scholarly journals On the philosophical method: therapy?

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 35-44
Author(s):  
Nara M. Figueiredo
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-52
Author(s):  
Timothy C. Lord

Collingwood’s An Essay on Philosophical Method provides an insightful critique of Russell’s analysis and metaphysics of logical atomism, proposing an unduly neglected neo-idealist alternative to Russell’s philosophical method. I summarize Collingwood’s critique of analysis and sympathetically outline the philosophical methodology of Collingwood’s post-Hegelian dialectical method: his scale of forms methodology, grounded on the overlap of philosophical classes. I then delineate Collingwood’s critique of the metaphysics of logical atomism, demonstrating how the scale of forms methodology is opposed to Russell’s logical atomism. Finally, I reflect on the reasons Collingwood’s Essay aroused little interest upon publication and the importance of continually rethinking the history of philosophy.


Author(s):  
Catherine Rowett

The chapter starts by telling a narrative to explain how and why the author came to reject the mistaken assumptions with which the research began, and how these initial assumptions had assumed false dichotomies familiar from existing work in the field. The chapter thereby explains why the results presented in Chapters 1–12 might seem unexpected. It draws together the chief philosophical lessons of those chapters, highlighting the fact that Plato is right about (i) how conceptual knowledge differs from both propositional knowledge and recognition of tokens, (ii) the different sense of ‘being’ involved in knowing ‘what it is’, about a type, (iii) the value of images and icons in the philosophical method, and (iv) the irrelevance of Socratic definitions and other bogus criteria for knowledge. Finally, it sketches some possible ways in which a further volume might apply the results to other dialogues.


Ramus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 41-69
Author(s):  
Richard Ellis

Gilles Deleuze's engagement with Heraclitus is long-standing, going back to his early work on Nietzsche, and persisting through the collaborative volumes produced with Félix Guattari in which Heraclitus becomes a key exemplar of their own philosophical method, whereby thought and nature are said to fold into one another in creative configurations. For Deleuze, as before him for Nietzsche, Heraclitus’ conception of universal becoming and of the constitutive flows across codes—be they ontological, epistemological, political, or ethical—demands a radical re-evaluation of the place of the human in time, and of the boundaries of subjectivity. Elsewhere, Deleuze states that the very meaning of philosophy is ‘to go beyond the human condition’ by opening us up to the other durations—inhuman and superhuman—with which, and by which, we are disclosed. A further key interlocutor here is Henri Bergson, whose work on time as duration, with psychological and ontological import, is central to the development of many of Deleuze's philosophical positions, including those subsequently nuanced by his work with Félix Guattari. Before attempting to map the plane of affiliations upon which these thinkers move, it is necessary to begin from Heraclitus’ own words on philosophical method and the opposition he draws between the correct, though elusive, practice of νόος (‘thought’, ‘understanding’) and the inadequate model of πολυμαθίη (‘much learning’) adopted by his intellectual predecessors.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 157-182
Author(s):  
Douglas O. Nwaokugha

The Niger Delta region of Nigeria is synonymous with crisis occasioned by militancy, agitations and insurgency from the youth, who in recent times have become aware of the neglect, marginalization, human rights abuses, environmental degradation etc, people of the region suffer in the hands of the Nigerian government and Multinational Corporations that explore and exploit the Niger Delta environment for its rich natural resources. Investing time in militancy, agitations and insurgency as presently spearheaded by youth in the region has created more problems than solve the Niger Delta crises. Using the philosophical method, this paper makes a case on how sport can be an effective engagement mechanism for youth engagement and youth empowerment. The paper sees sport as a human engagement whose effective exploration and utilization can lead to the empowerment of youth in Nigeria’s Niger Delta and consequently recommends that states intervention agencies, politicians and philanthropists should make the provision of sport infrastructure a topmost priority for youth development and empowerment. The paper strongly maintains that policies that target youth empowerment in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria will surely be a foundation for sustainable peace and stability not only in Nigeria but across the globe.


