The role of the “North Atlantic Triangle” in the development of Canadian foreign policy: on the question of interpretations of the concept

Author(s):  
Nataliia Y. Zhukovskaya

An analysis of various interpretations of the concept of the “North Atlantic Triangle” in the context of the development of Canadian foreign policy in the late 19th – first half of the 20th centuries is presented. The relevance of the work is due to the need to study the interaction of the Atlantic powers in historical dynamics, with an emphasis on the origins of the development of the “North Atlantic triangle”. Based on the classic works of Canadian historians and the works of modern researchers, the concept of the “North Atlantic Triangle” is analyzed through three main ideas: the “bookkeeper’s puzzle”, the idea of “counterweight” and the idea of a “bridge” or “linchpin”. It is concluded that the development of Canadian national interests began long before Canadians recognized themselves as a nation and gained the ability to pursue an independent foreign policy. This process was largely determined by a specific relationship between two centers of gravity: Great Britain and the United States. Canada was the weakest side of this construct, therefore, for reasons of security and the preservation of its own interests, it developed certain scenarios of relations with the Atlantic partners. Depending on historical circumstances, the emphasis in these scenarios was different. That is why interpretations of the concept of the “North Atlantic Triangle” often differ depending on the subject content and chronological boundaries of a particular study. However, it has been proven that the main goal setting of Canadian foreign policy priorities – to ensure their own security and derive maximum benefit from relations within the “North Atlantic Triangle”, skillfully smoothing out contradictions and maneuvering between Great Britain and the United States – remained unchanged.

1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 362-369

The Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;Being parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington on April 4, 1949;Considering their reciprocal pledges under Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty separately and jointly with the other parties, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack;


Author(s):  
Susan Colbourn

On April 4, 1949, twelve nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty: the United States, Canada, Iceland, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Portugal, Italy, Norway, and Denmark. For the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty signaled a major shift in foreign policy. Gone was the traditional aversion to “entangling alliances,” dating back to George Washington’s farewell address. The United States had entered into a collective security arrangement designed to preserve peace in Europe. With the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States took on a clear leadership role on the European continent. Allied defense depended on US military power, most notably the nuclear umbrella. Reliance on the United States unsurprisingly created problems. Doubts about the strength of the transatlantic partnership and rumors of a NATO in shambles were (and are) commonplace, as were anxieties about the West’s strength in comparison to NATO’s Eastern counterpart, the Warsaw Pact. NATO, it turned out, was more than a Cold War institution. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Alliance remained vital to US foreign policy objectives. The only invocation of Article V, the North Atlantic Treaty’s collective defense clause, came in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Over the last seven decades, NATO has symbolized both US power and its challenges.


1913 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chandler P. Anderson

On the 15th of November, 1912, the United States and Great Britain formally ratified and put into effect an agreement which, in consequence of diplomatic negotiations covering nearly two years, had been signed by their plenipotentiaries on the 20th of July, 1912, adopting with certain modifications the rules and method of procedure embodied in the award of the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration Tribunal, rendered at The Hague on September 7, 1910, under which all questions hereafter arising in regard to the exercise of American fishing liberties under the treaty of 1818 may be determined in accordance with the principles laid down in the award. This agreement constitutes the final step which was necessary to complete and perfect the arbitration award and give it practical application; and the award and this agreement together establish for all time the extent of the rights and obligations of the inhabitants of the United States in the exercise of thenfishing liberties under the treaty of 1818.


1949 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 633-665 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H. Heindel ◽  
Thorsten V. Kalijarvi ◽  
Francis O. Wilcox

In joining the North Atlantic Treaty the United States made a momentous decision in its foreign policy. This article undertakes to analyze the rôle of the United States Senate in this historic step and to summarize the more important issues encountered.


Author(s):  
Sara Lorenzini

This chapter assesses how modernization worked its way into Cold War politics and how it influenced public discourse and foreign policy in the United States during the second half of the 1950s. Between 1957 and 1958, several events prompted the United States to shift toward a more active foreign aid policy. These events brought a consensus that a more vigorous approach to promoting economic growth and development as a way to contain communist influence was needed. The question of improved coordination of development assistance among the Atlantic nations was also a factor. Most of Western Europe shared America's concern about Soviet penetration, and several members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) insisted on activating economic collaboration according to article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, using it to provide aid cooperatively. The chapter then considers how, with the presidency of John F. Kennedy, modernization became the representative Western ideology for waging the Cold War, even as other coexisting traditions of imperial origin offered rival methods of using development aid as a tool of foreign policy to face radicalization in the decolonizing world.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 825-832

With the development of certain administrative frictions (concerning coal quotas, occupation costs, and the scrap metal treaty) between the western occupying powers and the German Federal Republic, early indications were that if the talk of “contractual agreements” did materialize it would reserve, for the occupying powers, wide controls over important areas of west Germany's internal and external affairs. In Washington, however, a general modification of approach was noted during the September discussions between the United States Secretary of State (Acheson), the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary (Morrison), and the French Foreign Minister (Schuman), preparatory to the Ottawa meetings of the North Atlantic Council.


1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 709-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert R. Bowie

The debate over strategy, forces, and nuclear control, which now divides the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is framed largely in military terms: what is the best way to protect the NATO area and its members from aggression? The military aspects are complex in themselves, but the import of these issues extends far beyond defense. Their handling will greatly affect prospects for a partnership between the United States and a strong, united Europe


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