scholarly journals Life sentence penalty and extradition under article 3 of the ECHR: A leading case of the European Court of Human Rights

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dr.Sc. Mario Antinucci

Life sentence penalty covers a diverse range of practices, from the most severe form of life imprisonment without parole, in which a person is sentenced to die in prison so long as their sentence stands, to more indeterminate sentences in which at the time of sentencing it is not clear how long the sentenced person will spend in prison. Dealing with the question whether the extradition of a person to a foreign state where is accused of a crime for which a sentence of life imprisonment can be imposed can potentially violate article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.What all these sentences have in common, however, is that at the time the sentence is passed, a person is liable to be detained for the rest of his or her natural life. We all know “The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules” and relevant international instruments on the rehabilitation of imprisonment, but at the moment more than 73 States in the world retain life imprisonment as a penalty for offences committed while under the age of 18. General perspective of criminal justice reform in Latin America should take into a right account the meaning of life - imprisonment penalty under article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

2013 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-512 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Szydło

The recent judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECtHR’ or ‘the Court’) in Vinter and Others reflects a very significant change in the Court's attitude to those actions of the states parties to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘the Convention’ or ‘the ECHR’) that consist in the imposition and further execution of whole life sentences. In this judgment, the Court concluded that Article 3 of the Convention – which prohibits torture, inhuman or degrading punishment – requires the reducibility of all whole life sentences as imposed by national courts, in the sense of a review mechanism which allows domestic authorities to conclude whether in the course of a life sentence the legitimate peno-logical grounds justifying the further incarceration of a life prisoner still exist. Moreover, such a mechanism or possibility for review of a whole life sentence must be provided for by a national law and, consequently, must be known to a life prisoner already at the moment of imposition of the whole life sentence. What is also important, a life prisoner, at the outset of his/her sentence, must know when (i.e. after how many years) and under what conditions a review of his/her sentence will take place or may be sought, and what he/she must do to be considered for release. Otherwise, the very imposition of a life sentence by a national court infringes Article 3 of the Convention.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Spano

In its landmark 2013 judgment of Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights held that a life sentence which is not de jure and de facto reducible amounts to a breach of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading punishment, as enshrined in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The author, a judge of the Strasbourg Court, analyses the Vinter judgment both as it stands alone as well as how it fits into and, now, influences the Court’s case-law on Article 3 and 5 of the Convention, before reviewing the procedural requirements laid down by the Court for a ‘Vinter review’ of life sentences. In doing so, the author examines the underlying tensions between the conception of penal policy as falling within the exclusive domain of domestic decision-making and the individualistic and dignitarian notion of human rights in which the Convention system is firmly grounded. The article is based on the 2016 Bergen Lecture on Criminal Law and Criminal Justice which the author gave on 26 October 2016 at the Faculty of Law, University of Bergen. 


2011 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seema Kandelia

This article reviews the system of whole life orders in England and Wales, looking in particular at whether such sentences constitute inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This issue came before the European Court of Human Rights in 2008 in the case of Kafkaris v Cyprus. The court held that a whole life tariff would not violate Article 3 as long as there was some possibility that a life sentence was de jure or de facto reducible. The possible grounds for the release of a prisoner serving a whole life sentence in England and Wales is, however, extremely limited. This article will assess to what extent the release procedures regarding whole lifers meet the criteria laid down by the European and domestic courts and whether there is any realistic hope of release for prisoners sentenced to whole life orders.


2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-171
Author(s):  
Nezir Pivić ◽  
Lejla Zilić-Čurić

Sentencing to life imprisonment is not in contrast with human rights issued in European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. However, the sentenced imposed to life imprisonment and system to of its execution must meet certain standards to be compatible with requirements stated in Article 3 of European Convention. The subject of our research paper are mentioned standards that Contracting States have to respect in terms of enforcing the sentence of life imprisonment. Introduction to the subject of the research is given in the form of penological review of life imprisonment as well as review of internationally established legal standards under the umbrella of the United Nations and the Council of Europe that relate to sentencing and enforcement of life imprisonment. In focus of this research paper is case law of the European Court of Human Rights that refer to life imprisonment. In that context, the focus of this research paper deals with the issue of the relationship between life imprisonment and prohibition of torture as human right that is absolutely protected and the issue of the Contracting States’s margin in appreciation in prescribing the form and conditions of revision of the sentence. The intention of the authors is focused on the legal analysis of Strasbourg case law on issue of compatibility of life imprisonment with the requirements of the Article 3 of the European Convention and to present the standards generated by Strasbourg case law regarding the implementation and mechanism of revision of life imprisonment.


Author(s):  
Thomas Klein ◽  
Katrin Treppschuh

Protocol No. 16 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which came into force in August 2018, enables the member States to request the European Court of Human Rights to give advisory opinions on questions of principle relating to the interpretation and application of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto. The German Government does not consider it necessary to sign and ratify Protocol No. 16 at the moment referring to the well-developed constitutional protection of Human rights in Germany. This article critically assesses this view and argues that the possibility to apply to the Court for advisory opinions can contribute to making Human rights protection in Germany more effective.


