scholarly journals Art. 22(4) Brussels i regulation and its successoronly only apply to cases concerned with the actual registration or validityof the listed ip rights. Commentary on the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 5 october 2017, c-341/16 = Artículo 22.4 del Reglamento Bruselas I y su sucesor solo se aplican a los casos relacionados con el registro efectivo o la validez de los derechos de propiedad intelectual enumerados. Comentario de la Sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea de 5 de octubre de 2017, c-341/16

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 937
Author(s):  
Kilian Sendlmeier

Abstract: The CJEU reaffirms its established case law on Art. 22(4) Brussels I Regulation (No. 44/2001) and interprets the provision narrowly. Courts in member states in which patents, trade marks, designs, or similar rights that are required to be deposited or registered, have jurisdiction only in cases that are actually concerned with the registration or validity of these IP rights. A case concerned with the potential ownership of such rights falls within the general provision of Art. 2(1) Brussels I and, therefore, is to be brought before courts in the member state where the defendant is domiciled.Keywords: Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters, Brussels I Regulation (No. 44/2001), Jurisdiction under Art. 2(1) and Art. 22(4) Brussels I Regulation, jurisdiction in proceedings concerned with IP rights, registration of property of a trade markResumen: El Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea mantiene su jurisprudencia establecida sobre el Art. 22.4 del Reglamento (CE) nº 44/2001 de Bruselas I e interpreta este artículo en sentido estricto. Los tribunales de los Estados miembros en los que se exige el depósito o el registro de patentes, marcas, dibujos y modelos u otros derechos similares solo son competentes en los casos en que se la posible titularidad de ese derecho entra en el ámbito de la disposición general del Art. 2.1 del Reglamento Bruselas I y, por lo tanto, debe ser llevado ante los tribunales de aquel estado miembro en el que el demandado esté domiciliado.Palabras clave: Procedimiento prejudicial, Cooperación judicial en materia civil y mercantil, Reglamento (CE) n° 44/2001, Competencia judicial, Artículo 2, apartado 1, Competencia de los órganos jurisdiccionales del domicilio del demandado, Artículo 22, punto 4, Competencia exclusiva en materia detítulos de propiedad intelectual, inscripción como titular de una marca.

Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt

The European Court of Justice is one of the most important actors in the process of European integration. Political science still struggles to understand its significance, with recent scholarship emphasizing how closely rulings reflect member states’ preferences. In this book, I argue that the implications of the supremacy and direct effect of the EU law have still been overlooked. As it constitutionalizes an intergovernmental treaty, the European Union has a detailed set of policies inscribed into its constitution that are extensively shaped by the Court’s case law. If rulings have constitutional status, their impact is considerable, even if the Court only occasionally diverts from member states’ preferences. By focusing on the four freedoms of goods, services, persons, and capital, as well as citizenship rights, the book analyses how the Court’s development of case law has ascribed a broad meaning to these freedoms. The constitutional status of this case law constrains policymaking at the European and member-state levels. Different case studies show how major pieces of EU legislation cannot move beyond case law but have to codify its principles. Judicialization is important in the EU. It also directly constrains member-state policies. Court rulings oriented towards individual disputes are difficult to translate into general policies, and into administrative practices. Policy options are thereby withdrawn from majoritarian decision-making. As the Court cannot be overruled, short of a Treaty change, its case law casts a long shadow over policymaking in the European Union and its member states, undermining the legitimacy of this political order.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 319
Author(s):  
Barbara Pietrzyk-Tobiasz

<p>Smells are an unusual way of communication, allowing not only for the creation of associations in the minds of the recipients, but also for evoking certain emotions. Therefore, they are used in marketing strategies and they may become trade marks. Unfortunately, until the adoption of Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, these signs were, in principle, excluded from registration. This was due to their inability to meet the requirement of graphic representation as understood by the criteria established by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. However, under this Directive, this requirement was abolished and replaced by the criterion of so-called representativeness of the sign. The purpose of this article is to present olfactory marks from both a marketing perspective and the admissibility of their registration, as well as to analyze the practice of registering them before and after the adoption of Directive 2015/2436.</p>


