scholarly journals ON CERTAIN SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS OF LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AND THE OPERATIONISM OF B. F. SKINNER 1

1969 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 489-506 ◽  
Author(s):  
Willard F. Day
2014 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Béatrice Godart-Wendling

Résumé Le but de cet article est d’évaluer l’hypothèse de John Rupert Firth (1890–1960) énonçant que l’article de l’anthropologue Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942), “The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages” (1923), constituerait une des sources d’inspiration ayant conduit Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) à élaborer une nouvelle conception de la signification en termes d’‘usage’. S’appuyant sur certains passages des Philosophical Investigations (1953), Firth établit ainsi une filiation entre les deux grandes idées phares de Malinowski, à savoir l’importance de la notion de ‘contexte de situation’ et l’idée que le langage serait un ‘mode d’action’ et les principales thèses (la signification comme usage, l’acquisition du langage, le langage comme un ensemble de jeux) que développera Wittgenstein. L’examen du bien fondé de cette hypothèse conduira à préciser la synergie des idées qui eut lieu en matière de pragmatique dans l’Angleterre de la première moitié du XXe siècle.


2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 609-625 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANNE ORFORD

AbstractIn hisPhilosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein declared: ‘We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.’ Michel Foucault in turn repeatedly referred to his method of study as description, arguing that the role of philosophy is not to reveal what is hidden, but rather to make us see what is seen. This essay suggests why the turn to description as a mode of legal writing might be a productive move at this time.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Michael Benjamin Warren Sinclair

<p>1.1 When I first looked, into Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations I felt not so much that this was great work, but that it was alive and exciting, a going concern. I next learned of its difficulty; it seemed to me then (as it does now) that Wittgenstein omitted all the preliminary easy bits that we usually find in philosophy books and, treated only of the very difficult problems which concerned him. That this was great philosophy had to be accepted, for most of the people I knew of as top philosophers said so. Its acknowledged greatness was not, however, the primary reason, nor even an important reason, for my continued reading of Wittgenstein's work it was the enigmatic style and. the strange feeling of depth in the remarks; I felt they really did say something glorious, make a powerful gesture (cf., PI, *610), if I could only figure out what.</p>


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