scholarly journals What has the Constitutional Court Given Us? Afriforum v University of the Free State 2018 (4) BCLR 387 (CC)

Obiter ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mokgadi Margaret Mokgokong ◽  
Moses Retselisitsoe Phooko

The history of South Africa is an unpleasant one. It was a society based on racial segregation with the promotion of Afrikaner culture and the Afrikaans language above all other languages. This can be traced to the architect of apartheid, the Afrikaner National Party, which introduced apartheid. Afrikaans-speaking people, through the Afrikaner National Party, dominated South Africa politically. Their language too, was promoted above all other languages. For example, Afrikaans enjoyed more privileges than other languages in that it was used for drafting laws, as the language of record in the courts and was also the only compulsory subject for learning. The apartheid government, through its racial policies, used the Afrikaans language as a tool to control Black South Africans in almost all spheres of life, including education, which had to be undertaken in Afrikaans. It is therefore no surprise that there were five universities that offered education mainly in Afrikaans. These are Stellenbosch University, University of the Free State, University of Pretoria, Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education (now North-West University) and Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit (now University of Johannesburg). The use of the Afrikaans language as an instrument for social control was not sustainable. The new constitutional dispensation ushered in an era wherein respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms is at the top of the South African agenda. The right to further education is constitutionally recognised in section 29(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Section 29(2) of the Constitution further recognises and embraces the diversity of South African society and provides that “everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public education institutions where that education is reasonably practicable” (s 29(b) of the Constitution). The State has an obligation to take reasonable measures on a progressive basis to ensure that further education is available and accessible (s 29(1)(b) of the Constitution). In ensuring “effective access to and implementation” of the right to further education, It is notable that, in its endeavour to make further education available and accessible, the State is required to consider several factors such as language policies. In an effort to facilitate the realisation of the right to further education, the Higher Education Act (101 of 1997) was enacted in order inter alia to “redress past discrimination and ensure representivity and equal access to higher education institutions” (preamble to the Act).In the UFS case (CC), the Constitutional Court applied section 29(1)(b) of the Constitution, which provides for the right to further education and the “right to receive education in the official language or languages of [one’s] choice”. This note centres on this decision and seeks to critically discuss and analyse both the majority and minority decisions of the Constitutional Court. The question presented is whether the Constitutional Court has given the public a solution to the issue surrounding the use of either Afrikaans or English as a language medium of instruction in the higher education sector and what the effect of this has been on the development of other languages. The case note is divided into five sections. The facts of the case, the issues put before the court for consideration and the finding of the court are discussed in part 2. Part 3 contains an analysis of the minority and majority judgments. Part 4 considers whether the court has given us any solutions. Part 5 sets out the authors’ recommendations and their conclusions.

Author(s):  
Ropafadzo Maphosa ◽  
Nomathole Nhlapo

The late former Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Africa, Pius Langa, opined that a truly transformative South Africa requires a new approach that places the Constitutional dream at the very heart of legal education. This view is consistent with section 29 of the Constitution which guarantees everyone the right to further education. However, the state has failed to make further (or tertiary) education progressively available and accessible. We believe this can be attributed to the fact that the South African legal education is still riddled with inequalities from the apartheid/colonial era. This article argues that decolonisation of legal education will begin when teachers of the law become cognizant of the reality that their teaching models will shape the future legal landscape, thus it is imperative for law schools to birth law graduates with an unwavering appreciation and willingness to implement constitutional values, such as human dignity and equality in practice. The advancement of these values is enhanced by the Africanisation of legal education which will ultimately legitimize the legal order so that it mirrors the society in which it exists.


1993 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 339-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annette Strauss

The ruling National Party (N.P.) asked white voters during the 1989 election campaign for a mandate to negotiate with all concerned about a new constitution, an undivided South Africa, one citizenship, equal votes, protection of minorities, and the removal of stumbling blocks such as discrimination against people of colour.1 Although the N.P. achieved a cleat majority – 93 seats against 39 for the Conservative Party (C.P.) and 33 for the Democratic Party (D.P.) – the right-wing opposition made destinct progress by gaining 17 seats. After the C.P had captured a further three from the N.P. in by-elections, including Potchefstroom in February 1992, President F. W. de Klerk announced in Parliament that whites would be asked the following month to vote in a referendum in order to remove any doubts about his mandate. The carefully worded question which the electorate had to answer was as follows: Do you support continuation of the reform process which the State President began on February 2, 1990 and which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiation?


