From the classroom to the courtroom: litigating education rights in South Africa

Author(s):  
Jason Brickhill ◽  
Yana van Leeve

This chapter focuses on two streams of education litigation concerning public schools in South Africa: first, cases concerning contestation over the power to formulate policy for schools in the education system established in the new democratic era; and, second, cases seeking to compel the state to provide specific education inputs. In respect of the power to determine key school policies, the South African Constitutional Court has sought to strike a balance between recognising the democratic and community-level legitimacy of school governing bodies, on one hand, and the need to empower government to act in the interests of all students and to promote equal education, on the other. In the second category of cases, the courts incrementally developed the content of the right to a basic education in section 29(1)(a).

Obiter ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mokgadi Margaret Mokgokong ◽  
Moses Retselisitsoe Phooko

The history of South Africa is an unpleasant one. It was a society based on racial segregation with the promotion of Afrikaner culture and the Afrikaans language above all other languages. This can be traced to the architect of apartheid, the Afrikaner National Party, which introduced apartheid. Afrikaans-speaking people, through the Afrikaner National Party, dominated South Africa politically. Their language too, was promoted above all other languages. For example, Afrikaans enjoyed more privileges than other languages in that it was used for drafting laws, as the language of record in the courts and was also the only compulsory subject for learning. The apartheid government, through its racial policies, used the Afrikaans language as a tool to control Black South Africans in almost all spheres of life, including education, which had to be undertaken in Afrikaans. It is therefore no surprise that there were five universities that offered education mainly in Afrikaans. These are Stellenbosch University, University of the Free State, University of Pretoria, Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education (now North-West University) and Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit (now University of Johannesburg). The use of the Afrikaans language as an instrument for social control was not sustainable. The new constitutional dispensation ushered in an era wherein respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms is at the top of the South African agenda. The right to further education is constitutionally recognised in section 29(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Section 29(2) of the Constitution further recognises and embraces the diversity of South African society and provides that “everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public education institutions where that education is reasonably practicable” (s 29(b) of the Constitution). The State has an obligation to take reasonable measures on a progressive basis to ensure that further education is available and accessible (s 29(1)(b) of the Constitution). In ensuring “effective access to and implementation” of the right to further education, It is notable that, in its endeavour to make further education available and accessible, the State is required to consider several factors such as language policies. In an effort to facilitate the realisation of the right to further education, the Higher Education Act (101 of 1997) was enacted in order inter alia to “redress past discrimination and ensure representivity and equal access to higher education institutions” (preamble to the Act).In the UFS case (CC), the Constitutional Court applied section 29(1)(b) of the Constitution, which provides for the right to further education and the “right to receive education in the official language or languages of [one’s] choice”. This note centres on this decision and seeks to critically discuss and analyse both the majority and minority decisions of the Constitutional Court. The question presented is whether the Constitutional Court has given the public a solution to the issue surrounding the use of either Afrikaans or English as a language medium of instruction in the higher education sector and what the effect of this has been on the development of other languages. The case note is divided into five sections. The facts of the case, the issues put before the court for consideration and the finding of the court are discussed in part 2. Part 3 contains an analysis of the minority and majority judgments. Part 4 considers whether the court has given us any solutions. Part 5 sets out the authors’ recommendations and their conclusions.


2011 ◽  
Vol 51 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 521-540 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tracy Humby ◽  
Maryse Grandbois

The right of access to sufficient water in the South African Constitution has for long been regarded as progressive in a global context where the human right to water is still a subject of contention. In its recent decision handed down in the Mazibuko matter, the South African Constitutional Court interpreted the right of access to sufficient water for the first time and clarified the nature of the State’s obligations which flow from this right. It also commented upon the role of the courts in adjudicating the human right to water. This article describes the passage of the Mazibuko matter and the manner in which the lower courts interpreted the right of access to “sufficient water” as well as outlining the Constitutional Court’s decision in the context of access to water services provision in South Africa.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mabona Thomas Mokoena

The right to remain silent is one of the most important symbols of a fair trial in the accusatorial legal systems, to which South Africa also belongs. In certain countries, such as the United States and South Africa, this right is constitutionally entrenched as a fundamental human right, which virtually guarantees that adverse inferences cannot be drawn against an accused who fails to disclose pre-trial information. The accused is thereby excluded as a critical source of information during this stage of the proceedings. In essence, this means that the criminal process is compelled to close one eye to a valuable and crucial source of information. other jurisdictions within the accusatorial family, notably England and  Scotland,  have  introduced legislation aimed  at crime  control which essentially compels the accused to break his or her silence during the pre-trial stage of the criminal process. The very essence of the right to remain silent as a fundamental human right is proving problematic to the South African Constitutional Court when considering it within the context of the  limitation clause. It is argued, in this article, that the solution lies, first, in a substantive constitutional analysis of rights and,  secondly, in interpreting the right as a functional evidentiary principle with the aim of securing procedural fairness.


