discusses the basic elements of the Istanbul Convention, reflects on the ratification process in the EU and its Member States, and sets out the main legal issues raised in the European Parliament’s request for an opinion (A-1/19 of 22 November 2019) to the Court of Justice of the European Union. Special focus is put on the choice of the correct EU legal basis and the practices of ‘splitting’ and ‘common accord’. This article argues that the European Parliament’s request for an opinion provides the perfect opportunity for the Court of Justice of the European Union to further clarify the law and the practice of concluding mixed agreements by the EU and its Member States.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the procedural law of the European Union (EU), focusing on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains that Article 267 is the reference procedure by which courts in member states can endorse questions concerning EU law to the European Court of Justice (CoJ). Under this Article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union and on the interpretation of the Treaties.


2009 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Lock

The article explores the limits of the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction by addressing two main issues: firstly, whether there are exceptions to that exclusivity, such as the application of the CILFIT case law or the exclusion of Community law from the dispute. Secondly, it asks whether other international courts must respect the ECJ's jurisdiction over a case. The article commences by briefly discussing the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction as it was established in Opinion 1/91 and the Mox Plant-Case and draws conclusions from this case law. It then addresses the above-mentioned points and comes to the conclusion that there are generally no exceptions to the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction and that the only option open to Member States is to exclude Community law from a dispute (and even that option is subject to limitations). Furthermore, after exploring several routes advanced in the academic discussion, the article comes to the conclusion that other courts must respect the ECJ's jurisdiction and as a consequence declare the case inadmissible.


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