Author(s):  
Monika Domańska ◽  
Dawid Miąsik ◽  
Monika Szwarc

The Court of Justice of the European Union operates on a case-by-case basis. This means that its decisions normally relate to specific problems occurring in a specific Member State. Consequently it is often hard to ‘translate’ this case law into the national legal system of a different Member State. Nevertheless the case law of the Court of Justice has consequences not only for the individual Member States. It also has harmonising effects. In this sense, the principles of primacy and of direct effect of EU provisions, as well as the obligation to interpret domestic law in conformity with EU law, operate as the minimum requirements which the legal systems of Member States must fulfil. Poland joined the European Union in May 2004. At that time the number of Member States increased to 25. The existence of avenues of judicial protection in the EU raised a number of questions from the very beginning. Now, after 15 years of experience it is time to consider the standard of application of EU law by Polish courts.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1099-1130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamás Szabados

AbstractIn several golden share cases, the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “Court”) condemned Member States for reserving certain special rights in privatized companies for themselves. In spite of the Court's consistently strict approach in the golden share cases, the more recent golden share judgments demonstrate that the Court's practice is not free from uncertainties. In its case law, the Court seems to hesitate between the application of the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital. Additionally, it is not entirely clear which measures are caught by provisions on the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (31) ◽  
pp. 24-36
Author(s):  
Valentin Paul Neamt

Abstract The present paper presents the obligation that courts in the member states of the European Union have to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, with a focus on courts against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under national law. The paper starts by presenting the applicable framework regarding the preliminary reference procedure, then focuses on analyzing the exceptions to national court’s duty under article 267 TFEU, with a focus on the direction in which the case law is heading based on the most recent judgments handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2015, finally presenting the author’s conclusions and observation on the subject.


2013 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olga Łachacz ◽  
Rafał Mańko

Abstract The paper analyses and evaluates the linguistic policy of the Court of Justice of the European Union against the background of other multilingual courts and in the light of theories of legal interpretation. Multilingualism has a direct impact upon legal interpretation at the Court, displacing traditional approaches (intentionalism, textualism) with a hermeneutic paradigm. It also creates challenges to the acceptance of the Court’s case-law in the Member States, which seem to have been adequately tackled by the Court’s idiosyncratic translation policy.


Teisė ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
Vilius Kuzminskas

The article discloses the fixed exclusion regulation of Clause 346 in the Treaty of Function of the European Union in different EU member states. A further assessment of different relevant judicial approaches to regulation are disclosed and evaluated in accordance with the European Court of Justice case law and procurement in the defense area doctrine.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-34
Author(s):  
Darius-Dennis Pătrăuș

The non bis in idem principle was first established in the Hammurabi Code (2,500 BC), under the name of res judicata pro veritate habetur.According to the non bis in idem principle, "no one is allowed to be summoned again in court or punished in another criminal case for the same criminal offense for which he has already been convicted or acquitted under the law of a state". The non bis in idem principle has a broad field of application in the field of international judicial cooperation in criminal matters.The harmonization of Member States' laws and the abolition of borders at EU level created the premises for the widespread application of the non bis in idem principle.For this reason, the Court of Justice of the European Union has been charged with interpreting the rule, namely the non bis in idem principle, as regulated in art. 54 CISA.At the present stage of regulation, an interpretation contrary to the non bis in idem principle would be likely to erode the right and affect international judicial cooperation in criminal matters.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 41-56
Author(s):  
Anna Kosińska

The present study seeks to answer the question whether the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union in cases concerning the exercise of broadly understood cultural policies may in reality affect the extent of implementation of cultural rights—that is, access to products of culture, participation in cultural life and freedom of artistic creativity—at the level of Member States. Cultural rights are traditionally regulated by the constitutions of EU Member States and are classified by legal scholars and commentators as second generation rights. Culture, in turn, according to primary legislation of the European Union, is only a supporting competence (Article 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). However, a review of the Court’s case law demonstrates that CJEU’s judgments form standards that contribute to a more effective implementation of cultural rights guaranteed in the national law of the Member States and international agreements to which they are parties. This results from the nature of the Union’s law, which penetrates a national system and thanks to the principle of direct effect and supremacy truly affects the situation of EU citizens.


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