Obiter ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiedza Simbo

Notwithstanding the enactment of the South African Constitution in 1996, 23 years later, the need to determine the scope and content of the right to basic education has been a battlefield for authors. Whilst authors battle, complaints are made about the South African government charging school fees for basic education, decreasing pass thresholds for matriculants, students learning in dilapidated classrooms, non-delivery of text books, unqualified teachers and many complaints reminiscent of a failing basic education system. Despite citizen attempts to take the government to court for specific violations relating to the provision of basic education, in the absence of a law of general application specifically unpacking the scope and content of the right to basic education in South Africa, an ultimate question remains, what is the scope and content of the right to basic education for the purposes of its implementation in South Africa? This paper attempts to determine the scope and content of section 29(1)(a) using an international law approach. After engaging the provisions of international law as well as writings by other authors, the conclusion is that, in relation to its scope and content, section 29(1)(a) is a hexagon right that is, a right comprising of six interrelated dimensions. The six dimensions are that, the right to basic education includes primary and secondary school attendance, the right to basic education includes compulsory and free attendance of both primary and secondary school and the right to basic education is an unqualified right. Further, the right to basic education is a minimum core content of the right to education, the right to basic education must be available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable and the quality standard of the right to basic education is explained by the World Declaration on Basic Education for All, 1990.


Author(s):  
Lourens Du Plessis

This contribution focuses on the way in which the South African Constitutional Court has, since 1997, been dealing with the (seemingly) eccentric claims of (assumedly) idiosyncratic 'religious Others'. Developments in this regard have, for the time being at least, culminated in the Constitutional Court's landmark judgment in MEC for Education: KwaZulu Natal v Pillay 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC), 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC)(hereafter Pillay). Constitutional Court judgments since 1997 manifesting the adjudication of such unconventional claims are assessed, eventually getting to Pillay as benchmark. This remarkable judgment, dealing with a deceptively mundane issue, has played a considerable role in fleshing out a jurisprudence of difference, putting an adherent of a vulnerable, minority religion in the right. This is not just a high point in the adjudication of constitutional entitlements of the religious (and cultural) Other in South Africa, but also a significant contribution to the growth of a jurisprudence sensitive to the predicaments and constitutional entitlements of unconventional, 'non-mainstream' claimants of religious (and cultural) rights. Finally Pillay illustrates that the constitutional guarantee of the right to freedom of religion, conscience, belief and opinion (entrenched in section 15(1) of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa 1996) can be crucially dependent upon due effect being given to the proscription of unfair discrimination on the grounds of religion, conscience, belief and opinion elsewhere (namely in section 9(3)) of the Constitution.


Author(s):  
Christa Rautenbach

The first edition of 2015 boasts 13 contributions dealing with a variety of topics. The first article, by Ben Coetzee Bester and Anne Louw, discusses the persistence of the "choice argument", which is based on the rationale that domestic partners who choose not to marry cannot claim spousal benefits, and arrives at the conclusion that legislation should differentiate between registered and unregistered domestic partnerships for the purpose of spousal benefits. Ernst Marais has written two articles on expropriation. In the first he examines the meaning and role of state acquisition in South African law and in the second he deals with the distinction between deprivation and expropriation in the light of Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC), where the Constitutional Court recently revisited the distinction between the two concepts and held that the distinguishing feature of expropriation is that it entails state acquisition of property, whilst deprivation takes place where there is no such acquisition. The fourth article, by Emeka Amechi, explores the measures taken by the National Recordal System and Disclosure of Origins in leveraging traditional knowledge within the structure, content and conceptual framework of the patent system in South Africa. The South African Companies Act and the realization of corporate human rights responsibilities is the focus of Manson Gwanyanya's article. He comes to the conclusion that the wording of the Act is such that it prevent human rights abuses by companies. In her contribution Melanie Murcott discusses the development of the doctrine of legitimate expectations in South African law and the failure of the Constitutional Court to develop the doctrine even further in the recent case of Kwazulu-Natal Joint Liaison Committee v MEC for Education, Kwazulu Natal. The second last article, which is by Lucyline Murungi, considers the implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) to provide for inclusive basic education in South Africa, and the last article, which is by Matome Ratiba, examines the significance of places of worship for Native Americans and demonstrates the valuable lessons South Africa could learn from the earth jurisprudence that has developed in the USA and elsewhere. The first note, authored by Magdaleen Swanepoel, discusses legal issues with regard to mentally ill offenders with specific reference to the cases where mental illness is raised as a defence in criminal cases. The second note, by Michelle Fuchs, deals with recent legal developments relating to the formalities involved when a mortgagee wants to declare immovable property executable to satisfy outstanding debt. The last contribution in this edition is a case note by Elmarie Fourie. She considers the question of what constitutes a benefit in terms of section 186(2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, which was examined in Apollo Tyres South Africa (Pty)Ltd v CCMA 2013 5 BLLR 434 (LAC).      


Author(s):  
Ropafadzo Maphosa ◽  
Nomathole Nhlapo

The late former Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Africa, Pius Langa, opined that a truly transformative South Africa requires a new approach that places the Constitutional dream at the very heart of legal education. This view is consistent with section 29 of the Constitution which guarantees everyone the right to further education. However, the state has failed to make further (or tertiary) education progressively available and accessible. We believe this can be attributed to the fact that the South African legal education is still riddled with inequalities from the apartheid/colonial era. This article argues that decolonisation of legal education will begin when teachers of the law become cognizant of the reality that their teaching models will shape the future legal landscape, thus it is imperative for law schools to birth law graduates with an unwavering appreciation and willingness to implement constitutional values, such as human dignity and equality in practice. The advancement of these values is enhanced by the Africanisation of legal education which will ultimately legitimize the legal order so that it mirrors the society in which it exists.


