Life Meaning Life: Is There Any Hope of Release for Prisoners Serving Whole Life Orders?

2011 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seema Kandelia
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Life Meaning ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
European Court ◽  
Life Sentence ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
Degrading Treatment

This article reviews the system of whole life orders in England and Wales, looking in particular at whether such sentences constitute inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This issue came before the European Court of Human Rights in 2008 in the case of Kafkaris v Cyprus. The court held that a whole life tariff would not violate Article 3 as long as there was some possibility that a life sentence was de jure or de facto reducible. The possible grounds for the release of a prisoner serving a whole life sentence in England and Wales is, however, extremely limited. This article will assess to what extent the release procedures regarding whole lifers meet the criteria laid down by the European and domestic courts and whether there is any realistic hope of release for prisoners sentenced to whole life orders.

Bringing People Down

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 433-466
Author(s):  
John Vorhaus
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Corporal Punishment ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
Relational Concept ◽  
Degrading Treatment ◽  
As If

Under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, degrading treatment and punishment is absolutely prohibited. This paper examines the nature of and wrong inherent in treatment and punishment of this kind. Cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) as amounting to degrading treatment and punishment under Article 3 include instances of interrogation, conditions of confinement, corporal punishment, strip searches, and a failure to provide adequate health care. The Court acknowledges the degradation inherent in imprisonment generally, and does not consider this to be in violation of Article 3, but it also identifies a threshold at which degradation is so severe as to render impermissible punishments that cross this threshold. I offer an account of the Court’s conception of impermissible degradation as a symbolic dignitary harm. The victims are treated as inferior, as if they do not possess the status owed to human beings, neither treated with dignity nor given the respect owed to dignity. Degradation is a relational concept: the victim is brought down in the eyes of others following treatment motivated by the intention to degrade, or treatment which has a degrading effect. This, so I will argue, is the best account of the concept of degradation as deployed by the Court when determining punishments as in violation of Article 3.

scholarly journals The legal meaning of the terms "torture", "inhuman treatment or punishment", "degrading treatment or punishment" and their distinction in the decisions of the European commission of human rights and the European court of human rights

2021 ◽  
pp. 26-33
Author(s):  
Khrystyna YAMELSKA
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Criminal Code ◽  
European Convention ◽  
European Court ◽  
Convention Against Torture ◽  
Degrading Treatment ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Jus Cogens ◽  
Legal Meaning

The paper reveals the legal meaning of the terms "torture", "inhuman treatment or punishment", "treatment or punishment that degrades human dignity". A distinction between these concepts is made on the examples of court decisions of European courts, taking into account the individual circumstances of each case. The genesis of the origin of the above concepts is investigated through a prism of the decisions of the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. The paper reveals the absolute nature of the "jus cogens" norm of Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The author proposes to modernize the Ukrainian criminal legislation on the reception of the position of the European Court of Human Rights on the delimitation of these concepts. In contrast to the European convention regulation of ill-treatment, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the author notes that the Ukrainian legislation regulates this issue quite succinctly. The Article 127 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine provides a definition only of torture, which in essence coincides with the definition of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the position of the European Court of Human Rights. The paper notes that the practice of Ukrainian courts shows that a distinction (similar to that provided by the European Court of Human Rights) is not implemented.

I respingimenti in mare di migranti alla luce della Convenzione europea dei diritti umani

2009 ◽  
pp. 591-607
Author(s):  
Alfredo Terrasi
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
North African ◽  
European Court ◽  
Degrading Treatment ◽  
Migration Flows ◽  
High Seas

- Italian authorities have recently undertaken a new policy to face migration flows from north african coasts. Since May, 6th 2009 Italian coastguard and financial police vessels have intercepted a large number of boats carrying migrants and returned them to Libya, in force of a readmission agreement between Italy and Libya. These operations, even if they take place on the high seas, have to comply with the European Convention for Human Rights, considering that the migrants fall under jurisdiction of Italian authorities within the meaning of art. 1 of the Convention. In particular, on the basis of the European Court of Human Rights case law, it can be argued that returning migrants to Libya, as long as they can be exposed to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment, is prohibited by art. 3. Moreover, art. 4 or the Fourth Protocol prohibits the collective expulsions of aliens. Notwithstanding, it's uncertain whether forcible return of aliens is consistent with the latter provision considering that the European Court requires that aliens ‘leave the country' in order to apply art. 4. In the end the praxis of Italian authorities is inconsistent with the Convention non-refoulement obligation deriving from art. 3.

