Unpacking Party Unity: The Combined Effects of Electoral Systems and Candidate Selection Methods on Legislative Attitudes and Behavioural Norms

2016 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 452-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reut Itzkovitch-Malka ◽  
Reuven Y Hazan

This article analyses the effect of electoral systems, candidate selection methods and the interplay between them on individual legislative attitudes and behavioural norms, specifically on two facets of party unity: party agreement and party loyalty. Our main argument is that one must take into account the effect of inter- as well as intra-party competition, and the interaction between the two, in order to explain individual legislative attitudes and norms. Using data from 34 European parties across 10 countries, we show that under exclusive candidate selection methods, there are large differences between proportional representation and single-member district electoral systems in their effect on party agreement and party loyalty. Under inclusive candidate selection methods, however, such differences are much less apparent. In other words, the candidate selection method conditions the influence of the electoral system on legislative attitudes and behavioural norms.

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
HAE-WON JUN ◽  
SIMON HIX

AbstractA growing literature looks at how the design of the electoral system shapes the voting behavior of politicians in parliaments. Existing research tends to confirm that in mixed-member systems the politicians elected in the single-member districts are more likely to vote against their parties than the politicians elected on the party lists. However, we find that in South Korea, the members of the Korean National Assembly who were elected on PR lists are more likely to vote against their party leadership than the members elected in single-member districts (SMDs). This counterintuitive behavior stems from the particular structure of candidate selection and politicians' career paths. This suggests that any theory of how electoral systems shape individual parliamentary behavior needs to look beyond the opportunities provided by the electoral rules for voters to reward or punish individual politicians (as opposed to parties), to the structure of candidate selection inside parties and the related career paths of politicians.


2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yael Shomer

Do electoral systems and intra-party candidate selection procedures influence the degree to which parties act in unison? Whereas the theoretical literature is quite clear about the hypothetical effect of these institutions, empirical evidence is mixed. In this article, I solve the puzzle and theorize about the interactive effects of elections and selections on parties’ behavior. I argue that the effect of candidate selections depends on the electoral environment within which they operate. Specifically, in an electoral environment that creates incentives for candidate-centeredness, the less restrictive the selection method a party uses, the less unified its record; whereas in an electoral environment that emphasizes party-centeredness, the effect of selections on unity is more muted. Using the electoral reform and divergent selection mechanisms characterizing Israel during the last three decades and utilizing Rice Scores, I provide support for the conditional effect of electoral systems and selection procedures on party behavior.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Osnat Akirav

This study investigates whether differences in candidate selection methods and/or the changes in the Israeli political system affect cooperation between parliament members and whether such cooperation explains legislative effectiveness. To examine these issues, we discuss different types of cooperative strategies using a scale we devised that defines three options for cooperation: 1) uncooperative, 2) cooperation within the party and 3) cooperation between parties. Then, we categorize the various methods that Israeli political parties have used to select their candidates since the establishment of the state, creating four categories of a variable we call the effect of the primaries. Additionally, we consider differences in four periods of changes in the Israeli party system. Finally, we assess the results of cooperation in light of our dependent variable, legislative effectiveness, using data from 1949 to 2015. Our findings indicate that the majority of bills passed without cooperation, but when cooperative strategies were used, they usually involved inter-party rather than intra-party support. Furthermore, the adoption of primaries reduced the probability of passing bills. In addition, when one party was dominant, 68% of the representatives initiated legislation alone, while during the multi-polar fragmented period 41.9% cooperated with legislators from other parties.


2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Whitefield ◽  
Robert Rohrschneider

This article seeks to contribute to the burgeoning literature on how parties assign salience to their issue stances. With regard to European integration, recent research has pointed not only to growing public Euro-scepticism but also to an increase in the importance that the public assigns to European issues. But are parties matching this shift with appropriate salience shifts of their own? The existing literature points to important constraints on parties achieving such salience representation that arise from the nature of inherited issue ownership and the nature of political cleavages. There are also reasons to expect important differences between Western European and Central European parties in the extent to which such constraints apply. We investigate these issues using data from expert surveys conducted in twenty-four European countries at two time points, 2007–2008 and 2013, that provide measures of the salience of European integration to parties along with other indicators that are used as predictors of salience. The results do not suggest that CEE parties assign salience in ways that differ substantially from their counterparts in Western Europe. What matters most in both regions is the position that parties adopt on the issues, with parties at the extremes on the European dimension being the ones to make the issue most salient in their appeals. We also note that some predicted determinants of issue salience, such as government status, electoral support and time spent in office, and party organization, are dogs that do not bark in both regions.


