scholarly journals The Intermarium As a Pivotal Geopolitical Buzzword

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-27
Author(s):  
Ostap Kushnir

This article focuses on historical and contemporary connotations of the Intermarium concept—Ukrainian and Polish academic and political thought on how to organize and govern the space between the Baltic and Black seas—employing the ideas of Józef Piłsudski, Józef Beck, Michał Czajkowski (Mykhailo Chaikovs'kyi), Mykhailo Drahomanov, members of the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius, and other intellectuals. In this context, it traces Ukraine’s and Poland’s attempts to construct Intermarium-type intergovernmental frameworks in the aftermath of the Cold War. It also examines the current stage of Ukrainian-Polish co-operation—the latter being regarded by Intermarium founding fathers as a vital precondition for this framework to be realized. In this respect, the article considers bilateral advancements in political, economic, cultural, and security spheres. As the emergence of a Ukrainian-Polish institutionalized linchpin is impossible in the contemporary geopolitical architecture, the article proposes that the term “Intermarium” has become ambiguous. If by chance the Intermarium comes into being as a defensive alliance today, it might bring more harm than benefit to the regional security.

Subject Outlook for Nordic-NATO defence cooperation. Significance The Russian intervention in Ukraine and assertive stance against NATO -- particular in the Baltic Sea region -- has pushed the Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden to reassess their defence and security policies in order to be better prepared to manage crises and deter aggression in northern Europe. This constitutes a sharp change in strategic outlook, as the Nordic-Baltic region has been characterised by low tensions, stability and continued economic and political integration since the end of the Cold War. Impacts Nordic participation in multilateral international operations may wane as their defence focus shifts to the Baltic region. Scandinavian procurement programmes present commercial opportunities to defence and aerospace firms. Prioritising bilateral security arrangements may fragment a unified US-Nordics approach to regional security. Closer security ties with the West are likely to compromise Scandinavia's negotiating position with Moscow on other issues.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Rob de Wijk

Abstract: The new Russian military doctrine from 2010, the growing international assertiveness of Russia, and eventually the annexation of the Crimea Peninsula in 2014 have forced the West to rethink deterrence strategies vis a vis Russia. Consequently, the old Cold War concept of deterrence was dusted off and the debate picked up from where it had ended in 1990. This article summarizes the end of the Cold War thinking on deterring aggression against NATO-Europe. It explains why the present Western theoretical foundation of deterrence, which still focuses on strong conventional forces backed up by nuclear weapons, no longer suffices, and argues that the new Russian concept of strategic deterrence requires a complete overhaul of the Western approach. It is not only the security of the Baltic member states of NATO or of transatlantic cables that matter, Europe has to cope with desinformation and destabilization campaigns and has to rethink its energy security strategy. Only together can NATO and EU master these challenges.


Author(s):  
Timothy Doyle ◽  
Dennis Rumley

In this chapter we argue that one of the principal inhibitors of sustainable security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region is that the Cold War has yet to end. Strategic concepts and postures reflecting containment, ‘constrainment’, sphere of influence, expansionism, and territorial competition still inhabit the rhetoric not just of the regional security environment. Regional strategies can therefore be interpreted within the framework of Cold War ‘logic’, thus impeding regional security cooperation. The ‘old’ Cold War has thus been perpetuated, reinforced, and reinterpreted as a ‘new’ Cold War due to geopolitical competition over global and regional primacy. Even within this process of geopolitical competition, old geopolitical concepts such as ‘pivot’ and ‘Indo-Pacific’ have also been reinterpreted and reused to justify new strategies that ultimately continue to foster a new Cold War in the region. Indeed, the Indo-Pacific has returned as a central element of the new Cold War.


Author(s):  
Geoff Eley

Certain facts about postwar Europe seem self-evidently true. Undoubtedly the most salient was the division of Europe and the political, economic, social, and cultural antinomies that separated western capitalism from Soviet-style communism in the overarching context of the Cold War. If the Cold War itself stretched across four decades, from the heightening of international tensions in 1947–1948 to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989–1991, the postwar settlement's reliable solidities had already been breaking apart in the 1970s. The global economic downturn of 1973–1974 ended the postwar boom, shelving its promises of permanent growth and continuously unfolding prosperity. In those terms, the core of the postwar settlement lies in the years 1947–1973. This article explores the single most striking particularity of the post-1945 settlement, namely the centrality acquired by organised labour for the polities, social imaginaries, and public cultures of postwar European societies. First, it discusses democracy as a cultural project during 1945–1968. The article then looks at corporatism and social democracy, and concludes by assessing patterns of stability in Europe during the postwar period.


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