When interpreting domestic legislation courts must, so far as it is possible, read and give effect to such legislation in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights; see s3(1). Hence domestic courts are given a degree of latitude – reference to the jurisprudence of Strasbourg is mandatory – but it need only be taken into account. Legislation must be construed in a manner compatible with the Convention but only so far as is possible. Three points are particularly worth noting: • When applying the European Convention on Human Rights a domestic court should be prepared to take a generous view as to whether an activity falls within the protection afforded by the Convention’s articles. • The Convention is to be regarded as a ‘living’ or ‘dynamic’ instrument to be interpreted in the light of current conditions. More recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights will be regarded as carrying more weight than earlier decisions. • Where an Article of the Convention permits some state interference with the enjoyment of a right, a court assessing the extent to which that interference is compatible with the Convention should consider (i) whether the interference is provided for by law; (ii) whether it serves a legitimate purpose; (iii) whether the interference is proportionate to the end to be achieved; (iv) whether it is necessary in a democratic society; (v) whether it is discriminatory in operation; and (vi) whether the state should be allowed a margin of appreciation in its compliance with the Convention – that is, be allowed to apply the Convention to suit national standards. The ‘quality of law test’

1996 ◽  
pp. 88-88
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
National Standards ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Domestic Court ◽  
European Court ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
Domestic Legislation ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
State Interference

scholarly journals Freedom of Religion and Freedom from Religion

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (01) ◽  
pp. 3-13 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Religious Freedom ◽  
Well Being ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Freedom Of Religion ◽  
Religious Expression ◽  
European Court ◽  
Religious Extremism ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
The Right

The right to freedom of religion, enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights has been frequently tested, both in UK courts and in the European Court of Human Rights, where successive decisions over a number of years led to the establishment of several well-known principles. However, in recent years religious extremism has brought into focus a tension between the right of freedom of religious expression and the well-being of individuals (not least children) and society. The Strasbourg court requires neutrality on the part of the state and its courts. However, unlike the European Court of Human Rights, the domestic courts have had to face situations where religious observance can be seen to be causing serious harm and where interference in religious freedom and family life has been shown to be justified.

scholarly journals “Verticalised” cases before the European Court of Human Rights unravelled: An analysis of their characteristics and the Court’s approach to them

2020 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 246-263
Author(s):  
Claire Loven
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Main Topic ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Private Actor ◽  
European Court ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Private Actors ◽  
Domestic Level

Based on Article 34 European Convention on Human Rights, individual applications must be directed against one of the Convention States. Originally ‘horizontal’ cases therefore must be ‘verticalised’ in order to be admissible. This means that a private actor who had first brought a procedure against another private actor before the domestic courts, must complain about State (in)action in his application to the European Court of Human Rights. Recently, some scholars and judges have raised procedural issues that may arise in these cases, but generally, these ‘verticalised’ cases have remained underexplored. To unravel verticalised cases before the ECtHR and to better understand procedural issues that may arise from them, this article provides a deeper understanding of the origins of verticalised cases and the Court’s approach to them. It is explained that verticalised cases before the ECtHR can be very different in nature. These differences are rooted in the different types of horizontal conflicts that may arise on the domestic level, the different relations between private actors they may concern, and the different Convention rights that may be at stake. The wide variety of verticalized cases is also reflected in the Court’s approach to them, as is the second main topic that the present article explores.

