scholarly journals Revisiting the Common Ownership of the Earth: A Democratic Critique of Global Distributive Justice Theories

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christiaan Boonen ◽  
Nicolas Brando
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Public Property ◽  
The Earth ◽  
Common Ownership ◽  
Global Distributive Justice ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
The Common ◽  
Justice Theories ◽  
Property Regime

Many theories of global distributive justice are based on the assumption that all humans hold common ownership of the earth. As the earth is finite and our actions interconnect, we need a system of justice that regulates the potential appropriation of the common earth to ensure fairness. According to these theories, imposing limits and distributive obligations on private and public property arrangements may be the best mechanism for governing common ownership. We present a critique of the assumption that this issue can be solved within the private–public property regime, arguing that the boundaries of this regime should not be taken for granted and that the growing literature on the democratic commons movement suggests how this can be accomplished. We consider that, if the earth is defined as a common, the private– public property paradigm must be open to questioning, and democratic commoners’ activities should be considered. 

scholarly journals Immigration, Humanity, and Morality

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sunday Adeniyi Fasoro
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
A Value ◽  
The Earth ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Common Ownership ◽  
Vulnerable People ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One

AbstractThe trend toward the concept of humanity in political theory has arisen largely as a reaction against the mistreatment of vulnerable people such as immigrants. The issue of immigrants’ vulnerability has led political thinkers to ponder on how to apply the principle of humanity to the question of the treatment of immigrants. I would like to address this matter by examining two questions: what is humanity, is it a value property, or a virtue? Does it really matter if the means by which an immigrant immigrates is demeaning to his own humanity as a person? The most common or intuitive reply to these questions would probably be: ‘humanity’ is simply a value-bestowing property, so regardless of immigrants’ actions they are owed respectful treatment. The aim of this paper is to emphasise instead that ‘humanity’ should be conceived as a virtue of actual commitment to act on moral principles. I explore three different meanings of humanity. First, I discuss ‘humanity’ as the common ownership of the earth. Second, I discuss ‘humanity’ as a value property. Third, I discuss humanity as a virtue of acting, on the one hand, with humanity, and on the other hand, on moral principles.

scholarly journals A Boundedly Rational Analysis of Global Distributive Justice

2013 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 99-123
Author(s):  
Alexandru Volacu ◽  
Iris-Patricia Golopenta
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Identification Problem ◽  
Rational Analysis ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Global Distributive Justice ◽  
Complete Failure ◽  
Justice Theories ◽  
National Governments

In the present paper we analyze two prominent global distributive justice theories, i.e. Pogge’s Global Resource Dividend theory (1994) and Dorsey’s maxificing welfarism (2005) under an assumption of bounded rationality. We consider that the agencies responsible for distributing resources are informationally constrained in regard to the assessment of economic positions in society and cognitively constrained in regard to the decision making process within the agency. We argue that under these conditions the distributive patterns prescribed by both theories can be severely distorted. Further, in Dorsey’s case bounded rationality can even lead to a complete failure of the theory, since not only are the resulting distributions sub-optimal if we introduce the possibility for a single mistake in the identification process, but they can also be completely redundant by prescribing distributions which are not capable of lifting a single citizen to the minimum level required for the fulfillment of basic needs. We further show that for both theories the identification problem becomes more severe and that the agencies are more susceptible to make mistakes in circumstances of extreme poverty, i.e. the circumstances primarily targeted by the theories. Aside from this main result, we also obtain three secondary results: 1. we extend the ongoing debates in political philosophy between ideal and non-ideal theories and in particular between fact-insensitivity and fact-sensitivity, 2. we provide a preliminary defense of a proportional distributive principle for global justice and 3. we provide a new starting point for the construction of arguments regarding the nature of the agency (e.g. global government, national governments, UN institutions, international NGOs) entitled to distribute resources in global justice theories.

scholarly journals A Critique of the “Common Ownership of the Earth” Thesis 1

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 33-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arash Abizadeh
Keyword(s):  
Global Justice ◽  
Basic Needs ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Conventional System ◽  
Property Ownership ◽  
The Earth ◽  
Common Ownership ◽  
The Common ◽  
Moral Constraint

In On Global Justice, Mathias Risse claims that the earth’s original resources are collectively owned by all human beings in common, such that each individual has a moral right to use the original resources necessary for satisfying her basic needs. He also rejects the rival views that original resources are by nature owned by no one, owned by each human in equal shares, or owned and co-managed jointly by all humans. I argue that Risse’s arguments fail to establish a form of ownership at all and, moreover, that his arguments against the three rival views he considers all fall short. His argument establishes, rather, a moral constraint on any conventional system of property ownership.

scholarly journals Policy Implications of the Common Ownership Debate

2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 140-149
Author(s):  
Eric A. Posner
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Market Structure ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Policy Responses ◽  
Common Ownership ◽  
The Common

Empirical findings that common ownership is associated with anticompetitive outcomes including higher prices raise questions about possible policy responses. This comment evaluates the major proposals, including antitrust enforcement against common owners, regulation of corporate governance, regulation of compensation of management of portfolio firms, regulation of capital market structure, and greater antitrust enforcement against portfolio firms.