Author(s):  
Dzhuzha О. M. ◽  
◽  
Melnychenko І. P. ◽  

The article provides a legal analysis of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in such cases like “Vinter and Others v. The United Kingdom”, “Hutchinson v. The United Kingdom”. The European Court of Human Rights has established key standards for those sentenced to life imprisonment, compliance with which will ensure that this type of punishment meets the requirements of the Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Such standards are: 1) sentencing of life imprisonment is not prohibited and does not conflict with the Article 3 or any other article of the Convention. The imposition of “non-reducible” life imprisonment may raise questions of compliance with the requirements of the Article 3 of the Convention; 2) in decision making whether life imprisonment can be considered as “non-reducible”, it is necessary to establish whether the person convicted to life imprisonment had any prospect of release. If national law provides for the possibility of reviewing life imprisonment regarding its mitigating, reducing, terminating or releasing, this is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of th Article 3 of the Convention; 3) for the purposes of the Article 3 of the Convention it is sufficient that life imprisonment is reducible de jure and de facto; 4) European penitentiary policy is currently focusing on the correctional purpose of imprisonment, in particular until the end of long prison sentences; 5) at the very beginning of the sentence a person convicted to life imprisonment has the right to know what he must do to consider the possibility of his release and under what conditions the sentence will be reviewed or also in what order a request to this may be made; 6) if domestic law does not provide for any mechanism or possibility to review life imprisonment, then the non-compliance with the requirements of the Article 3 of the Convention occurs at the time of imposition of life imprisonment and not at a later stage. The importance of such standards separating of the European Court of Human Rights for the national theory and practice of life imprisonment is that these provisions are effective guidelines for determining the prospects of releasing from sentencing in the form life imprisonment. Key words: European Court of Human Rights, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, case law, convict, life imprisonment.


Author(s):  
Puzyrov M. S. ◽  
◽  
Pekhovskyi A. Yu. ◽  
Shtupun Yu. D. ◽  
◽  
...  

The article is dedicated to the analysis of the domestic legislation on release from serving a sentence in the form of life imprisonment. It has been found out that life imprisonment is the most severe type of punishment in many countries of the world. This fact leads to lively scientific and practical discussions around the legal regulation of certain aspects of its implementing and serving. The issue of release from serving this type of punishment is especially acute, as human rights organizations emphasize the lack of an effective mechanism for release from serving a sentence in the form of life imprisonment in Ukraine, which contradicts not only a number of international normative and legal acts but also the basic principles of a democratic society which should not deny a person in the opportunity to re-socialize. A review of international norms relating to this area of legal relations is maintained. The main models of release from serving a sentence in the form of life imprisonment on the example of foreign experience are considered. It is concluded that the current model of release from serving a sentence in the form of life imprisonment in Ukraine is inconsistent with the provisions of Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the principle of humanism, and therefore has no prospects for further development and requires significant transformation, because the institution of presidential pardon is rather exceptional and does not create a really functioning mechanism of release from serving a sentence in the form of life imprisonment, but only creates additional problems in the law enforcement process. These shortcomings of the existing model of release from serving a sentence in the form of life imprisonment in Ukraine have been highlighted, in particular, by the European Court of Human Rights. It is substantiated that the current initiatives aimed at making changes in this area at the level of normative and legal acts are an important but insufficient step to solve this problem. Therefore, the relevant amendments should be made in the Criminal and Criminal Executive Codes of Ukraine and further detailed at the sub statutory level. Making such amendments will not only allow to bring the provisions of domestic criminal and criminal-executive legislation in line with high international standards of human rights protection, but also in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine, which is the Basic Law of our state. Key words: life imprisonment, release from serving a sentence, pardon, legislation, foreign experience.


2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-130
Author(s):  
Miodrag Simović ◽  
Marina Simović ◽  
Vladimir Simović

In the system of measures of societal reaction towards the perpetrators of criminal offences, all the modern criminal laws, including the new legislation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, recognise sentences in the first place. They are the main types of criminal sanctions whose purpose can be achieved to the fullest, and that is the protection of society and social goods from all forms and types of injury and threat caused by the commission of criminal offences. Given that in the structure of criminal offences occur those with serious consequences, violating the highest social values, committed with a severe form of guilt by a repeat offender, in concurrence or by a group or organised crime group, it is logical that all penal systems recognise the harshest sentence - longterm or life imprisonment - especially after the abolition of the death sentence - capital punishment, for the severest forms of crimes. The paper analyses issues related to the harshest sentence, long-term, or life imprisonment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the special emphasis on the European Court of Human Rights case law.


2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.


Author(s):  
Guido Raimondi

This article comments on four important judgments given by the European Court of Human Rights in 2016. Al-Dulimi v. Switzerland addresses the issue of how, in the context of sanctions regimes created by the UN Security Council, European states should reconcile their obligations under the UN Charter with their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights to respect the fundamentals of European public order. Baka v. Hungary concerns the separation of powers and judicial independence, in particular the need for procedural safeguards to protect judges against unjustified removal from office and to protect their legitimate exercise of freedom of expression. Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary is a judgment on the interpretation of the Convention, featuring a review of the “living instrument” approach. Avotiņš v. Latvia addresses the principle of mutual trust within the EU legal order and the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention.


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