A Study on the Improvement of the Differential Subsidy Rate System for the Social Welfare National Subsidy Program: Focusing on Infant Care-Education Fees and Child Allowances

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 389-415
Author(s):  
Geun Seok Hong ◽  
Jeong Bin Yim
2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (7) ◽  
pp. 3211-3233
Author(s):  
Ping Xiao ◽  
Ruli Xiao ◽  
Yitian (Sky) Liang ◽  
Xinlei (Jack) Chen ◽  
Wei Lu

Rural consumers may face not only the challenge of affordability but also the problem of limited accessibility. Can a government’s subsidy program effectively address these issues? This paper examines the impact of a large-scale subsidy program, “Household electrical appliances going to the countryside,” offered by the Chinese government. The government regulation imposes a price subsidy combined with a price ceiling on products in the program. We consider two effects of the subsidy: the retail price is lowered to make the product more affordable to consumers, and manufacturers are encouraged to expand their distribution coverage to make products more accessible to consumers. We build a dynamic model of oligopoly to study how firms adjust their distribution coverage. Conditional on the model estimates, we evaluate the program’s effects on social welfare, consumer surplus, and firms’ market performance and marketing channel decisions through counterfactual analyses. We find that the subsidy program increases social welfare by CNY 0.209 billion, as a result of a subsidy expense of CNY 0.236 billion. When breaking down the impact, we find it increases consumer surplus by CNY 0.184 billion (50%), manufacturers’ profits by CNY 0.125 billion (53%), and manufacturers’ payoffs by CNY 2.5 million (17%). Specifically, 14% (13.2%) of the consumer surplus (firm profit) increases are from changes in distribution coverage, and the rest is from the subsidy (price changes). The program’s return of investment (i.e., social welfare minus subsidy expense), which is negative, however, could be improved by applying a relatively lower subsidy rate. This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmad Bello Dogarawa ◽  
Suleiman Muhammad Hussain
Keyword(s):  

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (11) ◽  
pp. 1280
Author(s):  
Zixuan Wang ◽  
Xiuzhang Li

In the competitive market environment, the growth of new energy vehicles (NEVs) faces many obstacles. Demand subsidy or production regulation-related policies are widely used to promote the development of NEVs. A comparative analysis of the effects of the two types of policies on the competitive vehicle market requires further study. To fill this gap, we investigate which type of policy is more preferable from the perspective of the social planner. In this paper, we construct a Stackelberg game with a welfare-maximizing social planner and two profit-maximizing manufacturers producing NEVs and fuel vehicles (FVs), respectively. Interestingly, although both types of policies can increase the quantity of NEVs, demand subsidy also promotes the growth of total vehicles at the same time; in contrast, production regulation reduces the total vehicles. Moreover, compared with the benchmark that no policy intervention, demand subsidy generally improves social welfare, while production regulation improves social welfare only with high consumer preference for NEVs. Nevertheless, production regulation always has a positive impact on the environment, whereas demand subsidy may have a positive impact only when the NEV is very environment friendly. The numerical results show that consumer environmental preferences and the regulation of environmental impact determine which type of policy dominates the other.


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