Principles Corroborated by Practice? The Use of Country of Origin Information by the European Court of Human Rights in the Assessment of a Real Risk of a Violation of the Prohibition of Torture, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 302-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Femke Vogelaar
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Country Of Origin ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
European Court ◽  
Real Risk ◽  
Consistent Manner ◽  
Standard Set ◽  
Degrading Treatment

This article studies the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) approach to country of origin information in its case law under Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights. It will first examine the standard set by the ECtHR on the use of country of origin information, followed by an assessment of the application of these principles by the ECtHR in its case law. The article specifically focusses on the use of country of origin information in expulsion cases of applicants from Somalia, Tamils applicants from Sri Lanka and applicants from Iran. The analysis of the ECtHR’s case law in this article will show that the ECtHR does not apply its own standards in a transparent and consistent manner. This raises questions as to the quality of the ECtHR’s assessment of the risk of a violation of Article 3.

scholarly journals Life sentence penalty and extradition under article 3 of the ECHR: A leading case of the European Court of Human Rights

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dr.Sc. Mario Antinucci
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Severe Form ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Life Imprisonment ◽  
Diverse Range ◽  
Criminal Justice Reform ◽  
Form Of Life ◽  
European Court ◽  
Life Sentence ◽  
The Moment

Life sentence penalty covers a diverse range of practices, from the most severe form of life imprisonment without parole, in which a person is sentenced to die in prison so long as their sentence stands, to more indeterminate sentences in which at the time of sentencing it is not clear how long the sentenced person will spend in prison. Dealing with the question whether the extradition of a person to a foreign state where is accused of a crime for which a sentence of life imprisonment can be imposed can potentially violate article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.What all these sentences have in common, however, is that at the time the sentence is passed, a person is liable to be detained for the rest of his or her natural life. We all know “The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules” and relevant international instruments on the rehabilitation of imprisonment, but at the moment more than 73 States in the world retain life imprisonment as a penalty for offences committed while under the age of 18. General perspective of criminal justice reform in Latin America should take into a right account the meaning of life - imprisonment penalty under article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

scholarly journals Rethinking Suresh: Refoulement to Torture Under Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms

2009 ◽  
pp. 125-160
Author(s):  
David Jenkins
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
European Court ◽  
Canadian Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Convention Against Torture ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
United Nations Convention ◽  
Degrading Treatment

This article takes the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Saadi v. Italy and uses it as an opportunity to re-examine the Canadian case of Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration). The author argues that the national security exception in Suresh is no longer tenable in light of subsequent developments in both international and Canadian law. The author concludes that the Supreme Court of Canada should reject the Suresh exception at its first opportunity and adopt an approach to review of refoulement cases similar to that under the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

scholarly journals ‘To me, fair friend, you can never be old’, William Shakespeare, ‘Sonnet 104’: ECHR at 70 Rudolf Bernhardt Lecture, 202

2021 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 895-916
Author(s):  
Başak Çalı
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
William Shakespeare ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
European Court ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Good Proxy ◽  
Mature Part ◽  
Over Time

This article undertakes a survey of the changes in the structure of the interpretive doctrines of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) over time in an exploration of the aging of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or the Convention) on its 70th anniversary. It argues that the Court’s interpretive doctrines that seek to give due deference to national rights traditions, canons and institutions have become increasingly pervasive in the Court’s procedural and substantive case law in the last two decades. This, in particular, has come at a loss for interpretative doctrines that interpret the Convention as a practical and effective living pan-European instrument. This argument is built in four parts. First it offers a defence of why a study of the interpretive doctrines of the Court over time is a good proxy for studying the ECHR’s ageing process. In the second part, it discusses the rich doctrinal forms of due deference and effective interpretation in the case law of the Court – both young and mature. Part three explains how the judicialisation and expansion of the European human rights system in late 1990 s transitioned to a more heightened and sophisticated focus on due deference doctrines in the Court’s case law. Finally, part four examines whether the recent judicial innovations under the Court’s Article 18 case law and the widely celebrated success of increased ownership of the Convention by domestic courts can act as counter points to the argument that the effective interpretation principle has suffered a loss as the Convention has aged, concluding that none of this may offset the fact that the Convention at 70 is more conservative in spirit than its younger self.

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