Author(s):  
Michael FitzGerald ◽  
Melody E. Valdini

While there are many factors that drive women’s descriptive representation (i.e., the percentage of women in the legislature) the electoral institutions generate some of the most powerful and consistent effects. In the first breaths of this literature, the focus was firmly on the impact of majoritarian electoral systems versus proportional representation (PR) systems on women’s descriptive representation. Since then, the literature has grown to engage broader ideas regarding the complicated nature of analyzing institutions in different cultural contexts and under different social conditions. Particularly in the later decades of the 20th century, scholars found that structural factors, such as economic disparities between men and women and the balance of women in careers that are typical paths to political office, were important to consider in concert with electoral rules. More recently, as more women gain access to the economic elite, the literature has focused more on cultural factors such as the historical legacies of Communism and the general societal reactions to women’s leadership. These non-institutional factors are now widely engaged as an important component of understanding why and to what extent we can expect an electoral system to generate a certain outcome. Beyond the impact of the electoral system itself, there is also relevant literature that engages how electoral institutions such as gender quotas and candidate selection processes affect women’s descriptive representation. There is wide variation in the design of gender quotas as well as candidate selection processes, just as there is in the design of electoral systems, and therefore a fuller understanding of the relationship between electoral institutions and women’s representation requires consideration of the interaction of candidate selection procedures, gender quotas, and electoral systems. For example, the presence of a placement mandate (i.e., a requirement stipulating where on the list women candidates must be positioned) or a decentralized candidate selection process each has a different effect on women’s representation in an electoral system that includes a preference vote. The sections below highlight some of the existing literature on electoral institutions and their impact on women’s descriptive representation. This is by no means an exhaustive list but does offer insight into the general themes and research areas that are common in this field of study.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 459-478
Author(s):  
Zhidas Daskalovski

AbstractWhat is the best electoral system to increase the number of political parties represented in Parliament? This article answers the question using data from all the elections in Macedonia since 2002, and by making simulations of the results according to different electoral systems. In principle, we found that the electoral model that would bring most parties to the Macedonian Parliament is the Droop and Hare used in one electoral district. Moreover, the article answers the question how favourable different electoral systems are to larger/smaller parties. We find that the following is the order of electoral systems from most to least favourable for larger parties: Imperiali highest averages, D’Hondt, Sainte-Laguë, Largest remainders – Imperiali, Danish, Largest remainders – Droop, Largest remainders – Hare.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge M. Fernandes ◽  
Lucas Geese ◽  
Carsten Schwemmer

Legislators are political actors whose main goal is to get re-elected. They use their legislative repertoire to help them to cater to the interests of their principals. In this paper, we argue that we need to move beyond treating electoral systems as monolithic entities, as if all legislators operating under the same set of macro-rules shared the same set of incentives. Rather, we need to account for within-system variation, namely, candidate selection rules and individual electoral vulnerability. Using a most different systems design, we turn to Germany, Ireland, and Portugal to leverage both cross-system and within-system variation. We use an original dataset of 345.000 parliamentary questions. Findings show that candidate selection rules blur canonical electoral system boundaries. Electoral vulnerability has a similar effect in closed-list and mixed-systems, but not in preferential voting settings.


Author(s):  
Gideon Rahat ◽  
William P. Cross

Candidate selection is about the decisions political parties make regarding who to put forward as candidates under their label for general elections. Beyond being the function that differentiates parties from other political groupings (especially considering the decline in parties’ performance of their other traditional functions), candidate selection is crucial for understanding power relations within parties, the composition of parliaments, and the behavior of elected officials. It also has an impact on the quality of democracy, especially with regard to the values of participation, competition, responsiveness, and representation. Candidate selection methods vary according to certain parameters. The two most important ones are the level of inclusiveness of the selectorate(s) (the body or bodies that choose the candidates) and their relative level of centralization. Beyond the few cases in which state laws define the process, the nature of candidate selection methods is influenced by various country-level factors, such as the electoral system and national political culture, as well as by party-level characteristics, such as party ideology. Reform of candidate selection methods occurs as a result of general developments, such as party change or personalization, party system developments, such as electoral defeat, and intraparty struggles. Although candidate selection is no longer “the secret garden of politics,” research still faces various obstacles. Consequently, the level of scholarly development is less advanced than the parallel study of electoral systems and their political consequences.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 640-650 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Braun ◽  
Hermann Schmitt

Political parties increasingly operate at multiple political levels. Nevertheless, we do not yet know much about the consequences of these multilevel electoral systems (MLESs) on party behaviour. To fill this gap, we examine party manifestos for European Parliament (EP) elections and compare them with party manifestos for national elections. Using manifesto data and covering 15 European Union (EU) countries between 1979 and 2014, we focus on European issues and ask whether parties’ issue emphasis and the positions they take are the same in both kinds of documents and respectively at both levels of the MLES. We show that although parties put more emphasis on EU issues in EP than in national elections, they behave sincerely regarding their position towards the EU – these are very similar irrespective of the electoral context. As many elections take place in MLES environments, in Europe, in particular, but far beyond, this noteworthy finding is highly relevant for scholars of party competition in general and even more instructive for the so far fragmented literature exploring the implications of MLESs.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 635-659 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHING-HSIN YU ◽  
ERIC CHEN-HUA YU ◽  
KAORI SHOJI

AbstractThis paper explores the linkage between electoral systems and candidate selection methods (CSMs) by analyzing two innovations of CSMs in Taiwan and Japan: polling primary and kobo, respectively. With an assumption that parties’ CSMs reflect their strategies to win elections, this article offers the rationale behind why and how major parties in Taiwan and Japan adjusted their CSMs to meet the challenges posed by the transition of electoral rules in each country from single non-transferable vote (SNTV) systems to mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) systems. We argue that a party's choice of CSMs reflects its rationale for maximizing the prospects of winning under the given electoral rule, which counters the ‘no-finding’ conclusion in some previous large-N studies on the linkage between electoral systems and choices of CSMs. Additionally, our findings highlight the importance of institutional factors, such as electoral systems, in explaining CSM reforms in a comparative perspective.


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