Author(s):  
Ian Proops

The book aims to provide a comprehensive study of the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ of Kant’s first Critique. It argues that Kant conceives of ‘critique’ as a kind of winnowing exercise, aimed to separate the wheat of good metaphysics from the chaff of bad. However, he uses a less familiar metaphor to make this point, namely, that of ‘the fiery test of critique’. This turns out to be, not a medieval ordeal (a trial by fire), but rather a metallurgical assay: so-called ‘cupellation’—a procedure in which ore samples are tested for their precious-metal content. The upshot is that critique has a positive, investigatory side: it seeks not merely to eliminate the dross of bad ‘dogmatic’ metaphysics but also to uncover any hidden nuggets of value that might be contained in traditional speculative metaphysics. There are both gold and silver to be found. The gold is the indirect proof of Transcendental Idealism afforded by the resolution of the Antinomies, the silver Kant’s defence of theoretically grounded ‘doctrinal beliefs’ in a wise and great originator and in an afterlife. In the course of making these points, the book engages with Kant’s views on a number of central problems in philosophy and meta-philosophy, including: the explanation of the enduring human impulse towards metaphysics, correct philosophical method, the limits of self-knowledge, the possibility of human freedom, the resolution of metaphysical paradox (‘Antinomy’), the justification of faith, the nature of scepticism, and the role of ‘as if’ reasoning in natural science.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 102-135
Author(s):  
John J. Preston ◽  

I argue that Heidegger’s methodological breakthrough in the early 1920s, the development of hermeneutic phenomenology, and the structure of Being and Time are the result of Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle’s philosophical method in his Physics and Nicomachean Ethics. In part one, I explain the general structure of Aristotle’s method and demonstrate the distinction between scientific and philo­sophical investigations. In part two, I show how formal indication and phenomenological destruction are the product of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s method by demonstrating their affinity in approach, content, and criteria for success. Lastly, in part three, I show how aspects of Being and Time, specifically das Man and the destruction of history, become more intelligible when framed in terms of an Aristotelian investigation into endoxa.


Author(s):  
Avner Baz

The article presents, clarifies, defends, and shows the contemporary relevance of ordinary language philosophy (OLP), as a general approach to the understanding and dissolution of at least very many traditional and contemporary philosophical difficulties. The first section broadly characterizes OLP, points out its anticipation in Immanuel Kant’s dissolution of metaphysical impasses in the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ of the Critique of Pure Reason, and then shows its contemporary relevance by bringing its perspective to bear on the recent debates concerning the philosophical ‘method of cases’. The second section responds to a series of common objections to, and misunderstandings of, OLP.


2011 ◽  
Vol 32 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 80-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dietmar H. Heidemann

In the Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel states that ‘philosophy … contains the sceptical as a moment within itself — specifically as the dialectical moment’ (§81, Addition 2), and that ‘scepticism’ as ‘the dialectical moment itself is an essential one in the affirmative Science’ (§78). On the one hand, the connection between scepticism and dialectic is obvious. Hegel claims that scepticism is a problem that cannot be just removed from the philosophical agenda by knock-down anti-sceptical arguments. Scepticism intrinsically belongs to philosophical thinking; that is to say, it plays a constructive role in philosophical thinking. On the other hand, scepticism has to be construed as the view according to which we cannot know whether our beliefs are true, i.e., scepticism plays a destructive role in philosophy no matter what. It is particularly this role that clashes with Hegel's claim of having established a philosophical system of true cognition of the entirety of reality. In the following I argue that for Hegel the constructive and the destructive role of scepticism are reconcilable. I specifically argue that it is dialectic that makes both consistent since scepticism is a constitutive element of dialectic.In order to show in what sense scepticism is an intrinsic feature of dialectic I begin by sketching Hegel's early view of scepticism specifically with respect to logic and metaphysics. The young Hegel construes logic as a philosophical method of human cognition that inevitably results in ‘sceptical’ consequences in that it illustrates the finiteness of human understanding. By doing so, logic not only nullifies finite understanding but also introduces to metaphysics, i.e., the true philosophical science of the absolute.


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