Amiya Kumar Bagchi. The Political Economy of Underdevelopment. London: Cambridge University Press. 1982. Reprint 1983. pp.viii+276. List of books for further reading; Index. Price: £ 8.50 (paperback edition).

1985 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-82
Author(s):  
Zia Ul Haq
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Third World ◽  
Social Process ◽  
Growth Strategies ◽  
Cambridge University ◽  
Working Classes ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The Third World

Amiya Kumar Bagchi, an eminent economist of the modern Cambridge tradition, has produced a timely treatise, in a condensed form, on the development problems of the Third World countries. The author's general thesis is that economic development in the developing societies necessarily requires a radical transformation in the economic, social and political structures. As economic development is actually a social process, economic growth should not be narrowly defined as the growth of the stock of rich capitalists. Neither can their savings be equated to capital formation whose impact on income will presumably 'trickle down' to the working classes. Economic growth strategies must not aim at creating rich elites, because, according to the author, "maximizing the surplus in the hands of the rich in the Third World is not, however, necessarily a way of maximizing the rate of growth".

Lessons of the Oil Crisis for the Third World

1975 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 515-522
Author(s):  
György Adam
Keyword(s):  
World Bank ◽  
Third World ◽  
Development Aid ◽  
World Bank Group ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Oil Crisis ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
Bank Group ◽  
The Third World

The author argues that the so-called oil crisis may open out a new perspective on development aid to the Third World if the oil-producing countries, instead of allowing the giant Western banks and corporations to make a grab for their petro dollars (as the Western nations had so far made a grab for incredibly cheap oil energy), decide to pool the surplus oil revenues for self-help among the Third World countries. He suggests the setting up of an interregional Third World Bank, which, unlike the existing World Bank group (typecast as the instrument of the rich market economies), would be the instrument of the developing countries, thus breaking the monopoly of the West in international financing.

scholarly journals Abrupt Climate Chang: Time Is Tight

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 127
Author(s):  
Jan-Erik Lane
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Carbon Capture ◽  
Third World ◽  
Climate Change Policy ◽  
The Third ◽  
Change Policy ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Global Coordination ◽  
The Third World ◽  
Rich Countries

The new theme of abrupt climate change (“Hawking tipping point”) must be taken up by global coordination – the UNFCCC, IPCC and the G20. The only policy response is to reinforce the COP21 project, and start managing its quick implementation of decarbonisation. A more decisive climate change policy – no coal or charcoal, solar power parks, and possibly carbon capture – may not guarantee the goal of + 2 degrees Celsius, but it may help avoid climate chaos. Only global coordination can break through the resistance of markets in the rich countries and governments in the Third World together with vibrant civil society. The large COP21 Secretariat must become a management agency for rapid decarbonisation with support from other global bodies (WB, IMF) and the G20.

The “Resource Curse”: Lessons of the Third World

2015 ◽  
pp. 28-39
Author(s):  
V. Shmat
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Natural Resources ◽  
Third World ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
Resource Curse ◽  
The Third ◽  
National Institutions ◽  
Resource Nationalism ◽  
The Third World ◽  
First World

According to the hypothesis known as the “resource curse”, natural resources abundance is a brake on economic growth of many Third World countries. But is it really so? The author believes there are deeper reasons why the Third World in general – regardless of the amount of raw material resources available in each country – cannot achieve the same level of welfare as the First World. The “resource curse” theory looks for the origins of the resourceful countries’ economic problems in the institutional sphere. But this seems misleading because of excessively narrow “here and now” approach. The economic and socio-political institutions of individual countries are regarded in short periods of time when “curse” declared itself. Its typical manifestations, such as rent-seeking, stagnation or degradation of the institutions, authoritarian power, snowballing public debt and symptoms of Dutch disease, were seen in many Third World countries long before the development of the major sources of raw materials and regardless of the availability or absence of them. Therefore, it seems appropriate to speak of a kind of “three-fold institutional curse” as an explanation of continuing underdevelopment of many countries and territories. Poor national institutions in the Third World countries are not actually caused by the presence or absence of concentrated natural resources. This is the result of prior historical development with series of discrete transitions from one condition to another: from colonial status – to independent statehood; from poverty – to unexpected wealth mostly based on the exploitation of the natural resources. Qualitative transformation of national institutions usually lags far behind. As a consequence, institutional development enters into a state of stagnation (inhibiting or destabilizing economic growth) that can stretch for very long periods of time. The author concludes that the presence or absence of resources, in fact, has no fundamental impact on the nature of socio-economic development of Third World countries. The major reason hindering institutional progress has external nature, that is heavy economic dependence on the First World (coupled with informal political subordination). This circumstance begets the “resource nationalism” by the developing countries – exporters of raw materials and fuel. History of “resource nationalism” provides a useful lesson for Russia whose economy is features by growing dependency on resources. Acknowledgement. The article has been supported by a grant of the Russian Science Foundation. Project № 14-18-02345.

Crime, Justice, And Underdevelopment: The Palestinians Under Israeli Control

1988 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elia Zureik
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Third World ◽  
Modern Society ◽  
Crime Rates ◽  
Value Systems ◽  
Community Based ◽  
The Third ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
The Third World ◽  
The Relationship

Orthodox theories of crime in the Third World and in regions of uneven economic development offer a unilinear explanation of the relationship between economic development and increased crime rates. Simply stated, this Durkheimian position views the transition from traditional to modern society as being associated with the weakening of mechanical forms of solidarity and the emergence of secular and impersonal role structures based on a complex division of labor. Universalistic and achievement criteria replace ascriptive and particularistic values, and deviance-derived social control models based on formalized coercive sanctions substitute for traditional and community-based forms of control. Anomic behavior, frustration of expectations, and norm violation are considered an expected, if transitory, outcome of social change, and are explained on the basis of a clash between modern and traditional value systems.

Environmental characteristics and organizational ideology: UNCTAD—the lessons of 1964

1978 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-160
Author(s):  
Javed A. Ansari
Keyword(s):  
Third World ◽  
Commodity Prices ◽  
Trade Policies ◽  
Poor Countries ◽  
Negotiated Settlement ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The Third World ◽  
Rich Countries

THE United Nations Conference on Trade and Development came nto existence in 1964. Its creation was viewed with a degree of cautious enthusiasm by the Third World and with a certain amount of apprehension by the rich countries. Its performance has dampened the enthusiasm and heightened the apprehension. Its contribution to substantive changes in trade policies has not been spectacular. Whatever improvement in commodity prices and hence in the terms of trade of the poor countries that occurred in the early 1970s was attributable to fortuitous circumstances – not to a negotiated settlement between the rich and poor countries, enabling the latter to retain a larger portion of the gains from trade. Can we3 therefore3 say that UNGTAD has been ineffective? That it has failed to perform its global task? And if so, what is the cause of this failure? Is the organizational ideology unsuitable in the sense that it is not representative of the national objectives of viable coalitions among UNGTAD constituents? Or has the leadership failed to evolve a strategy which links the pursuit of specific sub-goals to the transformation of the system in accordance with the organizational ideology? This present paper attempts to look at the first question and to venture an opinion on the effectiveness of UNGTAD in the light of these findings.

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