WHITE ANTS DESTROYING LIVING TREES AND CHANGING THF FOLIAGE, IN CAMBRIDGE, MASS

1885 ◽  
Vol 17 (7) ◽  
pp. 134-136
Author(s):  
H. A. Hagen
Keyword(s):  
Dead Wood ◽  
The South ◽  
The Earth ◽  
The Common

The common white ant, Termes flavipes, destroys dead wood, stumps of trees and timber, just as does its nearest relative, T. lucifugus, in Europe. Of the latter species some cases are reported where living pines and oaks have been destroyed in the South of France. For T. flavipes, only one case is known, in which living grape vines in a hot house in Salem were injured. (S. H. Scudder. Proc. Boston, N. H. S., vol. 7, p. 287). Now the earth in the hot houses here in Cambridge is largely infested by white ants, but as far as I know, no destruction of plants has been observed. I was very much interested by the information from Mr. F. W. Putnam that in a garden in Irwing street living maples were largely infested by white ants. The evidence of the truth of this information was apparent by the first glance at the trees.

scholarly journals XXIII. On the degree of salubrity of the common air at sea, compared with that of the sea-shore, and that of places far removed from the sea

1780 ◽  
Vol 70 ◽  
pp. 354-377 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
The Earth ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Common ◽  
In The Beginning ◽  
Bodies Of Water

Sir, As you had recommended to me the examination of the air at sea by the nitrous test, I followed your advice in my return to the Continent in the beginning of November last: and I embraced that opportunity with the more eagerness, as I knew that you had given credit to the account of several consumptive people having recovered their health by going on sea voyages, after the common means for curing that distemper had failed. I was in hopes likewise to find in this inquiry, a confirmation of what you conjectured in you Anniversary Discourse in the year 1773, viz . that great bodies of water, such as seas and lakes, are conducive to the health of animals, by purifying and cleansing the air contaminated by their breathing in it: so that the salutary gales, by which this infected air is conveyed to the waters, and by them returned again to the land, though they do rise now and then to storms and hurricanes, must nevertheless induce us to trace and to reverse in them the ways of a beneficent Being, who, not fortuitously, but with design, not in wrath, but in mercy, thus shakes the waters and the air together, to bury in the deep those pestilential effluvia which the vegetables upon the face of the earth are insufficient to consume.

Justice and Authority in Investment Protection

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Oisin Suttle
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
International Investment ◽  
International Consensus ◽  
International Investment Law ◽  
Investment Protection ◽  
Global Distributive Justice ◽  
Investment Law

Abstract What role should concerns about distributive justice play in international investment law? This paper argues that answers to fundamental and contestable questions of social and global distributive justice are a necessary, if implicit, premise of international investment law. In particular, they shape our views on the purpose of investment law, and in turn determine the scope of authority that investment law can claim, and that states should accord it. The implausibility of achieving international consensus on these questions constitutes a substantial objection to the harmonization of investment law or the consistent operation of a multilateral investment court.

Is there a Duty to Prevent Harm in Tort? A Common Law Perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-145
Author(s):  
Paula Giliker
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Public Authority ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
Statutory Duty ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Legal Position ◽  
The Common

Abstract In this paper, I will examine the extent to which the common law of tort in England and Wales imposes a duty to prevent harm on public authorities and private individuals. As will be seen, the starting point for the common law is that such liability should, in both cases, be regarded as exceptional. This must, however, be weighed against duties to prevent harm that arise under the torts of negligence and breach of statutory duty. Public authorities may also face claims that their failure to prevent harm is in breach of ECHR arts 2 or 3. While the law is complex, this paper identifies three key arguments that explain the current legal position at common law, namely that: (i) tort law should treat private and public parties alike: (ii) human rights claims should be treated as distinct from private law claims and (iii) libertarian concerns signify that a duty to prevent harm should be exceptional and needs to be justified. While these arguments provide both an explanation of and a justification for the current law, this article questions to what extent the treatment of public authority liability may be regarded as unduly harsh on vulnerable claimants.

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