Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance

1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 709-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert R. Bowie

The debate over strategy, forces, and nuclear control, which now divides the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is framed largely in military terms: what is the best way to protect the NATO area and its members from aggression? The military aspects are complex in themselves, but the import of these issues extends far beyond defense. Their handling will greatly affect prospects for a partnership between the United States and a strong, united Europe

1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 399-401

On December 7, 1950 it was reported that the Council of Deputies of the North Atlantic Pact Organization had resolved the difficulties standing in the way of the creation of integrated military forces for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by accepting a compromise proposal put forward by the United States representative (Charles M. Spofford). The essence of the plan was reported to be that the twelve treaty countries would proceed with the formation of integrated forces under a supreme command, including German combat teams recruited by German civilian authorities under the supervision of the Allied High Commissioners; in the meantime the French would call a conference to explore the possibilities of forming a European army into which German units would be merged. Despite indications from western Germany that the Federal Republic was dissatisfied with the limitation of 6,000 men per combat unit as compared with units of from 10,000 to 15,000 for the twelve members of NATO, the press reported that the compromise was agreed to by the Council of Deputies and by the Military Committee at a meeting on December 12 and 13, 1950.


1953 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 164-168

The Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in Paris, December 15–18, 1952, the first meeting of the Council on a ministerial level since the Lisbon meeting of February 1952. Ministers of foreign affairs, finance and defense of the fourteen NATO members took part in the meeting. Observers agreed that the principal fact conditioning the discussions and decisions of the ministers was the impending change of government in the United States.


1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 518-520

Defense CommiteeA week of conferences on strategic plans for meeting the threat of communist aggression preceded the meeting of the Defense Committee on the North Atlantic Treaty organization on April 1at the Hague. The North Atlantic Military Production and Supply Board met for one day on March 24 at the Hague under the chairmanship of Hubert K. Howard, head of the United States delegation. The primary object of this meeting was to consider certain proposals for an integrated and coordinated production of military equipment and supplies by members of the pact. An official statement made at the end of the meeting announced that “encouraging” progress had been made in laying the groundwork for effective operation of production and supply activity. Thestanding group of the Military Committee, composed of military representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, on March 25 resolved final, minor differences in an all inclusive program evolved from plans of the five regional military groups in the pact.


1952 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 144-147

The eighth meeting of the North Atlantic Council met in Rome from November 24 through November 28, 1951, under the chairmanship of Lester B. Pearson (Canada) and with representatives of Gṙeece and Turkey participating as observers. Press reports indicated that the agenda included: 1) discussion of an interim report on the non-military objectives of the Atlantic alliance prepared by a five-power committee consisting of representatives of Canada, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands and Belgium; 2) the report of the Military Committee calling for increased rearmament pledges for 1954 and increased commitment of military contingents in 1952; 3) a report by Dean G. Acheson (United States) on discussions held between Konrad Adenauer (Germany) and the foreign ministers of the United States, United Kingdom and France; 4) a recommendation that the Council of Deputies receive more power; and 5) an interim report by the Temporary Council Committee appointed at Ottawa to survey the economic resources of the members of the alliance.


1960 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 355-358 ◽  

A short meeting of the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), devoted exclusively to East-West relations, was held on September 4, 1959, following a visit by United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower. United States Secretary of State Christian Herter, opening the session, explained to the Council why Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had been invited to the United States and reviewed the general world situation since the Geneva Conference, including the current state of disarmament negotiations.


1952 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 464-475

On April 2, 1952, in letters to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to the United States Secretary of Defense (Lovett), the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (Eisenhower) asked that steps be taken to assure his release by June 1, 1952. The appointment of General Matthew Ridgway (Supreme Allied Commander, Far East) to succeed as Supreme Commander in Europe was unanimously approved by the NATO Council on April 28; the nomination had been made by the President of the United States (Truman) at the request of the Council. It was simultaneously announced that Alfred M. Greunther would continue in his capacity as Chief of Staff. The change in Supreme Commanders was effected at Rocquencourt on May 30, 1952.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 825-832

With the development of certain administrative frictions (concerning coal quotas, occupation costs, and the scrap metal treaty) between the western occupying powers and the German Federal Republic, early indications were that if the talk of “contractual agreements” did materialize it would reserve, for the occupying powers, wide controls over important areas of west Germany's internal and external affairs. In Washington, however, a general modification of approach was noted during the September discussions between the United States Secretary of State (Acheson), the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary (Morrison), and the French Foreign Minister (Schuman), preparatory to the Ottawa meetings of the North Atlantic Council.


1961 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 326-329 ◽  

The Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held its eleventh annual ministerial review at NATO headquarters in Paris from December 16 to 18, 1960. The main topic of discussion at the meeting was the announcement by United States Secretary of State Christian Herter of what he reportedly termed a new concept for the operation of medium-range ballistic missiles. The United States plan included: 1) a proposal that NATO discuss a multilateral system for the political control of the weapons; 2) an offer to place five ballistic missile submarines armed with 80 Polaris missiles under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), by the end of 1963; and 3) a suggestion that the other members of the alliance contribute approximately 100 more medium-range ballistic missiles by purchasing them in the United States. The press reported that Lord Home, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, welcomed the United States proposal and said that NATO should examine the possibility of a medium-range ballistic missile force under multilateral control, a suggestion in which M. Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, concurred. The West German Defense Minister, Franz Joseph Strauss, told the Ministers, the press announced, that concrete decisions on the United States proposal should be taken in the near future, and that plans for NATO control of the Polaris missile force should be pushed through by military and political authorities early in the spring of 1961. The Council of Ministers decided to pass on to its Permanent Comand other related materials, according to the press.


1992 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 633-680 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Weber

At the end of the 1940s, the United States and several West European states allied to defend themselves against invasion by the Soviet Union. Balance-ofpower theory predicts the recurrent formation of such balances among states. But it says little about the precise nature of the balance, the principles on which it will be constructed, or its institutional manifestations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a peculiar mix. As a formal institution, NATO has through most of its history been distinctly nonmultilateral, with the United States commanding most decision-making power and responsibility. At the same time, NATO provided security to its member states in a way that strongly reflected multilateral principles. Within NATO, security was indivisible. It was based on a general organizing principle, the principle that the external boundaries of alliance territory were completely inviolable and that an attack on any border was an attack on all. Diffuse reciprocity was the norm. In the terms set out by John Ruggie, NATO has generally scored low as a multilateral organization but high as an institution of multilateralism.


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