The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate

1949 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 633-665 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H. Heindel ◽  
Thorsten V. Kalijarvi ◽  
Francis O. Wilcox

In joining the North Atlantic Treaty the United States made a momentous decision in its foreign policy. This article undertakes to analyze the rôle of the United States Senate in this historic step and to summarize the more important issues encountered.

Author(s):  
Nataliia Y. Zhukovskaya

An analysis of various interpretations of the concept of the “North Atlantic Triangle” in the context of the development of Canadian foreign policy in the late 19th – first half of the 20th centuries is presented. The relevance of the work is due to the need to study the interaction of the Atlantic powers in historical dynamics, with an emphasis on the origins of the development of the “North Atlantic triangle”. Based on the classic works of Canadian historians and the works of modern researchers, the concept of the “North Atlantic Triangle” is analyzed through three main ideas: the “bookkeeper’s puzzle”, the idea of “counterweight” and the idea of a “bridge” or “linchpin”. It is concluded that the development of Canadian national interests began long before Canadians recognized themselves as a nation and gained the ability to pursue an independent foreign policy. This process was largely determined by a specific relationship between two centers of gravity: Great Britain and the United States. Canada was the weakest side of this construct, therefore, for reasons of security and the preservation of its own interests, it developed certain scenarios of relations with the Atlantic partners. Depending on historical circumstances, the emphasis in these scenarios was different. That is why interpretations of the concept of the “North Atlantic Triangle” often differ depending on the subject content and chronological boundaries of a particular study. However, it has been proven that the main goal setting of Canadian foreign policy priorities – to ensure their own security and derive maximum benefit from relations within the “North Atlantic Triangle”, skillfully smoothing out contradictions and maneuvering between Great Britain and the United States – remained unchanged.


1969 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 711-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edwin Brown Firmage

On March 13, 1969, the United States Senate by a vote of 83 to 15 consented to the ratification of a treaty described as “the most important international agreement brought before the U. S. Senate since the North Atlantic Pact” and “the most important international agreement limiting nuclear arms since the nuclear age began.” Assuming a timely entry into force, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons may delay incarnation of the specter which “haunted” John F. Kennedy:I see the possibility in the 1970's of the President of the United States having to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these [nuclear] weapons. I regard that as the greatest possible danger and hazard.


Author(s):  
Susan Colbourn

On April 4, 1949, twelve nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty: the United States, Canada, Iceland, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Portugal, Italy, Norway, and Denmark. For the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty signaled a major shift in foreign policy. Gone was the traditional aversion to “entangling alliances,” dating back to George Washington’s farewell address. The United States had entered into a collective security arrangement designed to preserve peace in Europe. With the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States took on a clear leadership role on the European continent. Allied defense depended on US military power, most notably the nuclear umbrella. Reliance on the United States unsurprisingly created problems. Doubts about the strength of the transatlantic partnership and rumors of a NATO in shambles were (and are) commonplace, as were anxieties about the West’s strength in comparison to NATO’s Eastern counterpart, the Warsaw Pact. NATO, it turned out, was more than a Cold War institution. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Alliance remained vital to US foreign policy objectives. The only invocation of Article V, the North Atlantic Treaty’s collective defense clause, came in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Over the last seven decades, NATO has symbolized both US power and its challenges.


Author(s):  
Sara Lorenzini

This chapter assesses how modernization worked its way into Cold War politics and how it influenced public discourse and foreign policy in the United States during the second half of the 1950s. Between 1957 and 1958, several events prompted the United States to shift toward a more active foreign aid policy. These events brought a consensus that a more vigorous approach to promoting economic growth and development as a way to contain communist influence was needed. The question of improved coordination of development assistance among the Atlantic nations was also a factor. Most of Western Europe shared America's concern about Soviet penetration, and several members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) insisted on activating economic collaboration according to article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, using it to provide aid cooperatively. The chapter then considers how, with the presidency of John F. Kennedy, modernization became the representative Western ideology for waging the Cold War, even as other coexisting traditions of imperial origin offered rival methods of using development aid as a tool of foreign policy to face radicalization in the decolonizing world.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 825-832

With the development of certain administrative frictions (concerning coal quotas, occupation costs, and the scrap metal treaty) between the western occupying powers and the German Federal Republic, early indications were that if the talk of “contractual agreements” did materialize it would reserve, for the occupying powers, wide controls over important areas of west Germany's internal and external affairs. In Washington, however, a general modification of approach was noted during the September discussions between the United States Secretary of State (Acheson), the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary (Morrison), and the French Foreign Minister (Schuman), preparatory to the Ottawa meetings of the North Atlantic Council.


1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 709-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert R. Bowie

The debate over strategy, forces, and nuclear control, which now divides the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is framed largely in military terms: what is the best way to protect the NATO area and its members from aggression? The military aspects are complex in themselves, but the import of these issues extends far beyond defense. Their handling will greatly affect prospects for a partnership between the United States and a strong, united Europe


1992 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 633-680 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Weber

At the end of the 1940s, the United States and several West European states allied to defend themselves against invasion by the Soviet Union. Balance-ofpower theory predicts the recurrent formation of such balances among states. But it says little about the precise nature of the balance, the principles on which it will be constructed, or its institutional manifestations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a peculiar mix. As a formal institution, NATO has through most of its history been distinctly nonmultilateral, with the United States commanding most decision-making power and responsibility. At the same time, NATO provided security to its member states in a way that strongly reflected multilateral principles. Within NATO, security was indivisible. It was based on a general organizing principle, the principle that the external boundaries of alliance territory were completely inviolable and that an attack on any border was an attack on all. Diffuse reciprocity was the norm. In the terms set out by John Ruggie, NATO has generally scored low as a multilateral organization but high as an institution of multilateralism.


Author(s):  
Lars U. Scholl ◽  
Lars U. Scholl ◽  
Lars U. Scholl

This essay analyses the North Atlantic Cotton Trade through records of cotton arrivals at Liverpool, using two sets of data from 1830-1832 and 1853-1855. Using Customs Bills of Entry, Williams presents data of cotton receipts from the United States to Liverpool; quantities of bales exported; numbers of vessels; origin ports of vessels; distinguishes between regular and occasional cotton traders; arrivals at Liverpool by nationality; and vessel tonnage. He determines that the majority of vessels participated in the cotton trade seasonally, and suggests that the cotton trade was not self-contained, but part of a complex interrelationship within the North Atlantic trade system, encompassing commodity dealings, shipping employment levels, and the seasonal characteristics of cargo. The conclusion requests further scholarly research into the pattern of ship movements in the Atlantic. Two appendices provide more data, concerning arrival dates of regular traders in Liverpool, and the month of departure of cotton vessels from Southern states.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-88
Author(s):  
Joseph Drexler-Dreis

Abstract This essay develops a response to the historical situation of the North Atlantic world in general and the United States in particular through theological reflection. It offers an overview of some decolonial perspectives with which theologians can engage, and argues for a general perspective for a decolonial theology as a possible response to modern/colonial structures and relations of power, particularly in the United States. Decolonial theory holds together a set of critical perspectives that seek the end of the modern/colonial world-system and not merely a democratization of its benefits. A decolonial theology, it is argued, critiques how the confinement of knowledge to European traditions has closed possibilities for understanding historical encounters with divinity, and thus possibilities of critical reflection. A decolonial theology reflects critically on a historical situation in light of faith in a divine reality, the understanding of which is liberated from the monopoly of modern/colonial ways of knowing, in order to catalyze social transformation.


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