scholarly journals Skutki prawne naruszenia terminów w postępowaniu legislacyjnym

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 249
Author(s):  
Robert Orłowski

<p>The aim of the article is to present the issues related to the time limits set for individual organs of public authority (the Sejm, the Senate, the President of the Republic of Poland) for the performance of specific activities within the legislative procedure. These time limits should be calculated according to conventional rules, that is, from the beginning of the day following the day on which the act on which the legal provisions are binding begins. However, the action will also be effective if it is performed on the same day on which the said event occurred. Violation of the time limit in legislative proceedings is of fundamental importance for the act, as a normative act, within the scope of its validity. As part of the review of the constitutionality of the law, the Constitutional Tribunal also examines the correctness of the proceedings in which the law was adopted. According to the latest jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal, violation of the minimum time limits required for the performance of individual activities, which have only been specified in the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm, may constitute an independent basis for declaring the entire act unconstitutional. This view differs significantly from the existing, well-established approach to this subject. The effects of violating the time limits of the legislative procedure can also be considered at the level of the rights (competences) of individual authorities within a specific proceeding. The signing of the act by the President after the expiry of the constitutional time limit should be deemed legally effective. The admissibility of issuing by the Constitutional Tribunal of scope judgements should be considered in cases of violation of the rules of correct legislation, leading to the omission or reduction of <em>vacatio legis</em>.</p>

2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-154
Author(s):  
Gordan Struić

Authentic interpretation of laws is an interpretation of legal provisions that, due to their lack of clarity or misinterpretation in their application, is provided by the parliament. Unlike the legislative procedure, which is conducted, as a rule, in two (exceptionally three) readings, a proposal for giving an authentic interpretation is discussed in one reading. Starting from the understandings of some authors that the act of authentic interpretation of laws is contrary to the principle of democratic pluralism, and that it lacks the necessary level of democratic control and citizen participation, the author examines whether the Croatian parliamentary law enables public participation in the procedure for authentic interpretation of laws and, if so, what legal instruments can be used to implement it in parliamentary practice. To this end, the paper analyzes several relevant constitutional, legal, and procedural provisions of the Croatian parliamentary law, with reference to a parliamentary practice. Given the fact that the procedure for authentic interpretation in the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Northern Macedonia, the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Serbia is regulated in a similar way by the rules of procedure of their respective parliaments, the relevant regulations of the latter three countries on the possibility of public participation in this procedure are analyzed as well. It was concluded that Croatian parliamentary law enables public participation in the procedure for authentic interpretation, through the instruments of petition, information and involvement in working groups and working bodies, and the same instruments, with certain specifics, are recognized in the parliamentary law of the latter three countries.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4(165) ◽  
pp. 147-158
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Kawałko

The commented ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal concerns the constitutionality of the provision of Article 70(1) of the Family and Guardianship Code, which provided that the time limit for a child to bring an action to deny the paternity of his or her mother’s husband is three years and runs from the moment the child reaches the age of majority, regardless of the child’s know-ledge of his or her biological origin, i.e. regardless of whether the child within that time limit acquired knowledge that he or she did not come from his or her mother’s husband and whether the child could decide to bring an action. The expiry of the three-year period resulted in the expiry of the child’s right to claim the denial of paternity of the mother’s husband and, consequently, precluded the possibility of a positive determination of the paternity of a man other than the mother’s husband. The Constitutional Tribunal found this provision to be inconsistent with Article 30 in conjunction with Article 47 in conjunction with Article 31(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The author agrees with the position expressed by the Constitutional Tribunal in the judgment in question, which in this case provides a basis for consideration of the relationship between the right to know one’s biological origin and the value of stabilising the civil status of a child and persons remaining in an established family relationship with him or her.


1962 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-217 ◽  

Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroun v. United Kingdom): In an order of July 6, 1961, the International Court of Justice fixed the time limits for the filing of pleadings in the case concerning the Northern Cameroons as follows: for the memorial of the Republic of Cameroun, November 1, 1961; and for the countermemorial of the United Kingdom, March 1, 1962. Subsequently, in an order of November 2, 1961, the Court, in accordance with a request from the agent of the government of the Republic of Cameroun, extended to January 3, 1962, the time limit for the filing of the memorial of the Republic of Cameroun and to May 2, 1962, the time limit for the filing of the countermemorial of the United Kingdom.


