Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology: Preliminary Studies for Part II of Philosophical Investigations. By Ludwig Wittgenstein

1985 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-82
Author(s):  
G. Lynn Stephens ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Philosophy Of Psychology ◽  
Philosophical Investigations

Reply to Michael O’Sullivan

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Psychology ◽  
Philosophical Investigations

Between 1946 and 1949 Wittgenstein produced a series of manuscripts, whose contents are published in part as Part II of Philosophical Investigations, and as Remarks on Philosophy of Psychology I and II, and Last Writings I and II. For the most part these read like nightstand diaries (of a sort I ...

L’hypothèse de Firth

2014 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Béatrice Godart-Wendling
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Bronislaw Malinowski ◽  
Mode D’Action ◽  
Bronisław Malinowski

Résumé Le but de cet article est d’évaluer l’hypothèse de John Rupert Firth (1890–1960) énonçant que l’article de l’anthropologue Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942), “The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages” (1923), constituerait une des sources d’inspiration ayant conduit Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) à élaborer une nouvelle conception de la signification en termes d’‘usage’. S’appuyant sur certains passages des Philosophical Investigations (1953), Firth établit ainsi une filiation entre les deux grandes idées phares de Malinowski, à savoir l’importance de la notion de ‘contexte de situation’ et l’idée que le langage serait un ‘mode d’action’ et les principales thèses (la signification comme usage, l’acquisition du langage, le langage comme un ensemble de jeux) que développera Wittgenstein. L’examen du bien fondé de cette hypothèse conduira à préciser la synergie des idées qui eut lieu en matière de pragmatique dans l’Angleterre de la première moitié du XXe siècle.

„Eine irreführende Parallele“

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-182
Author(s):  
Stefan Majetschak
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Intensive Study ◽  
Philosophy Of Psychology ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Or Groups ◽  
Conceptual Confusion ◽  
Psychological Concepts

Abstract“A Misleading Parallel”. Wittgenstein on Conceptual Confusion in Psychology and the Semantics of Psychological Concepts. After the Philosophical Investigations, except for details, were largely finished in 1945, Wittgenstein, in his final years, undertook an intensive study of the grammar of our psychological concepts and the philosophical misinterpretations we often assign to them. Anyone looking through these extensive collections of philosophical remarks will probably quite often find it difficult to understand which questions Wittgenstein was addressing with individual remarks or groups of remarks and where the philosophical problems lay for which he was trying to find a solution, whether therapeutic or otherwise appropriate.In the article at hand I do not claim to fathom the full range of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the philosophy of psychology even in the most general way. Rather it is my intention to shed some light on a diagnosis which he made for the psychology of his time. In part 1 of this paper I would like to provide a brief sketch of what Wittgenstein considered to be the conceptual confusion prevalent in psychology and to suggest why he did not expect the methods of an experimental (natural) science to be successful in solving the problems that concern us in psychology. In part 2 I’ll attempt to analyze how psychological concepts, according to Wittgenstein, might be construed in order to avoid any type of conceptual confusion.

In Praise of Description

2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 609-625 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANNE ORFORD
Keyword(s):  
Michel Foucault ◽  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Legal Writing

AbstractIn hisPhilosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein declared: ‘We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.’ Michel Foucault in turn repeatedly referred to his method of study as description, arguing that the role of philosophy is not to reveal what is hidden, but rather to make us see what is seen. This essay suggests why the turn to description as a mode of legal writing might be a productive move at this time.

scholarly journals Language-Games in the Later Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Michael Benjamin Warren Sinclair
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Language Games ◽  
Primary Reason ◽  
Great Work ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
The People ◽  
Strange Feeling

<p>1.1 When I first looked, into Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations I felt not so much that this was great work, but that it was alive and exciting, a going concern. I next learned of its difficulty; it seemed to me then (as it does now) that Wittgenstein omitted all the preliminary easy bits that we usually find in philosophy books and, treated only of the very difficult problems which concerned him. That this was great philosophy had to be accepted, for most of the people I knew of as top philosophers said so. Its acknowledged greatness was not, however, the primary reason, nor even an important reason, for my continued reading of Wittgenstein's work it was the enigmatic style and. the strange feeling of depth in the remarks; I felt they really did say something glorious, make a powerful gesture (cf., PI, *610), if I could only figure out what.</p>

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document