2011 ◽  
Vol 51 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 521-540 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tracy Humby ◽  
Maryse Grandbois

The right of access to sufficient water in the South African Constitution has for long been regarded as progressive in a global context where the human right to water is still a subject of contention. In its recent decision handed down in the Mazibuko matter, the South African Constitutional Court interpreted the right of access to sufficient water for the first time and clarified the nature of the State’s obligations which flow from this right. It also commented upon the role of the courts in adjudicating the human right to water. This article describes the passage of the Mazibuko matter and the manner in which the lower courts interpreted the right of access to “sufficient water” as well as outlining the Constitutional Court’s decision in the context of access to water services provision in South Africa.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mabona Thomas Mokoena

The right to remain silent is one of the most important symbols of a fair trial in the accusatorial legal systems, to which South Africa also belongs. In certain countries, such as the United States and South Africa, this right is constitutionally entrenched as a fundamental human right, which virtually guarantees that adverse inferences cannot be drawn against an accused who fails to disclose pre-trial information. The accused is thereby excluded as a critical source of information during this stage of the proceedings. In essence, this means that the criminal process is compelled to close one eye to a valuable and crucial source of information. other jurisdictions within the accusatorial family, notably England and  Scotland,  have  introduced legislation aimed  at crime  control which essentially compels the accused to break his or her silence during the pre-trial stage of the criminal process. The very essence of the right to remain silent as a fundamental human right is proving problematic to the South African Constitutional Court when considering it within the context of the  limitation clause. It is argued, in this article, that the solution lies, first, in a substantive constitutional analysis of rights and,  secondly, in interpreting the right as a functional evidentiary principle with the aim of securing procedural fairness.


1986 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-228
Author(s):  
A. Roy Eckardt

“According to a long-standing Christian tradition relating to oppression, a particular tyrant or a particular tyrannical regime ‘forfeits the moral right to govern and the people acquire the right to resist.’ And this is the state of affairs in today's South Africa… Radical South African liberation thinking-praxis goes much farther than the non-revolutionist Social Gospel tendencies of much American black liberation thinking.”


Author(s):  
Lourens Du Plessis

This contribution focuses on the way in which the South African Constitutional Court has, since 1997, been dealing with the (seemingly) eccentric claims of (assumedly) idiosyncratic 'religious Others'. Developments in this regard have, for the time being at least, culminated in the Constitutional Court's landmark judgment in MEC for Education: KwaZulu Natal v Pillay 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC), 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC)(hereafter Pillay). Constitutional Court judgments since 1997 manifesting the adjudication of such unconventional claims are assessed, eventually getting to Pillay as benchmark. This remarkable judgment, dealing with a deceptively mundane issue, has played a considerable role in fleshing out a jurisprudence of difference, putting an adherent of a vulnerable, minority religion in the right. This is not just a high point in the adjudication of constitutional entitlements of the religious (and cultural) Other in South Africa, but also a significant contribution to the growth of a jurisprudence sensitive to the predicaments and constitutional entitlements of unconventional, 'non-mainstream' claimants of religious (and cultural) rights. Finally Pillay illustrates that the constitutional guarantee of the right to freedom of religion, conscience, belief and opinion (entrenched in section 15(1) of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa 1996) can be crucially dependent upon due effect being given to the proscription of unfair discrimination on the grounds of religion, conscience, belief and opinion elsewhere (namely in section 9(3)) of the Constitution.


Author(s):  
Gerhard Van der Schyff

This contribution considers the protection of fundamental rights in the Netherlands and South Africa. Both countries strive to be constitutional democracies that respect basic rights. But both countries go about this aim in very different ways. These different paths to constitutionalism are compared, as well as the reasons for these differences and whether it can be said that these differences are justifiable. This is done by comparing the character of the rights guaranteed in the Dutch and South African legal orders, the sources of these rights and the locus or centre of protection in both systems. The conclusion is reached that no single or perfect route to attaining the desired protection of fundamental rights exists, but that one should always enquire as to the state of individual freedom and the right to make free political choices in measuring the worth of a system's protection of rights.


Author(s):  
Jason Brickhill ◽  
Yana van Leeve

This chapter focuses on two streams of education litigation concerning public schools in South Africa: first, cases concerning contestation over the power to formulate policy for schools in the education system established in the new democratic era; and, second, cases seeking to compel the state to provide specific education inputs. In respect of the power to determine key school policies, the South African Constitutional Court has sought to strike a balance between recognising the democratic and community-level legitimacy of school governing bodies, on one hand, and the need to empower government to act in the interests of all students and to promote equal education, on the other. In the second category of cases, the courts incrementally developed the content of the right to a basic education in section 29(1)(a).


2006 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
EVADNÉ GRANT

In the joined cases of Bhe v. Magistrate Khayelitsha and Others; Shibi v. Sithole and Others; South African Human Rights Commission and Another v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Another (2005(1) B.C.L.R. 1 (CC)), the South African Constitutional Court held unanimously that the male primogeniture rule according men rights to inheritance not enjoyed by women enshrined in the South African Customary Law of Succession violated the right to equality guaranteed under section 9 of the South African Constitution. On one level, the decision can be seen as a triumph for the universality of human rights norms. On another level, however, the case raises difficult questions about the relationship between human rights and culture. The aim of this paper is to assess the judgment critically in the context of the ongoing debate about the application of international human rights standards in different cultural settings.


1972 ◽  
Vol 1 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 25-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadine Gordimer

This is the text of an address given earlier this year in South Africa which illustrates some of the problems connected with the South African government's plans to abolish the right of appeal against decisions brought by the State Publications Control Board.


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