2021 ◽  
pp. 119-138
Author(s):  
Vladimir Vrhovšek ◽  
Vladimir Kozar

This article discusses a concept of legally permitted and limited offsetting in bankruptcy according to the law of the Republic of Serbia, with comparison to earlier regulations where the offsetting occurred by the force of law, as the legal consequence of initiating bankruptcy proceedings. Legal provisions, legal practice, opinion of the jurisprudence on general and special terms about the right to offset the claims in bankruptcy in the Republic of Serbia, as well as in the countries in the region, have been presented. Relevant legal solutions from laws on bankruptcy of Montenegro, Republic of Srpska, Republic of Croatia, and the Republic of Slovenia have been reviewed. Offsetting claims in bankruptcy proceedings are in principle allowed in regional countries as well. Regarding the effect of bankruptcy on the right to offset the claims, there is a great similarity among the legal solutions in regulations of above mentioned countries, except for the Republic of Slovenia. The Republic of Slovenia retained the broadest concept of legal compensation as a legal consequence of initiating bankruptcy proceedings, which constitutes an important difference compared to restrictive solutions of the Serbian bankruptcy law and regional legislation. This article aims to show to the business entities operating in the region, through comparative legal analysis, different conditions and procedure of offsetting in bankruptcy in national legislation, bearing in mind the importance of this legal institution, which allows the creditors to fully collect their claims outside the bankruptcy payment lines, and regardless of the number of available funds in the bankruptcy estate.


2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 762-767

1. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro).The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina instituted proceedings against Yugoslavia on 20 March 1993 alleging violations of the 1949 Genocide Convention and requesting an indication of provisional measures which was made in an order of 8 April 1993.1 This was reaffirmed in an order of 13 September 1993,2 following a second request for provisional measures made by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 27 July 1993 and a request made by Yugoslavia on 10 August 1993.3 By an order of 16 April 19934 the following time limits were set for the filing of the written pleadings: Bosnia and Herzegovina, memorial, 15 October 1993; Yugoslavia, counter-memorial, 15 April 1994. By an order of 7 October 19935 these were extended to: Bosnia and Herzegovina, memorial, 15 April 1994; Yugoslavia, counter-memorial, 15 April 1995 and, by order of 21 March 1995,6 the date for the submission of the Yugoslavian counter-memorial was again extended to 30 June 1995. On 26 June 1995 Yugoslavia submitted preliminary objections which were rejected by the Court in its order of 11 July 1996.7 By an order of 23 July 19968 the time limit for filing the Yugoslav counter-memorial was fixed as 23 July 1997. The counter-memorial was filed on 22 July 1997 and contained counterclaims against Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in an order of 17 December 1997,9 the Court held them to be admissible and that they formed a part of the current proceedings. These counter-claims were subsequently withdrawn at the request of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this being noted by the Court in its order of 10 September 2001.10 The order of 17 December 199711 set the following time limits for the written pleadings on the merits: Bosnia and Herzegovina, reply, 23 January,1998; Yugoslavia, rejoinder, 23 July 1998. By an order of 22 January 199812 these were extended to: Bosnia and Herzegovina, reply, 23 April 1998; Yugoslavia, rejoinder, 22 January 1999. By an order of 11 December 199813 the time limit for the submission of the Yugoslav rejoinder was further extended, to 22 February 1999.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 2155-2160
Author(s):  
Emilija Gjorgjioska ◽  
Zorica Stoileva ◽  
Dijana Gorgieva

In the arbitration, just like in civil litigation, it may be necessary before the final merit award is rendered by the arbitral tribunal, the relations between the parties to be temporarily settled. The need for ordering interim measures before or during an arbitration may arise in order to create conditions for maintaining the existing situation untilthe arbitration settlement of the dispute, facilitating the enforcement of the potential condemnatory arbitration award or faster conduct of the arbitration.Due to these advantages of the interimmeasures, the problem of interim measures in the modern arbitration process theory and practice gets more and more important. In the context of this, the questions arise what types of interim measures and under what conditions can be ordered in the arbitration?Who has the authority to order inerim measures: the state court or arbitrator of the arbitration tribunal or arbitrator for emergencies, and etc. Regarding the types of interim measures that can be ordered before or during the arbitration, there are: conservation, temporary, procedural-facilitating, record-keeping and execution-enforcement measures. The conditions for ordering each of these measures are specific and depend on the purpose and function of the interim measure itself. Regarding the dilemma who is auhtorized to order interim measures in the arbitration, it must be emphasized that the older arbitration theory and practice that has been created around state protectionist legal politics accepts the position that only the state court can order inerim measures while the contemporary arbitration theory and practice proves that the arbitrator of the arbitration court (more often) or an emergency arbitrator (less often) should order the imerim measures in the arbitration. It is precisely because of these problems and dilemmas that still baffle the science of the arbitration procedural law the subject of this paper will be the legal regulation of the subject matter of the interim measures in the Macedonian arbitration legislation. For this purpose, an analysis will be made of the positive legal provisions of the Law on Litigation Procedure of the Republic of Macedonia which regulates the domestic arbitration, the Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the Republic of Macedonia, which regulates the international arbitration and the Rules of The Permanent court of Arbitration attached to the Economic Chamber of Republic of Macedonia that apply to resolve arbitration disputes with and without a foreign element and will be analyzed whether they regulate and to what extent they regulate the issue of ordering of inrim measures in the arbitration. This will be done in order to conclude whether there is a need for amendments of the Macedonian Arbitration Legislation in order for the Macedonian arbitration procedural right to be in line with the modern arbitration tendencies for ordering interim measures in the arbitration, primarily the UNCITRAL Model Law.