Obiter ◽  
2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
IP Maithufi

During the latter part of the year 2012 and early 2013, various articles or commentaries dealing with the admission of learners to public schools appeared in daily and weekend newspapers. Some of them commented on the manner in which school governing bodies of public schools appeared to be discriminating in the admission of prospective learners, while others commended school governing bodies on performing their admission function in accordance with the powers granted to them by legislation.The articles that appeared during early 2013 mostly commented about the opening of public schools for the academic year 2013 in the five inland provinces, while others berated the manner in which some prospective learners were refused admission by certain public schools. Before then, on 10 January 2013, Mogomotsi Magome mentioned in the Pretoria News of the same date that the Minister of Basic Education had said that “she‟ll fight tooth and nail to reverse the court ruling on school capacity”. The articles that appeared thereafter concentrated on whether school governing bodies of public schools in South Africa or the State, through the Department of Basic Education and its provincial education departments, has the power or authority to determine the admission criteria or capacity of public schools for the purposes of the admission of learners. Further comments on this issue appeared during April 2013.During the rest of April 2013, most of the comments made in the newspapers dealt directly with the question that was raised in Governing Body, Rivonia Primary School v MEC for Education, Gauteng Province ([2012] 1 All SA 576 (GSJ), hereinafter “Rivonia [2012]”), which was by then taken on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The question for determination in this case was whether the capacity of a public school is determined by the school governing body or the provincial education department which is under a statutory duty to find sufficient capacity to provide schooling to all children of school-going age.The above comments indicate the public interest that followed the decision in the Rivonia case. The reason for the interest shown is not difficult to find for the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to a basic education and as such the refusal to admit a learner by a public school may appear to be an infringement of this right. Furthermore the South African Schools Act of 1996 provides that a public school must admit learners and serve their educational needs without unfairly discriminating in any manner. Some of the comments as shown above, regarded the refusal to admit the learner in this case as unfair discrimination.The Constitutional Court also had the opportunity to determine the issues raised in this case in Member of the Executive Council for Education in Gauteng Province v Governing Body of Rivonia Primary School (case CCT 135/12 [2013] ZACC 34). The judgment of the Constitutional Court was delivered on 3 October 2013. The following day, 4 October 2013, the public interest shown by the media resurfaced. The Constitutional Court judgment shall, for the purpose of this discussion, be referred to as Rivonia (CC).In order to fully understand the legal issues involved in this case, it is necessary to have regard to the manner in which the South Gauteng High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court approached the determination of these issues.


2006 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
EVADNÉ GRANT

In the joined cases of Bhe v. Magistrate Khayelitsha and Others; Shibi v. Sithole and Others; South African Human Rights Commission and Another v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Another (2005(1) B.C.L.R. 1 (CC)), the South African Constitutional Court held unanimously that the male primogeniture rule according men rights to inheritance not enjoyed by women enshrined in the South African Customary Law of Succession violated the right to equality guaranteed under section 9 of the South African Constitution. On one level, the decision can be seen as a triumph for the universality of human rights norms. On another level, however, the case raises difficult questions about the relationship between human rights and culture. The aim of this paper is to assess the judgment critically in the context of the ongoing debate about the application of international human rights standards in different cultural settings.


Author(s):  
Taryn Lee Vos

South Africa has become a magnet to a larger group of foreign migrants than the global average. This is due to the fact that it is a front-runner, economically speaking, in Sub-Sahara Africa with a reputation of political stability. The South African Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic, to which all other law is subject. South Africa’s constitutional framework, coupled with immigration legislation and policies, aim to promote the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights for all individuals living within the borders of the Republic. While certain rights are expressly reserved for citizens only and are largely of a civil or political nature, the remaining rights are those that ‘everyone’, including foreign nationals, may enjoy. Non-citizens within the borders of the Republic receive, inter alia, the protection of South Africa’s basic constitutional values; in particular the right to equality, human dignity and freedom. Socio-economic rights, subject to the limitations clause in section 36 of the Constitution, are also made available to everyone. This includes both citizens and foreign nationals. These rights can be found in section 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the Constitution and relate to issues of access to land, housing, health care, food, social security and education. The focus of this paper will be the right of access to social security for non-citizens, particularly migrants, in South Africa. Who falls within the scope of the term ‘everyone’ as found in section 27 of the Constitution? The international perspective on the issue of social exclusion of non-citizens from accessing social security benefits is briefly dealt with, followed by a discussion of the South African perspective on the matter. The approach of the South African Constitutional Court in respect of the protection of the rights of noncitizens will then be discussed. The European approach to the matter, including the approach of European courts, will then be examined. The concluding paragraphs entail an evaluation of the improvements that can be made to the South African social security system as inspired by the European approach.


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