Temida ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivana Stevanovic

In this paper the author denotes some of the new legal provisions contained in the Law on juvenile offenders and criminal protection of juveniles of the Republic of Serbia, in the light of both the reintegration of juvenile offenders and future more active role of a victim of crime committed by a juvenile offender - the role that would contribute to victim?s empowerment. Likewise, the author points out the importance of alternative sanctions, i.e. procedures and measures that should enable diversion from the classic criminal procedure, or its suspension. The article signifies the importance of noncustodial measures as alternatives to institutional treatment, in terms of the new provisions contained in the Law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 75-92
Author(s):  
Olga Kazalska

On 5 August 2015, at the plenary sitting of the Sejm, was submitted the motion to adopt the Senate’s amendments. Despite obtaining an absolute majority of votes, the Marshal of the Sejm declared their rejection by the Sejm. Doubts regarding the compliance with all the requirements of the legislative procedure prompted the President of the Republic of Poland to bring the case to the Constitutional Tribunal for consideration. It was necessary to determine whether the presumption of adoption of the Senate amendment, adopted in the Constitution of 1997, is a regulation on the essential elements of the legislative procedure, violation of which determines unconstitutionality of the legislative act.


1989 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
David O. Brink

In my article “Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review” I tried to do three main things. First, I tried to establish a link between familiar issues within legal theory about the nature and determinacy of the law and familiar issues within constitutional theory about the scope and record of judicial review via their common dependency on assumptions about the nature of legal interpretation. Second, I argued that a proper theory of interpretation has at least two important components: a theory of the semantics of legal terms and a theory about how best to characterize the purposes or intentions underlying legal provisions. Third, I sketched my own account of these two components of legal interpretation and then explored their implications for these familiar disputes within legal theory and constitutional theory. In particular, the semantic claims that I outlined require us (a) to distinguish between the meaning or reference of legal terms and people’s beliefs about the extension of those terms and (b) to rely on theoretical considerations, of various kinds, in ascertaining the extension of general terms occurring in legal provisions. The account of underlying purpose that I sketched requires legal interpreters to identify the purpose of a legal provision with the abstract values that the framers of that provision sought to implement, rather than with the specific activities that they sought to regulate, and then to determine the extension of these values (i.e., the activities that these provisions, properly understood, do regulate) by appeal to theoretical considerations about the nature of these principles and policies. These interpretive claims, I argued, tend to vindicate a belief in the determinacy of the law in hard cases and the style, if not the content, of the Court’s exercise of judicial review in cases concerning individual rights, against worries that in these cases it has exceeded the scope of legitimate judicial review.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 158
Author(s):  
Insan Tajali Nur

The regulation in the Regional Regulation is faced with the problem of how the Regional Regulation can regulate the affairs of authority in accordance with the characteristics of the region. But it does not conflict with the higher laws and regulations. One of the problems is Disharmony legislation resulting in differences in interpretation in its implementation; the emergence of legal uncertainty; Legislation is not carried out effectively and efficiently, and legal dysfunction, in a disharmonic manner, the rules and regulations - Invitation under the above laws and regulations is an evaluation material. But de facto, there are a number of draft regulations based on rules outside the order of the laws.Whereas in Article 7 paragraph 2 of Act Number 12 of 2011 confirms the strength of the laws of the legislation in accordance with the hierarchy in paragraph 1. Continued related to Article 140 paragraph (3) of Law Number 23 of 2014 concerning the Establishment of Legislation as has undergone the second amendment to the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 9 of 2015 concerning Regional Government, states that the procedure for preparing a draft Regional Regulation from the Governor or Regent / Mayor is regulated by a Presidential Regulation. Then Article 141 paragraph (2) of the Law on Regional Government states that further Provisions concerning the procedure for preparing the Regional Regulation are regulated in the DPRD Rules of Procedure.Based on the principle of the formation of laws and regulations, the Minister of Home Affairs's regulation violates the principle of conformity between types and materials of content, because the substance should be the material of the contents of the Presidential Regulation as part of the hierarchy of the Order of Regulations - Invitation and the contents of the DPRD Rules of Procedure.  


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